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ABSTRACT 
 
 
THE ROLE OF ALVISE GRITTI WITHIN THE OTTOMAN POLITICS IN THE  
 
CONTEXT OF THE “HUNGARIAN QUESTION” (1526-1534) 
 
 
 
Otman, Elvin 
M.A., Department of History 
Supervisor: Assist. Prof. Dr. Mehmet Kalpaklı 
September 2009 
 
Alvise Gritti is one of the most interesting and vivid characters appeared in 
both Ottoman and European history of the sixteenth century. As an Istanbul-born 
Venetian, Gritti was the son of Andrea Gritti, the Doge of Venice elected in 1523, 
from a non-Muslim Ottoman woman. Since he was accepted as illegitimate 
according to the Venetian law, he was deprived from the right of participation into 
the Venetian politics. He found the opportunity of having a political carrier in 
Istanbul, his birth place, where he had come to engage in commerce; mediated 
between the Ottoman sultan and the European states; and undertook important tasks 
in the “Hungarian Question”, which was considered as one of the most important 
political problems of the period.  
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 This thesis intends to peruse the life and the roles of Alvise Gritti within the 
Ottoman politics. In this context, besides the political conjuncture of the period, the 
family, the personality, and the extensive commercial and political networks of 
Alvise Gritti and the tasks that he undertook as part of the “Hungarian Question” 
mainly by light of the Venetian sources.  
 The thesis reaches the conclusion that Alvise Gritti is one of the “versatile 
personalities” of his time; he advanced through the present political system and 
deposed by the same system whenever he started to use it for his benefits. Thus, it 
was deduced that the examination of the life of Gritti and his political roles is 
important and necessary not only to reveal a figure rarely appeared in the Ottoman 
history but also to understand the general political structure and the diplomatic 
relations of the period more clearly.  
 
Keywords: Alvise Gritti, Gritti Family, Beyoğlu, Suleyman I,  Ibrahim Pasha, 
Charles V, Ottoman-Habsburg rivalry, “Hungarian Question” János Szápolyai, 
Italian Wars, Balance of Power, Universal Sovereignty.  
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ÖZET 
 
 
“MACARİSTAN MESELESİ” BAĞLAMINDA ALVİSE GRİTTİ’NİN OSMANLI 
SİYASETİ İÇERİSİNDEKİ ROLÜ (1526-1534) 
 
 
Otman, Elvin 
Yüksek lisans, Tarih Bölümü 
Tez Yöneticisi: Yard. Doç. Dr. Mehmet Kalpaklı 
Eylül 2009 
 
Alvise Gritti on altıncı yüzyıl Osmanlı ve Avrupa tarihinde görülen en ilgi 
çekici ve renkli karakterlerinden biridir. İstanbul doğumlu bir Venedikli olan Alvise 
Gritti, 1523 yılında Venedik Doçu seçilen Andrea Gritti’nin gayr-ı Müslim bir 
Osmanlı kadınından olma oğludur. Venedik yasalarına göre gayr-ı meşru çocuk 
kabul edilmesinden dolayı Venedik siyasetine katılma hakkından mahrum 
bırakılmıştır. Venedik’te bulamadığı siyasi kariyer fırsatını, ticaret yapmak için 
geldiği ve aynı zamanda doğum yeri olan İstanbul’da bulmuş; Osmanlı Sultanı ve 
diğer Avrupa Devletleri arasında arabuluculuk yapmış ve dönemin en önemli siyasi 
sorunlarından biri olarak değerlendirilen “Macaristan Meselesi”nde önemli görevler 
üstlenmiştir.  
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 Bu tez çalışması Alvise Gritti’nin hayatı ve Osmanlı siyaseti içinde üstlendiği 
rolleri incelemeyi amaçlamaktadır. Bu bağlamda, dönemin genel siyasal yapısının 
yanı sıra çoğunlukla dönemin Venedik kaynaklarının ışığında, Alvise Gritti’nin aile 
yapısı, kişiliği ve İstanbul’da sahip olduğu geniş ticari ve siyasi bağlantıları 
tartışılmış ve Gritti’nin “Macaristan Meselesi” kapsamında üstlendiği görevler 
incelenmiştir.  
 Tez, Alvise Gritti’nin dönemin çok yönlü insan tipolojisinin güzel bir örneği 
olduğu, mevcut siyasal sistem sayesinde yükseldiği ve kazanımlarını kendi çıkarları 
doğrultusunda kullanmaya başlayınca da yine kendisini yükselten sistem tarafından 
alaşağı edildiği sonucuna varmıştır. Bu sebeple, Gritti’in yaşamının ve siyasi 
rollerinin incelenmesinin hem Osmanlı tarihinde eşine ender rastlanan bir figürün 
açığa çıkarılması hem de dönemin siyasal yapısının ve diplomatik ilişkilerinin daha 
iyi anlaşılması bakımından önemli ve gerekli olduğu ortaya çıkmıştır.  
 
Anahtar Kelimeler: Alvise Gritti, Gritti Ailesi, Beyoğlu, I. Süleyman, İbrahim 
Paşa, V. Karl, Osmanlı-Habsburg rekabeti, “Macaristan Meselesi”, János 
Szápolyai, İtalya Savaşları, Güçler Dengesi, Evrensel Hâkimiyet.  
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CHAPTER I 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Alvise Gritti1 (1480-1534), an Istanbul born Venetian merchant, can be considered as 
one of the most fascinating personalities of the first half of the sixteenth century. He 
was the son of Andrea Gritti, who was elected as the Doge2 of Venice in 1523, and 
his mother was non-Muslim Ottoman woman with whom the Doge lived in Istanbul 
during his office. Since his birth was not within Catholic marriage, Gritti was not 
only considered as an illegitimate child according to the Venetian law but also he 
was deprived of the right of participating into political life of the Venetian Republic 
which was offered to every Venetian patrician. Nevertheless, he found the 
opportunity of obtaining a political career in the Ottoman State which he could not 
acquire in Venice. While he was engaging in commerce in Istanbul, he also served as 
a mediator between the Ottoman sultan and the representatives of some European 
states. Moreover, he played decisive roles in the “Hungarian Question”, which was 
considered to be one of the most important political affairs of the period. 
                                                 
1 Alvise was the Venetian use of the Italian name Luigi and Latin name Ludovico. In the ancient 
Venetian dialect the name was used in the form of Aluigi. The French use of the name is Aloisio. 
Besides these, the Ottomans pronounced and used the name in the documents as Lovizo or Lovize. 
For that reason some of the documents and studies concerning Alvise Gritti referred to him with 
various uses of his name. In this study the Venetian use of the name, Alvise is going to be used in 
reference to the Venetian origin of the studied character.  
2 Doge or Dose as in Venetian dialect, meaning duke, was the name given to the princes of Venice.  
The term also used for the princes of Genoa. For detailed information about the term, its etymology 
and use see “Doge” in Giuseppe Boerio, Dizionario del Dialetto Veneziano, (Venezia: Premiata 
Tipografia di Giovanni Cecchini Editioni, 1856). 
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 Alvise Gritti is a good example of the typology of “versatile personalities” of 
the Renaissance period. He controlled an extensive and effective international 
commercial network in Istanbul. He was introduced to the Ottoman politics 
especially through his intimate friendship with the Grand Vizier Ibrahim Pasha. 
Furthermore, due to the great wealth that he acquired from the international 
commerce, he lived a fascinating life in Istanbul. His palace witnessed great festivals 
and entertainments; moreover, many intellectuals and artists were patronized by 
Alvise Gritti himself. The biographers of Gritti mention that even the Ottoman Sultan 
Süleyman I attended some of the festivals organized in his palace and went there 
with Ibrahim Pasha to consult the state affairs with Gritti. As the Doge of Venice was 
perceived as an ordinary bey, prince, by the Ottomans, Gritti was called as Beyoğlu3, 
the son of the Prince, in Istanbul and the district of Pera where his palace was 
located was also called Beyoğlu, with reference to his epithet especially in the 
nineteenth century.4   
 There are a variety of sources to analyze Alvise Gritti, his fascinating life and 
political roles that he undertook within the Ottoman Empire and Hungary. Among 
the primary sources, it can be argued that the biographies of Alvise Gritti have the 
                                                 
3 Besides the meaning of prince, bey is also an appellation in Ottoman which means “sir”. In Ottoman 
orthography it spells as beg oglı and in most of the Ottoman documents this spelling were used. 
However in the present text, the modern Turkish form of spelling will be used. 
4 Pera was one of the three important districts of Istanbul at that time, meaning literally “opposite 
side” in Greek. It took this name because of its opposite situation to the Golden Horn in which the 
Ottoman Palace was situated. Pera was the settling area of the non-Muslim subjects of the Ottoman 
Empire and the foreigners, especially merchants and diplomats. Especially, after 1535 in which the 
right oh having permanent ambassador in the Ottoman capital given to French, this zone started to 
became the center of embassies. On the other hand, due to its being countryside, the residences of the 
wealth merchants was situated here. The second name of the district was Beyoğlu and it is argued that 
this name was derived from a son of a famous prince living there. For this prince, there had been two 
speculations, first Alexios Komnenos, the Byzantine Prince converting to Islam; lived in this district in 
the time of Mehmed II, the second is Alvise Gritti, the son of Venetian doge Andrea Gritti who had 
been called as bey, prince by the Ottomans. Since in some the Ottoman documents, Alvise Gritti, 
himself, was called with his epithet rather than his name, the second proposition seems more accurate. 
For the name of Beyoğlu and its history see:  “Beyoğlu”, Dünden Bugüne İstanbul Ansikolopedisi, 
(İstanbul: Kültür Bakanlığı-Tarih Vakfı, 1994), 212-218, Halil İnalcık, “Istanbul”, The Encyclopedia 
of Islam: New Edition, (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1978), v. 4, 224-248. 
3 
 
most important role to understand and interpret of the character. The accounts of his 
chamberlain Francesco Della Valle, who entered the service of Gritti in 1531, are 
considered as the most important source about the Venetian. 5  After providing 
preliminary information about the personality and the Istanbul life of Alvise Gritti, 
Della Valle thoroughly narrated his activities in Hungary after 1531. Not 
surprisingly, the author emphasized the tragic death of Gritti and attempted to display 
his grandeur to the Venetian audience.  
 Besides his own biography, the biography of Andrea Gritti, his father, gives 
the researchers preliminary information about Alvise Gritti. It is evident that Andrea 
Gritti was one of the prominent personalities to be examined thoroughly in order to 
understand Alvise Gritti and his life. A good first hand source about Andrea Gritti is 
his biography which was written by Niccolò Barbarigo and published in Venice in 
1686. 6  While giving detailed information about Andrea Gritti and his life, 
achievements and his actions in the Venetian politics, Barbarigo draw a general 
portrait of the father Gritti. Moreover by comparing and contrasting the father and 
the son Alvise, Barbarigo displayed the impact of Andrea Gritti on the personality 
and actions of his son. 
                                                 
5 Francesco della Valle, Una breve narracione della grandezza, virtù, valore et della infelice morte 
dell’Illustrissimo Signor Conte Alouise Gritti, del Serenissimo Signor Andrea Gritti, Principe di 
Venezia, Conte del gran Contado di Marmarus in Ongaria et General Capitano dell’esercito Regno, 
appresso Sulimano Imperator de Turchi, et alla Maesta del Re Giovanni Re d’Ongaria, (Venice, c. 
1525). This biography is conserved within the Biblioteca Nazionale Marciana of Venice under the 
collocation of Itt. Cl. 6. Cod. 122 (6211). This biography was published with the edition of Iván Nagy: 
Francesco Della Valle, Una breve narracione della grandezza, virtù, valore et della infelice morte 
dell’Illustrissimo Signor Conte Alouise Gritti, del Serenissimo Signor Andrea Gritti, Principe di 
Venezia, Conte del gran Contado di Marmarus in Ongaria et General Capitano dell’esercito Regno, 
appresso Sulimano Imperator de Turchi, et alla Maesta del Re Giovanni Re d’Ongaria, , Magyar 
Történelmi Tár, ed. by Iván Nagy v. 3 (Pest: 1857), 9-60. In the present study the citations  are given 
according to the edition of Nagy rather than the original manuscript. 
6  Niccolò Barbarigo, Vita del Serenissimo Andrea Gritti Prencipe di Venetia, (Venice, 1686). 
Biblioteca Nazionale Marciana, Itt. Cl. 7. Cod. 1590 (7976).  
4 
 
 Another important source of information was the relazioni7, of the Venetian 
baili 8 . These reports were classified and published by Eugenio Albèri in three 
volumes between the years of 1850 and 1855.9  These reports comprise detailed 
information about the political, diplomatic and commercial affairs of the time from 
the eyes of the Venetian baili and drew a general picture of the Ottoman State and its 
administration. The relazioni which were based on the first hand observations are 
one of the most significant sources that can be utilized to enlighten the Ottoman 
history in general. The reports concerning the first half of the sixteenth century 
include important details about Alvise Gritti, Ibrahim Pasha and the Ottoman Sultan 
Süleyman I and their reciprocal relations. Although the information given by them 
are usually exaggerated and misinterpreted, it is crucial to understand the mentality 
of both the Venetian Republic and the Ottoman State.  
 Furthermore, the unpublished documents conserved within the Archivio Stato 
di Venezia, Venetian State Archive, are decisively instrumental to analyze the 
relations of Alvise Gritti with Venice. The correspondences between Andrea Gritti, 
the Doge of Venice, and his son Alvise and the letters and dispatches of the Venetian 
representatives and Consiglio dei Dieci, the Council of Ten, offer qualified data to 
the researchers. The correspondences clearly reveal that all events that occurred in 
the Republic, in Italy and even in Europe was reported to Alvise Gritti and the 
Republic asked his opinions and advises when needed. Moreover, Alvise Gritti was 
perceived as a source of information about the Ottomans and used by the 
                                                 
7 Relazione, in plural relazioni, was the reports of the Venetian representatives charged in foreign 
states. Every representative should compose a relazione and present it before the Venetian Senate after 
having concluded his office.  
8 Bailo, in plural baili, was the name of the Venetian ambassador of Istanbul. Besides his role of 
representation of the Venetian Republic, the bailo was the head of the Venetians living in Istanbul.    
9 Relazioni degli Ambasciatori al Senato, ed. by, Eugenio Albèri, serie. 3, v. 1-3, (Florence, 1840-
1855) 
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Serenissima 10  as an unofficial representative mediating between itself and the 
Ottoman administration.  
 Besides the unpublished documents, the collection of Marino Sanuto named I 
Diarii11is an important source of information. Sanuto noted down everything that 
was said and done in councils and assemblies of the Venetian Republic; observed the 
documents conserved in the secret archives of the state and composed a huge 
collection of registers including the entire documents of the Venetian Republic 
concerning the domestic and foreign relations. Since the registers were composed in 
a form of a diary, the data were offered in a chronological order to the researchers. I 
Diarii are certainly important to utilize in order to understand the structure of the not 
only the Venetian Republic but also the other states being in relation with itself.  
  Apart from the Venetian documents the Ottoman materials are also utilized 
in the studies based on Alvise Gritti. Some of the Ottoman documents conserved in 
the Archivio di Stato di Venezia under the classification of Documenti Turchi, 
Turkish Documents, include brief information about Alvise Gritti, which is very 
instrumental to interpret his role within the Ottoman State. 
 Apart from the documents, the pamphlets and the informative books written 
on the subject of cose dei Turchi, the issues about the Turks, contain detailed 
information about Alvise Gritti and the Ottoman Empire. At this point it is important 
to mentioned two works of the contemporaries of Gritti:  Benedetto Ramberti12 and 
Luigi Bassano da Zara13. Their travel accounts based on their own observations about 
the Ottoman Empire, its administration, political and social life are very useful to 
                                                 
10 Serenissima was the epithet of the Venetian Republic. The Venetians called their Republic as the 
Serenissima Republica, the Most Serene Republic.  
11 Marino Sanuto, I Diarii, ed. by Rinaldo Fulin, (Bologna: Forni Editore, 1879-1903) 
12 Benedetto Ramberti, Libri Tre Delle Cose de Turchi, (Venice, 1539) 
13 M. Luigi Bassano da Zara, I Costumi et i Modi Particolari de la Vita de’ Turchi, Roma: 1545, 
republished by Franz Babinger, (Monaco di Baviera: Casa Editrice Max Hueber, 1963).  
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gather information about Gritti and the state in which he could find to have a political 
career. Moreover, these accounts present the readers the general perceptions of 
Europeans concerning the Ottoman Empire and the Ottomans in the sixteenth 
century.  
 As well as the primary sources, there are numerous secondary sources about 
Alvise Gritti, his life and role in the sixteenth century. It can be argued that the 
Istanbul-born Venetian merchant has been popular among the researchers since the 
nineteenth century. Not surprisingly, the preliminary works about him were 
conducted in Europe, especially in his areas of action namely Austria and Hungary. 
 The first comprehensive and significant study about Alvise Gritti was 
conducted by the Austrian specialist Heinrich Kretschmayr in 1890. In his eminent 
work entitled Ludovico Gritti: Eine Monographie14, which has been used by his 
successors as a reference book, Kretschmayr presented a comprehensive 
monographic study with reference to his research that he made in the Italian, 
Austrian and Hungarian archives. After discussing the personal characteristics of 
Gritti and his family connections, Kretschmayr argued that the rise of the Venetian 
merchant to the one of the most important political roles in the Ottoman Empire was 
related to his clever and adroit personality, full of the personal talents of diplomacy. 
He also pointed out that the position within the Ottoman politics and exceeding 
authority in Hungary which he gained in a very short period of time allured him: He 
intended to succeed the Hungarian throne because of this ambition he got entangled 
with the enigmatic and complex political conflicts and was killed by the Hungarians 
because of his claims over the kingdom. Although the work of Kretschmayr was a 
masterpiece encouraging the further studies on Alvise Gritti, the author let off with 
                                                 
14 Heinrich Kretschmayr, Ludovico Gritti: Eine Monographie, (Vienna: 1896).   
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associating the rise, success and death of Alvise Gritti to his personal talents and 
actions. The main political structure of the period and its effects on the personage 
were mainly ignored. Nevertheless the monographie of Kretscmayr provides the 
reader a general portrait of the personality and presented most of the related 
documents including the correspondences of Alvise Gritti, mainly in Latin, which 
were brought to light by the archival research of the author in the appendix part of 
the book.  
 The insufficient sides of the study of Kretschmayr were intended to be dealt 
with almost a century after by the Hungarian historian Gábor Barta. His article 
written in 1971 was translated into Turkish and published by Vural Yıldırım with the 
title of Gritti Ludovicus’un Macar Valiliği, in 2008.15 In the article, by discussing the 
new information about the activities of Alvise Gritti in Hungary and the reactions of 
the Hungarian magnates against him, Barta pointed out the general socio-political 
structure of Hungary in the first half of the sixteenth-century. In this context,  he 
established a correlation between the role of Gritti and the circumstances of the 
period. The statements of Barta was followed and developed by a Venetian historian 
Carla Coco in his article named Alvise Gritti fra Veneti, Turchi e Ungheresi, 16 
especially by the light of the correspondences between Andrea and Alvise Gritti. 
 The studies on Alvise Gritti and his activities in Hungary were developed by 
Aurel Decei. In his study, Decei tried to understand the role and the function of 
Alvise Gritti in both the Ottoman Empire and Hungary. As a result of his extensive 
research in the Ottoman archives, Decei formulated his argument according to the 
unpublished Ottoman documents. One of the main contributions of his research to 
                                                 
15 Gábor Barta, “Gritti Ludovicus’un Macar Valiliği (1531-1534).” Belleten, v. 72, no: 263 (April 
2008), 251-293.  
16  Carla Coco, “Alvise Gritti fra Veneti, Turchi e Ungheresi”, Studi Miscellanei Uralici e Altaici, ed 
by. Andrea Csillaghy, no: 20, (Venice: Libreria Editrice Cafoscarina, 1984), 379-396.  
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the literature was the presentation of a report written by Alvise Gritti in 1533 and 
sent to the Ottoman Sultan Suleyman I concerning his activities in Hungary. His 
research was translated into French, developed by other newly found Ottoman 
documents and published by Jean Louis Bacqué- Grammont ans Christian Feneşan in 
1992.17 This study based on an extensive research showed the influence of Alvise 
Gritti within the Ottoman Empire and in a sense verified the arguments of the former 
studies from the Ottoman perspective.  
 Another important work about Alvise Gritti and his role in Hungary, was the 
prominent book of Ferenc Szakály entitled Ludovico Gritti in Hungary 1529-1534: A 
Historical Insight into the Beginnings of Turco-Habsburgian Rivalry 18 , which 
discusses the Gritti phenomenon within the context of Hungary and its internal 
conjunctures. As an important component of the researched period, Szákaly 
discussed the Ottoman intervention in Hungary and the Ottoman-Habsburg rivalry of 
the sixteenth century which entirely changed the inner structure of the Hungarian 
Kingdom and caused the emergence of a political chaos. Moreover, Szákaly argued 
that the Ottoman Empire intended to use its famous “gradual methods of conquest”19 
also in Hungary and used Gritti as a mediator in order to implement the Ottoman 
structure into the Hungarian territories. According to Szákaly, this policy failed in 
Hungary because the Hungarian structure was so different from the Balkan territories 
in which the policy was exercised successfully; and Alvise Gritti was disposed in this 
chaotic situation when he indented to push the limits of his power and authority.  
                                                 
17 Aurel Decei, “Aloisio Gritti au Service de Soliman Le Magnifique d’aprés des documents Turcs 
Inédits (1533-1534), Anatolia Moderna-Yeni Anadolu, ed. by Jean Louis Bacqué-Grammont and 
Christina Feneşan, v. 3 (1992), 1-103.  
18 Ferenc Szakály, Lodovico Gritti in Hungary 1529-1534: A Historical Insight into the Beginnings of 
Turco-Habsburgian Rivalry, (Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadò, 1995).  
19 The theory of “gradual methods of conquest” was presented to the literature of history by the 
prominent Turkish historian Halil İnalcık. In the following chapters this theory and its implementation 
in Hungary is going to be discussed thoroughly.  
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 A new approach to Alvise Gritti was brought by the interesting and pioneer 
works of Robert Finlay. Finlay undersigned several articles on the Gritti family, 
Andrea Gritti and his role in the Venetian history and Alvise Gritti. 20   What 
differentiates Robert Finlay from the other scholars dealing with Alvise Gritti is the 
fact that, besides the discussions on the general political conjuncture of the period, 
Finlay established a cultural background which provides the reader to understand the 
general perception of the contemporary peoples and the cultural atmosphere of the 
contemporary states. At this point two articles of Finlay come into prominence: in Al 
Servizio del Sultano: Venezia, i Turchi e il Mondo Cristiano, 1523-1538, Finlay 
pointed out how Alvise Gritti was perceived within the Venetian Republic and the 
Republic’s reactions to his activities by using mainly the Venetian documents. On 
the other hand, in his Prophecy and Politics in Istanbul: Charles V, Sultan Suleyman, 
and the Habsburg Embassy of 1533-1534, the author conducted a similar account 
from the Ottoman perspective, and stated the perception of Alvise Gritti among the 
Ottoman statesmen based on some prophecies rounding around the Venetian. 
Finlay’s accounts became very significant in understanding thoroughly the role of 
Alvise Gritti both in the political and cultural environments of the period. 
 The most recent and comprehensive study about Alvise Gritti was conducted 
by the Italian historians Gizella Nemeth Papo and Adriano Papo. In their chef 
d’œuvre entitled Ludovico Gritti: Un Principe Mercante del Rinascimento tra 
Venezia I Turchi e La Corona D’Ungheria, the authors did not only analyze the 
                                                 
20 The articles of Robert Finlay utilized in this thesis are “Al Servizio del Sultano: Venezia, i Turchi e 
il Mondo Cristiano, 1523-1538”, “Renovatio Urbis”: Veneto nell’età di Andrea Gritti (1523-1538), 
ed. by Manfredo Tafuri (Roma: Officina Edizioni, 1984) 78-118; “Fabius Maximus in Venice: Doge 
Andrea Gritti, the War of Cambrai and the Rise of Habsburg Hegemony, 1509-1530.” Renaissance 
Quarterly, v. 53, no: 4 (winter, 2000), 988-1031; “Politics and the Family in Renaissance Venice: The 
Election of Doge Andrea Gritti.” Studi Veneziani, no: 2, (1978), 97-117;  “Prophecy and Politics in 
Istanbul: Charles V, Sultan Suleyman, and the Habsburg Embassy of 1533-1534”, Journal of Early 
Modern History, v.2, no: 1, (1998) ,1-31. 
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entire collection of sources about Alvise Gritti and make a good resume; they also 
investigated the complex personality and networks of relationships of Alvise Gritti 
by concentrating on the Venetian, Ottoman and Hungarian points of view. 
Furthermore, they attempted to categorize the Venetian according to the 
contemporary political and intellectual perception of Renaissance. Besides the rich 
bibliography they used, the authors brought many undiscovered Venetian and 
Hungarian documents and manuscripts in the light. Concerning their statements it 
can be argued that they made one of the most important contributions to the research 
field based on Alvise Gritti and his relations with the Ottoman Empire as well as the 
other European powers.  
 Besides the mentioned works of the foreign researchers, although there is a 
very limited literature about him, Alvise Gritti is a subject of research for the Turkish 
scholars also. Mahmut Şakiroğlu21 and Zeki Sönmez22 introduced Alvise Gritti and 
the Gritti Family to the Turkish researchers and readers. Especially in his book Türk-
İtalyan Siyaset ve Sanat İlişkileri, Zeki Sönmez gives brief information about Andrea 
and Alvise Gritti and argued that these personalities had important contributions in 
the formation of an “Ottoman Renaissance” by patronizing many intellectuals, poets, 
musicians and artists within the Ottoman capital.  
  At this point it would not be inaccurate to argue that Gülrû Necipoğlu 
undersigned the most important contribution of the studies about the Gritti 
phenomenon among the Turkish scholars. In her pioneering article entitled  
Süleyman the Magnificient and the Representation of Power in the Context of 
                                                 
21 Mahmut H. Şakiroğlu, “Gritti Ailesi”, in Dünden Bugüne İstanbul Ansiklopedisi, v. 3, (Istanbul: 
Kültür Bakanlığı-Tarih Vakfı, 1994), 428-429.   
22 Zeki Sönmez, Türk-İtalyan Siyaset ve Sanat İlişkileri, (İstanbul: Bağlam Yayınları, 2006).  
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Ottoman-Habsburg-Papal Rivalry, 23  Necioğlu provided information about the 
regalia including the golden helmet resembling to Papal tiara presented to the 
Ottoman Sultan Süleyman I by the Grand Vizier Ibrahim Pasha. This helmet was the 
product of consortium of Venetian goldsmiths and merchants leaded by Alvise Gritti. 
The helmet was used in the representation of power of the Ottoman Sultan against 
the Habsburg Emperor Karl V in their rivalry of universal sovereignty. While 
discussing the symbolic meaning of the regalia and their use, Necipoğlu pointed out 
that with the Grand Vizier Ibrahim Pasha, Alvise Gritti played an important role in 
the formulation of the ideals of “World Empire” and “universal sovereignty” during 
the reign of Suleyman I.  
 Another important contribution came from Özlem Kumrular. Kumrular wrote 
a brief article named Osmanlı Sarayında ve Avrupa Siyasi Sahnesinde Venedikli Bir 
Sınır Diplomatı: “Mir-İ Venedik Oğlu Alvise Gritti24, about the Venetian by using 
mainly the Spanish documents of the period which are newly discovered. Although 
Kumrular did not discuss the role of Alvise Gritti in Hungary thoroughly and did not 
give sufficient information about his death, her article can be accepted as the first 
most comprehensive study conducted in Turkey.  
 As it was stated before, besides the preliminary study of Özlem Kumrular, a 
comprehensive study about Alvise Gritti has not been conducted up until today in the 
Turkish literature of history. The present study was incarnated on the purpose of the 
clarification the question of why and how Alvise Gritti who was an outsider of the 
Ottoman the state structure and preserved his Christian faith until his death, could 
                                                 
23 Gülrû Necipoğlu, “Süleyman the Magnificient and the Representation of Power in the Context of 
Ottoman-Habsburg-Papal Rivalry.” The Art Bulletin, v. 71, no:  3 (September, 1989), 401-427.  
24 Özlem Kumrular, “Osmanlı Sarayında ve Avrupa Siyasi Sahnesinde Venedikli Bir Sınır Diplomatı: 
“Mir-i Venedik Oğlu” Alvise Gritti.” Tarih ve Toplum: Yeni Yaklaşımlar, no. 6, (Autumn 2007-Winter) 
2008, 39-59. 
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have managed to enter the Ottoman politics and assumed high level political duties. 
Therefore, the life of Alvise Gritti and the roles that he had undertaken in the 
Ottoman politics within the context of the “Hungarian Question” is going to be 
examined thoroughly in the light of the primary sources and former studies to 
understand the circumstances lead him to appear as an important political actor of his 
time.  
 The methodology of the thesis was based on combining the information 
produced on Alvise Gritti from the end of nineteen century to present, and creating a 
comprehensive narrative within the frame of the life of Alvise Gritti and his roles 
within the Ottoman politics. Concerning the aim and the scope of the present study, 
the use of the primary sources is limited with mainly the Venetian documents and 
first hand accounts. In the scope of the archival research, the present author brought 
four new documents about Alvise Gritti to light. The four letters of Alvise Gritti 
written in 1526, now conserved within the collection of Dispacci degli Ambasciatori 
al Senato, are used within this thesis. Since providing the full transcription and 
translation of these documents exceeds the limits and scope of the present study, 
parts of the letters were indented within the text with its English translation. The new 
information inferred from these letters changed the common consent on the date of 
the appearance of Alvise Gritti on the political stage of the Ottoman Empire and the 
Ottoman policy over Hungary. On the other hand, to produce a most coherent and 
comprehensive analyze, the secondary sources based on the Hungarian, German, 
Spanish and French documents and literature are used as a tool of controlling the 
accuracy and relevance of the statements through comparative readings.  
 Moreover some Ottoman documents also reviewed to support the suggested 
ideas. The Ottoman names, letters, and fermans, imperial edicts, found in the 
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Archivio di Stato under the classification of Documenti Turchi, were utilized. 
Moreover, the chronicle of a contemporary Ottoman historian Peçevî İbrahim 
Efendi25 was used to verify the political data given in the text.   
 In accordance with the purpose of the study, this thesis is divided into three 
chapters in which the personality and life story of Alvise Gritti is intended to be 
discussed in relation with the contemporary European and Ottoman political 
conjuncture of the early sixteenth century. The first chapter aims to provide the 
reader background information about the general political conjuncture of Europe as 
well as the Ottoman Empire, and introduce the main political events and concepts 
which are useful to figure out the general context of the period in which Alvise Gritti 
appeared as an important figure. As an important components of the sixteenth 
century political history, the Italian Wars and the Habsburg-Valois struggle in 
Europe is going to be explained briefly and the intervention of the Ottoman Empire 
to the European politics and the occurrence of the “Hungarian Question” will be 
discussed within the context of “balance of power” and “universal supremacy”. 
 After giving brief information about the general political conjuncture of 
Europe and the Ottoman Empire, the following chapters of the thesis focus on the life 
of Alvise Gritti and his roles within the Ottoman politics. The second chapter deals 
with the family background, the personality and the early life of Alvise Gritti by the 
lights of the contemporary Venetian literature based on him and his family and on 
the Ottoman Empire and some archival documents. Alvise Gritti did not rise in the 
Ottoman socio-political and commercial structures all of a sudden, he benefited from 
his family ties and the political and commercial networks which had been created by 
his father Andrea Gritti. Through these networks, he did not only carve out a great 
                                                 
25 Peçevî İbrahim Efendi., Târih-i Peçevî, (Istanbul: Enderun Kitabevi, 1980). 
 
 
14 
 
fortune; but also find the chance of meeting the Ottoman high-ranking officers. On 
the other hand, his growth within a prominent Venetian patrician family under a 
good education provided him good political, diplomatic and cultural skills and made 
him one of the good examples of “versatile personalities” Therefore, besides the brief 
biography of Alvise Gritti including his palace and life in Istanbul, his family and 
relations both with his father and the Venetian republic will be discussed in details to 
draw a general picture of life of and the personal characteristics of Alvise Gritti 
being a basis for understanding his rise within the political life of the Ottoman 
Empire.  
 The final chapter aims at examining the role of Alvise Gritti in the Ottoman 
politics by the light of the information gathered from the previous chapters and 
seeking an answer the principal question of the thesis by analyzing his activities 
concerning the “Hungarian Question”. In this chapter, as being the person who 
introduced Alvise Gritti into the Ottoman palace and politics, Ibrahim Pasha, the 
Grand Vizier of Suleyman I, and his relations with Alvise Gritti are going to be 
examined thoroughly. Furthermore, the emergence and the transformation of a 
succession crisis in Hungary after the death of the Hungarian King Lajos II into a 
tool used in the Ottoman-Habsburg rivalry of the sixteenth century and an 
international question with which the other European potentates occasionally 
interfered. At this point, the participation of Alvise Gritti into the Hungarian affairs 
on behalf of the Ottoman Empire, his activities in Hungary and his transformation to 
a complex, enigmatic and intimidating political figure in both Ottoman and European 
history will be analyzed by the light of the archival documents. Moreover, some 
newly found Venetian documents, which changed the general consent on the year in 
which Alvise Gritti firstly appeared in the Ottoman politics and the Ottoman plans of 
15 
 
Hungary before the Battle of Mohács will be also analyzed and presented to the 
readers.  
 After discussing the life and the roles of Alvise Gritti within the Ottoman 
politics in details, this thesis intends to display the fact that although he was not a 
unique example in the Ottoman History, Alvise Gritti was one of the few non-
Muslims having such a fascinating a political career in the Ottoman State. Alvise 
Gritti could get the chance of acting within the European politics of the Ottoman 
State having a considerably complicated structure in which even the Ottoman 
bureaucrats was not be able to take a part. In this context, besides the personal 
characteristics and effective political and commercial networks that he derived from 
his family, especially from his father Andrea Gritti, the general political conjuncture 
of the sixteenth century crated the figure of “Alvise Gritti” and he was used as a tool 
within the great political plans of the great powers of the time. As his rise, his fall of 
Alvise Gritti was also related to the system. When he became ineffective and even 
dangerous for the states since he had become an enigmatic and hypocrite personality, 
he was overthrown by the political powers which had been provided his rise. In this 
context, a detailed study about Alvise Gritti besides its importance to analyze and 
evaluate quite a rarely seen figure in the Ottoman History, offers the researchers the 
opportunity of drawing a general picture of the sixteenth century political history 
from both the Ottoman and European perspectives. At this point, besides presenting a 
comprehensive evaluation of the former studies, the author hopes to provide a basis 
for further research on this subject in the light of new information revealed in this 
thesis.    
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CHAPTER II 
 
THE POLITICAL CONJUNCTURE IN EUROPE AND THE 
OTTOMAN EMPIRE (1500-1550) 
 
 
Alvise Gritti (1480-1534) was one of the most interesting figures of the first half of 
the sixteenth century. His life started as the son of a Venetian merchant, and he died 
as the Governor of Hungary. He took several duties in the Ottoman Empire like the 
advisor of the Grand Vizier, the mediator of the Hungarian King János Szápolyai, the 
commander of the Ottoman corps in within the Ottoman expeditions in Hungary and 
the unofficial envoy between the Porte and some of the European states like Venice, 
Austria and Hungary. That inconceivable and particular rise of Alvise Gritti cannot 
be fully comprehended by analyzing only his biography; various factors played 
decisive roles in his career. Not surprisingly, one of the most important factors in his 
rise was the general political conjuncture of the first half of the sixteenth century, 
from both the European and that of the Ottoman perspectives. Alvise Gritti was a 
product of the sixteenth century in a sense and he could find the chance of showing 
his personal talents by using the complex political developments of that period. In his 
political career, even in his entire life, his great talent in analyzing the general 
situation and in using the current conditions and opportunities of his time brought 
him success. From this perspective, in order to understand Alvise Gritti and the 
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importance of his role both in the Ottoman and in European History, the general 
European and Ottoman political conjuncture of the early sixteenth century should be 
analyzed carefully.  
 
 
2.1 Political Chaos in Europe: The Italian Wars and the Rise of Habsburg 
Hegemony  
 
The major event in the sixteenth-century European history is most probably the 
Italian Wars. Italian Wars were the series of conflicts that occurred between 1494 
and 1559 among the European States for the hegemony of Italy and in a wider sense 
for the domination of Europe.26  In this period the Italian peninsula was mainly 
divided into three parts. In the south there was the kingdom of Naples, at the center 
there was the Papal State, and in the north there were independent city-states such as 
Venice, Florence, Genoa and Milan. The lack of any political power uniting all these 
small political entities under one umbrella did not only result in the struggles of 
hegemony among the Italian states but it also motivated the great powers to interfere 
with their internal affairs. The Italian states did not hesitate to ask foreign powers for 
help against each other. The long lasting Italian Wars were the consequences of that 
demand for support: In order to prevent the Venetian expansion over its own 
territories the Duchy of Milan encouraged Charles VIII of France to invade the 
peninsula. Although the French forces were expelled from Italy by the allied forces 
                                                 
26 For detailed information about the Italian Wars and their impacts on the European history see: 
Wallace K. Ferguson, Geoffrey Bruun, A Survey of European Civilization, v. I, (Boston: Houghton 
Mifflin Company, 1958), 389-391; Luigi Salvatorelli, A Concise History of Italy: From Prehistoric 
Times to Our Own Day, (New York: Oxford University Pres, 1977), 363-415; Eugene F. Jr. Rice, 
Anthony Grafton, The Foundations of Early Modern Europe, 1460-1559, (New York: W.W Norton & 
Company, Inc., 1994), 135-139; Stephen J. Lee, Avrupa Tarihinden Kesitler, 1494-1789, (Ankara: 
Dost Kitabevi Yayınları, 2002), 63-69.  
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of Venice, the Papacy, the Kingdom of Naples, Spain and the Holy Roman Empire; 
that incident initiated a long period of war on the Italian territories in which the great 
powers of the time aspired to settle their accounts. 
  Among the Italian city-states, the most powerful one was the Republic of 
Venice, possessing the entire territory of North Eastern Italy, the Dalmatian Coast 
from Istria to Albania and Ionian Islands besides the lagoon city of Venice. The 
territories of the Republic were divided into three parts namely the lagoon city, the 
terraferma including the Venetian territories of Venice in the Italian Peninsula apart 
from the lagoon city, and the colonies. Because of the international sea trade, mostly 
with the Ottoman Empire and the oriental ports, the Republic prospered a lot and 
with its military forces composed of a great number of condottieri, mercenary 
soldiers, and its unrivaled naval force, it became one of the major political actors not 
only in Italian but also in international politics. 27  The increasing influence and 
territorial expansion of Venice was considered as a threat for other Italian States and 
the Papacy. To restrain the Republic, the foreign powers were called once again, this 
time by the Papacy, and the League of Cambrai, which was formed by the forces of 
the Papacy, France, Spain and the Holy Roman Empire decisively defeated the 
Venetian army in the Battle of Agnadello in 1509.28 Venice lost its possessions of the 
terraferma, even Padua, and the allied forces started to threaten the shores of the 
Venetian lagoon. Thanks to its successful maneuvers, Venice could gradually 
recover its lost territories within the eight years. On the other hand, in order not to 
face the danger of invasion, the Republic abandoned its aggressive policy and 
focused on the defense of its possessions by avoiding battlefield clashes. Instead of 
                                                 
27 Rice, Grafton, 133-135;  
28 John Julius Norwich, A History of Venice, (London: Penguin Books, 2003), 390-402; M. E. Mallerr, 
J. R. Hale, The Military Organization of a Renaissance State: Venice c. 1400 to 1617, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1984), 221-222.  
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direct interference with the armed struggles, Venice followed a passive but clever 
policy: the Republic generally used the diplomatic maneuvers; tried to benefit from 
the rivalries between the other states and sought to have strong alliances in order to 
stop the marching of any foreign power to its territories.29 Thus, it managed to secure 
its independence until the end of the eighteenth century.  
The conduct of the Italian Wars was changed in the first half of the sixteenth 
century. In 1515, Francis I acceded to the throne of France. His main purpose was to 
wear the crown of the Holy Roman Empire. However, four years later, German 
electoral princes elected Charles I of Spain as the Holy Roman Emperor. As he sat 
on the throne under the name of Charles V of Habsburg, he possessed a world empire 
which included Spain, Austria, the Netherlands and the present day Belgium, the 
Spanish colonies and Burgundy in France, as a result of his family connections.30 
This was a precarious fact for Francis I intending to wear also the imperial crown. 
Hence the French King was worried about the possible advance of Charles V who 
had already possessed a vast empire and could dream of uniting the whole continent 
under his domination. This was a threat not only for France itself, but also for the 
other independent states of Europe. In this context, Francis I decided to limit the 
                                                 
29 For detailed information about the change of Venetian policy after Agnadello see: Finlay, “Fabius 
Maximus..”. For the impacts of the Battle of Agnadello and League of Cambrai on the principles of 
the Venetian republicanism see: Edward Muir, “Was There Republicanism in the Renaissance 
Republics?: Venice after Agnadello”, Venice Reconsidered: The History and Civilization of an Italian 
City-State 1297-1797, ed. by, John Martin and Dennis Romano, (Baltimore & London, The Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 2002), 137-167.     
30 “His paternal grandfather was Emperor Maximilian I (ruled 1493-1519), who married the only 
daughter of the last duke of Burgundy, the heiress of the seventeen provinces of Netherlands and of 
Franche-Comté. His maternal grandparents were the Catholic kings, Ferdinand of Aragon and Isabella 
of Castile; their daughter, Juana, married Philip the Handsome, son of Maximilian I and Mary of 
Burgundy. By 1500, […] deaths in the Spanish royal family […] had left Juana heiress of the Spanish 
kingdoms and made the match of political triumph for the Habsburgs. […] At the death of his father in 
1506, Charles became the duke of Burgundy: at the death of Ferdinand in 1516 […] he became the 
king of Castile and Aragon, and of Naples, Sicily, Sardinia, and the Spanish possessions in the New 
World. When Maximilian died in January, 1519, Charles inherited the Austrian territories of the 
Habsburg archdukes.” Rice, Grafton, 125.  
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advance of Charles V and these two great powers of Europe clashed on the Italian 
Peninsula.  
Francis I intended to control Charles V. Thus he invaded Lombardy in 1521. 
However after a war which lasted for four years, he could not resist the forces of 
Charles V. On February 24, 1525, the French armies were defeated in Pavia, and the 
French King was imprisoned and brought to Madrid by Charles V.31 There was a sole 
solution for the French King: to ask help from another power. In this aspect, he 
returned his face to the East, to the Ottoman Empire which was the other greatest 
power of the time. Consequently, also the Ottoman Empire got involved with the 
European power struggles and the problems of the state system in the continent. The 
Empire would not only use those circumstances for its own interest, but also to 
contribute to the modification and consolidation of European State System in the 
sixteenth century.  
 
 
2.2 Ottoman Intervention: Decisive Maneuvers in the European Politics 
 
 At the beginnings of the sixteenth century, the Ottoman Empire was already 
a world empire, possessing a large amount of territories in three continents. With the 
continual and decisive conquests of Mehmed II, generally known as the Conqueror, 
the Ottoman State became a de facto empire, which consolidated its settlement in 
Anatolia and Rumelia. During his reign (1451-1481), the Empire was expanded to 
the natural frontier of the Danube line, and the Ottoman army started to threaten 
Central Europe. Although the siege of Belgrade failed in 1456 the Ottoman raiders 
                                                 
31 Ferguson, Bruun, 389-390.  
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terrorized the Venetian Friuli in the northeastern part of Italy between the years of 
1468 and 1473.32 The last expedition of Mehmed II was so significant; the city of 
Otranto was stormed and conquered in 1480 under the command of the Grand Vizier 
Gedik Ahmed Pasha. The main purpose of the Ottoman Sultan was evident. He had 
already possessed Constantinople, the capital city of the Eastern Roman Empire, and 
from then the new target was Rome33, and Italy, the historical territories of the 
ancient Roman Empire.34 With the death of Mehmed II in the following year, the 
Ottoman troops abandoned the city and the dreams of the conquest of Italy were 
postponed. With the reign of Selim I (1512-1520), the expansion policy of the 
Empire changed: Selim I gave priority to the conquests in the East. During his time, 
the Eastern frontier was secured and the Middle Eastern and Arab lands, including 
Mecca and Medina, were taken under the Ottoman rule. Thus, a new era began in the 
Ottoman History: the Empire became an Islamic caliphate and the Ottoman sultans 
considered themselves as the protectors of the entire Muslim world.35 Moreover, as a 
result of the conquests, the Empire started to control the richest centers of the transit 
trade and the state incomes vastly increased.36 This political and economic power 
made the Empire one of the greatest powers of the time, playing a determining role 
                                                 
32 Ottoman raiders made numerous incursions in Friuli in the mentioned period. However, the most 
important attack was made in 1478 by Iskender Pasha, the bey, governor, of Bosnia.  Approximately 
fifteen thousand soldiers plundered the region but after having seen the more numerous Venetian 
army, they returned to Bosnia. For further information about the incursions and their perception in the 
Italian political and cultural milieu, see: Mustafa Soykut, Image of the “Turk” in Italy: A History of 
the “Other” in Early Modern Europe: 1453-1683, (Berlin: Klaus Schwarz Verlag, 2001), 54-59.   
33 Rome was perceived by the Ottomans as the Kızıl Elma, Red Apple. The legend of Kızıl Elma 
which was supposed to be a Byzantine legend was about the conquest of Rome. In the legend the red 
apple symbolizes the golden globe situated on the altar of the Church of Saint Peter in Rome and to 
acquire the apple brings about the universal supremacy. At this point the Ottomans also benefited from 
this legend in order to formulate and legitimize their policies based on Rome and Italy. However, the 
Europeans also used this legend in the formulating and legitimating the crusades against the Ottoman 
Empire by displaying the red apple as Istanbul.  
34 For detailed information about the reign of Mehmed II see: Halil İnalcık, The Ottoman Empire: The 
Classical Age 1300-1600, (London: Phoenix, 2000), 23-32. For the objective of conquering the 
Roman territories see: Franz Babinger, Fatih Sultan Mehmed ve Zamanı, (Istanbul: Oğlak Bilimsel 
Kitaplar, 2002), 416-417.   
35 İnalcık, Classical Age, 33-34.  
36 Ibid., 34.  
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in the political history of the sixteenth century, and that fact was more pronounced 
during the reign of Suleyman I (1520-1566).  
The ascension of Suleyman I -the Magnificent for as the westerners, and the 
Lawgiver as the Ottomans referred him- to the throne in 1520 was another turning 
point for the Ottoman Empire. The conquests of his father Selim I had worried the 
Europeans a lot; they had been thinking, after having concluded the expeditions in 
the east, Selim would turn his face to Europe. Therefore, the Pope Leo X had been 
trying to organize a crusade and summoning the European sovereigns to fight against 
Turks. Both Charles V and Francis I had promised that they would go on a crusade 
against the Ottomans and used this cause in their struggle for the imperial crown.37 
However, by the unexpected death of Selim, Europe took a deep breath. Suleyman I 
was considered by the Europeans as a more passive sultan than his father in relation 
to his melancholic attitude. For them, with the death of Selim, “an aggressive lion 
left a meek lamb as successor;”38 but in a short time, they realized that they lapsed. 
As soon as he succeeded to the throne, Suleyman I focused on the expansion in the 
west. The main purpose of the Sultan was marching towards Europe, and firstly he 
attempted to secure the stepping stones to control both the Mediterranean and Central 
Europe. In 1521, he conquered Belgrade, the city which his great-grandfather 
Mehmed II had failed to achieve, and in the following year the Island of Rhodes was 
captured. Suleyman I bided the time to march further in the continent and the 
opportunity occurred in 1525.  
As it was stated above, after the defeat of Pavia, Francis I, the imprisoned 
King of France, asked for help to the Ottoman Sultan. Suleyman I did not hesitate to 
                                                 
37 Halil İnalcık, “Avrupa Devletler Sistemi, Fransa ve Osmanlı: Avrupa’da “Geleneksel Dostumuz” 
Fransa Tarihine Ait Bir Olay”, Doğu Batı,  no: 14, (February-March-April, 2001), 122-142, 122.  
38 “Et certamente pareva a tutti che un Leon arrabiato havesse lasciato un mansueto agnello per 
successore […]”. M. Francesco Sansovino, Gl’Annali overo Le Vite de’Principi et Signori della Casa 
Othomana, (Venice: 1571), 207.   
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reply to the letter of the French King. In his well-known letter, while consoling the 
French King, Suleyman I underlined that the Ottoman armies were always ready for 
a war; this was the signal of an impending Ottoman expedition against the Habsburg 
forces.39 Not surprisingly the Ottoman forces marched towards Hungary, the gate of 
Central Europe in the following year. The Kingdom of Hungary, which consisted of 
the present day Hungary, Transylvania, Slovakia, parts of Ukraine and some parts of 
Austria, was an important power in the East-Central European region from the tenth 
to the mid-sixteenth century.40 It had also played a decisive role in organizing and 
leading struggles against the Ottoman advance in the Balkan Peninsula.41 However, 
because of the unavoidable expansion of the Ottoman State towards Central Europe, 
the Kingdom got caught between the Habsburg and Ottoman Empires. In this 
respect, possessing Hungary became significant for the Sultan not only in terms of 
meeting the Habsburg Emperor for revenge on behalf of the French King and 
limiting the increase of Habsburg influence in Europe but also creating a stepping 
stone for the future Ottoman conquests in Europe towards Austria.  
On August 26, 1526, in the Battle of Mohács,42 the Hungarian forces were 
completely defeated and the Hungarian King Lajos II was killed. Buda was taken 
under the control of the Ottomans. Following the death of the Hungarian King, the 
                                                 
39 “[…] İmdî padişâhlar sınmak ve habs olunmak ‘aceb değildir, gönlünüzü hoş tutup azürde-hatır 
olmayasız. Öyle olsa, imâ def’-i düşmân ve feth-i memalik için seferden hâlî olmayub biz dahi anların 
tarîkine sâlik olup her zamanda memleketler ve sa’b ve hasîn kaleler feth eyleyüp gece gündüz atımız 
eğerlenmiş ve kılıcımız kuşanılmıştır.” The letter of Suleyman I to Francis I was published and 
translated into modern Turkish by Halil İnalcık, see: İnalcık, “Avrupa Devletler Sistemi...”, 127-128.  
40 See: Illustration 6.  
41 For brief information about the history of Hungarian Kingdom before the Ottoman invasion and its 
role in the crusades against the Ottomans see: Paul Coles, The Ottoman Impact on Europe, (London: 
Thames and Hudson, 1968), 79-85; Geza David, “Macaristan”, DİA, v. 26,  289.  
42 About the Battle of Mohács see: Roger Bigelow Merriman, Suleiman The Magnificient 1520-1566, 
(Cambridge & Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1944), 76-96; Géza Perjés, Mohaç Meydan 
Muharebesi, pres. by Şerif Baştav, (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1992); Özlem Kumrular, 
“Orta Avrupa’nın Kaderini Değiştiren Savaş: Mohaç Öncesi ve Sonrası ve Kastilya’da Yankısı”, 
Belleten, v. 71, no: 261 (August 2007), 537-574. For the course of war and military conditions of the 
both Otoman and Hungarian army see: Feridun M. Emecem, “ “Büyük Türk”e Pannoia Düzlüklerini 
Açan Savaş Mohaç, 1526”, Muhteşem Süleyman, ed.by Özlem Kumrular, (İstanbul: Kitap Yayınevi, 
2007), 45-92.    
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overwhelming majority of the Estates, as opponents of the former king, elected the 
Voivode of Transylvania János Szápolyai as the new king on November 10. This 
election was also supported, ipso facto organized, by the Ottoman Empire. The real 
concern of Suleyman I was to create a vassal Hungary under the reign of a vassal 
king owing his authority to himself. In this aspect, it is not surprising to note that the 
Ottoman armies departed from the city of Buda right after the enthronement of 
Szápolyai. However, János Szápolyai was not the only nominee for the Hungarian 
throne. Almost a month after his election, on December 17, other Hungarian princes 
opposing the election of Szápolyai, declared Ferdinand I of Habsburg, the king of 
Bohemia and the archduke of Austria, the new Hungarian king by accentuating his 
family connections with the murdered king. Ferdinand was married to the sister of 
Lajos II. Moreover, Lajos II was the husband of Mary of Habsburg, the sister of 
Ferdinand and Charles V. Since Lajos II did not have a legitimate heir, Ferdinand 
could easily claim for the right of succession to the Hungarian throne.43 This meant 
the opening of not only a new political rivalry in Hungary, but also an international 
power struggle which would deeply affect the political history of sixteenth century 
Europe.  
On the European front, the year of 1526 marked the creation of the League of 
Cognac which was formed by the participation of France, the Papacy, Venice, Milan 
and Florence against the Emperor Charles V in order to expel him from Italy. 
However, the alliance could not achieve its purpose; Charles V seized Milan and the 
imperial troops sacked Rome in 1527.  Two years later, the forces of Francis I were 
decisively defeated at Genoa and the French King was forced to sign the Treaty of 
Cambrai on August 5, 1529 which obliged him to abandon his claims in Italy on 
                                                 
43 Merriman, 81.  
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behalf of the Habsburg Emperor Charles V.44 Therefore, Charles V did not only 
defeat his main rival in the struggle for the crown of the Holy Roman Empire; but 
also gained predominance in European politics. From then on, the only power which 
was able to stop the Habsburg Emperor was as the Ottoman Empire. Not only 
France, but also the Republic of Venice secretly supported, and even provoked, the 
Ottoman Sultan to come to Europe and to face Charles V. The representatives of the 
states rushed between the palaces and supplied information. 
On the other hand, the Ottoman Empire was struggling with the problems in 
Hungary. After the return of the Ottoman troops, Ferdinand marched towards Buda 
with the support of the some Hungarian princes and defeated János Szápolyai in 
1527 and he was declared as the King of Hungary. Thereupon, Szápolyai and his 
forces were obliged to retreat to Transylvania and by the envoys sent to Istanbul, 
Szápolyai asked help from the Sultan in order to regain his authority in Hungary. In 
1529, Suleyman made his second expedition to Hungary, defeated the forces of 
Ferdinand in Buda and crowned Szápolyai as the King of Hungary. Szápolyai 
recognized the supremacy of the Ottoman Sultan and agreed to pay an annual tribute 
to the Empire.45 Although Ferdinand secured the northern and western territories that 
he had possessed before, Hungary became mainly an Ottoman vassal. The Ottoman 
Sultan did not stop in Buda: he marched towards Vienna, the center of the Habsburg 
Austria and besieged the city. The city could not be conquered and Suleyman I had 
to withdraw his forces after twenty three days. However, the Sultan consolidated the 
hegemony of Szápolyai in Hungary.  
The refusal of Ferdinand to abandon his claims over Hungary led to a further 
Ottoman campaign to Hungary in 1532; “[…] in the following year Ferdinand 
                                                 
44 Salvatorelli, 381-382.  
45 İnalcık, Classical Age, 35-36.  
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retained the territory which still held in Hungary but recognized Szápolyai as ruler of 
the greater part of the kingdom.”46 Following the death of Szápolyai, Ferdinand 
revived his claim to possess the whole kingdom. At that point, Suleyman I decided to 
take Hungarian territories under the direct control of the Empire. After long lasting 
struggles in 1541, the Hungarian territories which had been previously held by 
Szápolyai were annexed to the Ottoman Empire and the beylerbeylik, the province, 
of Buda was established. Consequently, the medieval Hungarian Kingdom was 
divided into three parts: the possessions of Ferdinand in the northern and western 
territories, the central part annexed to the Ottoman Empire and the Principality of 
Transylvania, vassal to the Ottoman Sultan. In 1547, Ferdinand abandoned his claims 
on Hungary but secured his previous possessions in return for an annual tribute of 
thirty thousand ducats. The final attempt of Ferdinand was to control Transylvania 
but the Ottoman forces repulsed him once again in 1557, the new beylerbeylik of 
Temesvar was established by the Ottomans in southern Transylvania, and the 
Ottoman dominance was consolidated on the Hungarian lands.47   
 
 
2.3 The Role of the Ottoman Empire on the Rise of the Balance of Power Policy 
in Europe 
 
The participation of the Hungarian lands by the Ottoman Empire was important in 
terms of not only the expansion of the Empire in Eastern-Central Europe, but also the 
                                                 
46 Coles, 86.  
47 For detailed information about the background and the conclusion of Hungarian expeditions of the 
Ottoman Empire see: İsmail Hakkı Uzunçarşılı, Osmanlı Tarihi, v. 2, (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu 
Yayınları, 2006), 323-344; Rhoads Murphey, “Süleyman I and the Conquest of Hungary: Ottoman 
Manifest destiny or a Delayed Reaction to Charles V’s Universalist Vision”, Journal of Early Modern 
History, no: 5, (2001), 197-223.   
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Ottoman role of the consolidation of balance of power in Europe. As it was indicated 
above, by the second half of the fifteenth century, the monarchies stood out in the 
political stage of the continent. These monarchies were the sovereign states under the 
sovereign princes who monopolized all power and justice in their authority. In order 
to consolidate their authority the monarchs used three important tools: a centralized 
bureaucracy formed of the state officials controlled by the monarch, a permanent 
mercenary army and a centralized financial system based on direct taxation. 48 
Besides the monarchs, there were also councils but their missions were not beyond to 
be instrumental in order to advise the monarchs; the last word in the state affairs was 
always belonged to the monarch himself. Therefore, in order to consolidate their 
authority and to convince both the nobility and the people living in their dominions, 
the monarchs used theoretical motives with elaborate propaganda by using the 
symbols and ceremonies. These theoretical claims were basically the religious and 
dynastic motives.49 
At this point, it is important to note that these states were not national states 
and did not have national aims. “The state was identified with the person of the 
monarch and with his dynasty.”50 For that reason, the dynastic marriages were so 
instrumental in the domestic and international policies, as well as the expansion 
patterns of the European monarchies. Similarly, the officers also belonged to the 
person of the monarch. Since they did not have strong national ties, they could easily 
change their patrons according to their personal interest.51 This fact can be proven by 
the existence of several diplomats or military commanders serving for many 
sovereigns, sometimes rivals to each other, and changing easily their patrons.  
                                                 
48 Rice, Grafton, 111-124.  
49 Ibid., 113, 136. 
50 Ibid., 136.  
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Concerning the information given above, it is possible to argue that the most 
important concern of these states was to defend their independent existence against 
any threatening political power. This brought about the emergence of the main 
principle of European states system: the “balance of power”. The “balance of power” 
doctrine intended to prevent the emergence of a great power as a threat for the 
existence of other weaker states. This prevention was generally realized by the 
political and military alliances of the weaker against the powerful. In this context, in 
the sixteenth century, the great power changing the balance in Europe was 
considered as the Habsburg Empire, and the European states tried to limit the 
Habsburg advance and secure the balance in the continent by either making alliances 
among each other against the Emperor, or asking help from the second greatest 
power in the East, the Ottoman Empire by postponing the religious rivalry. Even this 
fact, probed the priority of the European states: for the European monarchs their 
authority and the sake of their states became first than to fight against Islam in the 
sixteenth century. 
On the other hand, the Ottoman Empire replied the calls for help of the 
European sovereigns -as it was seen in the example of Francis I- most willingly 
because the Ottoman Sultan himself aimed to be the leading figure in the world 
politics and he also aspired to create a universal empire. In 1453 when he conquered 
Istanbul, Mehmed II claimed the title of Kayser-i Rûm, the Caesar of Rome. His 
conquest policy clearly points out the fact that the young Emperor intended to 
conquer Italy, the historical lands of the Roman Empire. Although the successors of 
Mehmed II did not use this title, they still continued to consider themselves universal 
emperors like Caesar. Thence, in his correspondences to Charles V, Suleyman I 
never used the title of Caesar, Emperor for the Habsburg Emperor and addressed to 
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Charles V as the King of Spain; because there could be one sole emperor in the 
world and the emperor of the time was the Ottoman sultan himself.52 At this instant, 
the inner conflicts of Europe were perceived by the Ottoman Empire as an 
opportunity not only for the expansion in Europe but also for consolidating its power 
and suppressing its rival for universal supremacy. 
In this process, the Suleyman I took several initiatives from making alliance 
with France and patronizing the powerless princes of Europe to supporting the spread 
of Protestantism and providing economic privileges for the allies of the state in order 
to ensure that none of the European powers became so powerful to unify Europe 
under his flag.  In 1537, the Ottoman admiral Barbaros Hayreddin Pasha defeated the 
armada of Charles V in Prevesa and secured the Eastern Mediterranean. Tripolitania, 
Tunisia and Algeria participated in the Empire as autonomous principalities, in order 
to limit the advance of Charles V in the Mediterranean Sea.53 In 1541, the Franco-
Ottoman alliance was renewed to wage a collective war against Charles V; Naples 
and Sicily were pillaged and Nice was captured in 1543.54  In the following year, 
since Francis I concluded a peace with Charles V; the war could not be realized. 
However, the Ottoman Empire could stop the march of Charles V in Mediterranean 
and in Central Europe.  
The direct intervention of the Ottoman Sultan played a determining role in the 
formation of European States System and the exercise of the “balance of power” 
policy in Europe. Furthermore, for the Ottoman Empire as well, this process brought 
about the territorial expansion, political supremacy and economic prosperity. For that 
                                                 
52 For detailed information about the perceptions of the universal empire and the accentuation on the 
concept of the “messiah” see:  Cornell Fleischer, “The Lawgiver as Messiah: The Making of the 
Imperial Image in the Reign of Süleymân” Soliman le Magnifique et Son Temps, ed. by G. Veinstein, 
(Paris: Éditions du Louvre, 1992), 159-177. 
53 For further information see: Uzunçarşılı, 374-388.  
54 For detailed information about the Franco-Ottoman alliance of 1541 and the role of Barbaros 
Hayreddin Pasha in the organization of the war against Charles V see: İnalcık, “Avrupa Devletler 
Sistemi…”, 129-135.  
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reason, in the following centuries, the reign of Suleyman I was going to be defined as 
the “golden age” of the Ottoman Empire; and when the Empire started to lose its 
power, the Ottoman intellectuals was going to advise the Sultans to took necessary 
measures in order to return to that “golden age”.55 
Within the perspective of the information given above it would not be 
inaccurate to argue that, the complex political structure of the sixteenth century 
brought about the emergence of extraordinary diplomatic maneuvers and the adroit 
personalities who would be able to deal with them. At this point, Alvise Gritti, the 
main research subject of the present study appeared as one of these personalities 
acting within the complex political and diplomatic conjuncture of both the Ottoman 
Empire and Europe. Due to his talents in analyzing how to use complex conditions of 
the period, he could acquired a fascinating political career in the Ottoman Empire 
and Hungary; moreover he was perceived as a key figure in the international politics 
by the other powers of his time like the Republic of Venice and Habsburg Empire. 
However, it is also unfair to see the rise of Alvise Gritti as a natural result of the 
conditions of the era. The personality and character as well as his family’s 
background of Alvise Gritti had important contributions to him in terms of finding a 
way to rise and a place to stay. In this aspect it cam be argued that one of the 
significant components of his unprecedented rise was his family connections and 
interesting personal characteristics which made him different from the rest. The 
following chapter will concern the family of Alvise Gritti, his personality and his 
early life in the Ottoman Empire will be discussed in details.  
 
 
                                                 
55  For brief information about the concept of “golden age” in the Ottoman History see: Cemal 
Kafadar, “The Myth of the Golden Age: Ottoman Historical Consciousness in the Post Süleymânic 
Era”, Süleymân the Second and His Time, ed. by, Halil İnalcık and Cemal Kafadar, (Istanbul: Isis 
Press, 1993), 37–49.     
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CHAPTER III 
 
MEETING THE BEYOĞLU: THE FAMILY AND THE EARLY 
LIFE OF ALVISE GRITTI 
 
 
Alvise Gritti, the main character of this study, can not be considered only as an 
ordinary Venetian merchant engaged in the commercial activities within the Ottoman 
Empire; he was also a proficient actor who played a variety of roles on the stage of 
the sixteenth century. Özlem Kumrular portrays him as the most important “diplomat 
of frontier” of his time. According to Kumrular, “diplomats of frontier” were the 
political figures working for the great plans of the states in which they politically 
served, rather than their homelands by lifelong rushing in the danger zones between 
the palaces and frontiers, whose impacts were increased in the complex political 
agenda of the second decade of the century.56 His competence on diplomacy can not 
be denied assuredly, but considering his charming personality, multiple interests, 
complex commercial, cultural, political and diplomatic networks and great ambition 
of self-ascension, it can be asserted that Alvise Gritti was just one of the “versatile” 
personalities in the Renaissance period.  
In his famous book, The Civilization of Renaissance in Italy, while drawing 
the general portrait of the people of Renaissance, Jacob Burckhardt accentuates the 
                                                 
56 Kumrular, 39-40. 
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general characteristics of this people as to their “versatile personalities”. Burckhardt 
mentions that in this period, there were numerous people having different 
occupations besides their main professions. The statesmen were generally the patrons 
of arts and humanists, the merchants and diplomats having the classical education of 
philosophy and literature and use these in the affairs of the daily life and contributed 
the outbreak and spread of the information. This versatility was fed by the desire of 
fame which created the birth of a splendid literature of biographies. These versatile 
people were also universal in a sense; they could live anywhere that they could 
satisfy their desires. This stereotype of individual was born in Italy according to 
Burckhardt; played the crucial role in the formation and spread of Renaissance.57  
These people were the characters of not only the cultural and intellectual, but 
also the political life of the Renaissance Europe. This fact can be proved considering 
the leading Early Modern European princes and statesmen who were the main 
supporter and even patrons of the humanists and had different occupations besides 
their political duties. In this context, it can be argued that Alvise Gritti was also one 
of these “versatile personalities” of the sixteenth century. Besides his commercial 
activities, he took important duties on diplomacy, was the patron of numerous artists 
and humanist, and by using his effective networks, he took part of the international 
politics of that time. Most interestingly, he could realize these not in his homeland, 
but in the Ottoman Empire where he could find the chance of promotion and in spite 
of his Venetian origin; he served as an Ottoman officer on be half of the Ottoman 
benefits. He became not the sole but one of the few foreigners having decisive roles 
in the Ottoman international politics. 
                                                 
57 For further information about the concept of this “versatile individual” and its examples in the 
Italian Renaissance see: Jacob Burckhardt, La Civilità del Rinascimento in Italia, (Rome: Newton 
Compton Editori, 2008), 112-139. 
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Alvise Gritti did not suddenly appear in the Ottoman stage; besides his efforts 
and merits, he also benefited from his family background which provided him an 
effective network in the Ottoman Empire. This chapter aims to provide the reader 
brief information about the family, personality and early life of Alvise Gritti in 
Istanbul in order to draw to portray how Alvise Gritti became an important actor in 
the Ottoman Empire.  
 
 
3.1 The Gritti Family: A Brief History 
 
Gritti Family was one of the important Venetian noble families, whose ties had dated 
back to the twelfth century, Giovolamo Alessandro Capellari, who edited the 
genealogies of the Venetian patricians58 in the second half of the eighteenth century, 
in his Campidoglio Veneto, mentions that the Gritti family was originated from 
Candia, in Crete and starts the family tree with the name of Giovanni Gritti who had 
been one of the three commanders during the conquest of Acre of Syria in 1104.59 
                                                 
58 The term of patrician means noble. In Venice, the residents were classified basically into five groups 
namely, nobles, cittadini, or citizens, popolani, or common people and slaves. Nobility was related 
with the formation of the family and wealth. Generally, the noble families were the ancient families 
serving the city for generations. The administrative posts were opened to nobility. In addition to 
nobility, the class of cittadini could also have right to participate into the Venetian bureaucracy at a 
certain level.  The class of cittadini were composed of two different groups; first cittadini originarii, 
men of ancient Venetian ancestry having the right of holding certain posts in the bureaucracy, and the 
latter cittadini de intus, or de intus et extra, foreigners, especially the merchants, resident in Venice 
and paying taxes in return for the protection provided by the Venetian law. Dennis Romano, Patricians 
and Popolani: The Social Foundations of the Venetian State, (Baltimore & London: The Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1987), 27-32.     
59  Giovolamo Alessandro Capellari, Campidoglio Veneto, v. 2 (Venice, 1774), f. 188r. In the 
Campidoglio Veneto, the male members of the family are mentioned; there is not any information 
about the female members of the family. In the work the names of the family members were not given 
with their birth dates; whereas the dates when they were assigned with their first important duties on 
behalf of Venetian Republic were noted before each of their names. Here it will be also useful to give 
brief information about the city of Acre, Akka in Arabic. Acre is a port city in modern day Israel. In 
1104, it was captured by King Baldwin I, in the context of the First Crusade by the help of Italian 
fleets. After the conquest, it was made the chief harbor city in the East Mediterranean. In 1517, it was 
captured by the Ottoman Empire and remained under its control until the end of First World War. For 
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The last leaf of the family tree is shown as Gasparo Gritti, elected to the Dieci Savii, 
magistrate court composed of ten aldermen, in 1716.60 The coat of arms of the family 
was a two parted emblem; azure and silver and on the azure part, there is a silver 
cross.61 There is not any satisfactory information about the family after Gasparo 
Gritti; nor is it well-known whether the family had continued after the eighteenth 
century, or all the heirs had been died.  On the other hand, by analyzing not only the 
Campidoglio Veneto, but also other sources about the Gritti family, it can be argued 
that most of the family members dealt with overseas commerce and had some 
important offices in the Venetian bureaucracy.62 
At this point, it is essential to note that the participation of the members of the 
Gritti family within the Venetian bureaucracy was not an extraordinary fact. Having 
a voice in the administration of Venice was an open right of every Venetian 
patrician. Venice had been a Republic since the first decades of the eighth century, 
and headed by an elected doge. The Republic of Venice did not have any written 
constitution; except from the Promissione, the ducal oath by which the doge accepted 
several restrictions on his authority, and some basic laws.63 The administration was 
composed of several councils.64 At the head of the all institutions, there was the doge 
and it was followed by the Minor Consiglio, Minor Council, which was composed of 
                                                                                                                                          
detailed information about the city and the First Crusade see: Steven Runciman, A History of 
Crusades, v. 1, (London: Penguin Books, 1981).   
60 Capellari, f. 189v.  
61 Ibid., f. 188r.  
62 Ibid., ff. 188r-190r. For further information about the family also see: “Gritti” in Enciclopedia 
Storico-Nobiliare Italiana: Famiglie Nobili e Titolate Viventi Riconosciute dal R. Governo D’Italia, 
ed.by, Vittorio Spreti and Colloborators, v. 3, (Bologna: Forni Editore, 1969), 578-579. For brief 
information about the members of the Gritti family pursuing several activities in Istanbul see:  
Şakiroğlu, 428-429.   
63  Frederic C. Lane, Venice: A Maritime Republic, (Baltimore & London: The Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1973), 95.  
64 Since the discussions on the Venetian governmental structure and its transformations in the course 
of time exceeds the scope of this study, only the basic administrative structure is intented to be 
mentioned in the text. In order to have  detailed information about the Venetian administration, the 
institution, the electoral processes and the transformation of the governmental bodies see: Ibid., 86-
102, 250-274, 427-431; Ivone Cacciavillani, La Serenissima: Una Republica Burocratica, (Venice: 
Corbo e Fiore Editori, 2003).   
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six consiglieri ducali, ducal counsels, controlling the acts of the doge, the Quarantia, 
Council of Forty, the Senato or Consiglio dei Pregadi, Senate, and at the base there 
was the Maggior Consiglio65, Great Council. The doge, the six ducal counsels and 
the tree heads of the Council of Forty composed the Signoria, the main governmental 
body of the Republic. This basic system remained until the eighteenth century; 
however, in the course of time, in case of necessity, other councils were incorporated 
into the Venetian administration; for instance in 1310, the Consiglio dei Dieci, 
Council of Ten, responsible from the security of the Republic was established.66 The 
elections for the councils were renewed generally in each year; on the other hand the 
doge secured his position for lifetime. “Each committee or council was checked by 
some other committee or council so as to assure the rule of law, even in the cost of 
losing some executive efficiency. Thus, while insisting on a division of power among 
the different elements in the pyramid of councils, the Venetians made no effort to 
separate executive, legislative and judicial functions.” 67  The main governmental 
organ of the Republic was the Maggior Consiglio in which all the male Venetian 
patricians had the right of participation. “Following the practical education, a 
Venetian nobleman would launch his political career by entering the Maggior 
Consiglio, an important rite of passage which usually occurred at the age of twenty 
five. By this passage a young noble became eligible to hold public office and to 
                                                 
65 In fact, at the base of the administration there had been the Concio, General Assembly in which the 
ordinary people had been represented. The Concio used to elect the doge and approve new laws. 
Therefore, Venetian government tied the monarchic, aristocratic and democratic principles within its 
institutions. Although the Concio was open also to the ordinary people, it was de facto controlled by 
powerful families; and finally it was abolished in 1423.  Instead the Maggior Consiglio became the 
main institution of the government. With the abolishment of the Concio, in other words, the exclusion 
of the popular element from the administration the Republic gained an oligarchic structure. Lane, pp. 
91, 252; Andrea Zannini, Burocrazia e Burocrati a Venezia in Età Moderna: I Cittadini Orginari (Sec. 
XVI-XVIII), (Venice: Istituto Veneto di Scienze, Lettere ed Arti, 2003). Oligarchy was strengthened 
especially in the times of crisis in Venice. Especially in the late fifteenth and early sixteenth century, 
Venetian oligarchs secured their position in the politics by using the principles of republicanism 
against the provincial elites aiming to step towards tyranny. For the discussion on the role of oligarchy 
and the meaning of republicanism in Venice in the early sixteenth century, see: Muir, 137-167.   
66 Lane, 116. 
67 Ibid., 95.  
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participate in the political life of the Republic.”68 In proportion to his success as well 
as his influence and networks, he could ascend the stairs until the office of doge.   
In this aspect, as being parts of a noble family, the members of the Gritti 
family also had voices in the Venetian bureaucracy. Most of the members took 
important roles in the Councils; some of them stood for the seat of doge. However, it 
would be accurate to argue that the most influential character in the Gritti family was 
Andrea Gritti, the father of Alvise Gritti being the main character of this study, who 
would serve as the Doge of Venice from 1523 to 1538. His time was generally 
referred to as a “Golden Age” of Venice 69 , in terms of political maneuvers, 
economical prosperity and socio-cultural development of the Venetian Republic. 
 
 
3.2 Andrea Gritti: As a Mirror for the “Prince” 
 
Andrea Gritti was born in Bardolino, near Verona, in 1455. 70  Because of the 
unexpected death of his father in his early childhood, he grew up under the control of 
his grandfather Tridano, another important figure in the Venetian bureaucracy. 
Tridano Gritti was also an important figure in the family. He served as the podestà di 
Padova, the chief magistrate of the municipality of a city or state subjected to 
Venetian Republic, as capitano generale del mare, the chief commander of sea, in 
the wars against the Ottoman Sultan Mehmed the Conqueror. He also had the 
diplomatic missions in England, France and Spain.71  
                                                 
68 Eric R. Dursteler, “The Bailo in Istanbul: Crisis and Career in Venice’s Early Modern Diplomatic 
Corps, Mediterranean Historical Review, 16:2, 2001, 1-30, 11.  
69 Szakály, 13.    
70 Barbarigo, 1.  
71 For detailed information about Tridano Gritti and his impact over Andrea Gritti see: Papo, Papo, 23.   
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By the efforts of his grandfather, he met with literature and philosophy; 
further studied in Padua72. As an educated young patrician, he accompanied his 
grandfather during his mission of embassy in England, France and Spain, and learnt 
the details of diplomacy by practice.73 After having terminated all the studies about 
commerce, he took the road of Istanbul, not only to seek his chance in trade, but also 
to serve to the advantage of the Serenissima, as his ancestors had done.74 In Istanbul, 
he not only learnt the rules of the trade in practice and became richer, but also could 
observe the Ottoman State, understand it and get the methods of satisfying his own 
needs together with those of his homeland.75. In 1476, he returned back to Venice, 
got married with Benedetta Vendramin. 76  From her, he had three children, two 
daughters and a son, namely Vienna, Benedetta and Francesco. In a short time after 
having given birth to Francesco, his wife died and for Andrea Gritti, younger than 
twenty five years old, it was too early for participating to the political life of Venice; 
                                                 
72 University of Padua, the second oldest university in Italy, was founded in 1222 and in the fifteenth 
century was an important center of humanistic education. In the university, the education of Greek 
language had been started since 1463 and by destroying the scholastic thought, a course based on the 
text of Aristotle had been introduced even in 1497. The university provided to his students, the young 
Venetian patricians in general, a wide range of courses including the politics and civil sciences which 
were accepted as the heart of classical education. In this way, Venetians could access directly the 
classical thought. See: Lucette Valensi, Venise e la Sublime Porte: La Naissance du Despote, (Paris: 
Hachette Littératures, 1987), 15-16. For further information about the role of the universities, courses 
offered, and organization styles in early modern Europe, see: Paul F. Grendler, “The Universities of 
the Renaissance and Reformation”, Renaissance Quarterly, v. 57, no: 1 (Spring 2004), 1-42.   
73 Barbarigo, 2; Andrea Da Mosto, I Dogi di Venezia, (Milan & Florence: Giunti, 2007), 236.  
74 “Poco dopo passando à gli studii delle cose maritime, non solo per private interesse mà per Publica 
utilità, ad imitazione dé suoi Maggiori portossi in Bisanzio, con oggetto dé poter in quel luogo 
approfittare à se stesso, e nell’istruttione e consiglio premunirsé.” Barbarigo,  p. 2.  
75 According to Lucette Valensi, young patricians advancing in Venetian bureaucracy and diplomacy 
were generally were risen under the humanist education of the time. The Academy of Venice and the 
University of Padua were the two important institutions providing them the courses about classical 
literature, philosophy and political ethics at that time. On the other hand, there were another two ways 
of education for young Venetians, namely, to accompany their family members during theirs missions 
in foreign states as ambassadors in order to improve their diplomatic skills, and to get the “trading 
experience”, in other words, to learn the commerce in one of the Mediterranean seaports of Venice. 
From this perspective, Andrea Gritti can be considered as a good example of a Venetian Patrician 
living in an atmosphere of high culture and classical education by integrating all these current 
methods of personal development. See: Valensi, 16-18.    
76 Benedetta Vendramin was grandchild Andrea Vendramin, Doge of Venice from 1476 to 1478. For 
further information see: Barbarigo,  7.  
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so he decided to return to Istanbul.77 This would be a turning point for his future 
career.    
Andrea Gritti came to Istanbul as a merchant but he acted as an unofficial 
diplomat.78 He prospered from the grain trade between the years of 1479 and 150279; 
became the leader of the Venetian community living in the Ottoman capital80 by 
controlling the commercial affairs and supporting generously the merchants in terms 
of both finding the contacts and commissions, and offering them money and credits 
in order to increase the commercial properties .81 “Andrea Gritti managed to have a 
brilliant carrier on the Bosporus, also thanks to the friendship of Grand Vizier 
Ahmed Pasha82, who provided him with important fiscal facilitations and introduced 
him to the court of Sultan Bayezid II.”83 This enabled him to observe the Ottoman 
system and to enlighten the Venetian Republic about the economic, political and 
military developments within the Empire. Especially, during the Ottoman-Venetian 
war of 1499-1503, he reported the preparations and the intentions of the Empire to 
                                                 
77 Ibid.  
78 In this period, not only the merchants, but also every Venetian people staying abroad were the 
natural spies of the Serenissima. Besides the diplomats, these people composed an important part the 
information network between Venice and the other states. Burckhardt, 69-70.  For further information 
about spying network of Venice see: Paolo Preto, I Servizi Segreti di Venezia, (Milano: Il Saggiatore, 
2004). Similarly, in the Ottoman Empire, the merchants dealing with the international trade acted as 
agents or ambassadors. For detailed information about the role of merchants in the Ottoman Empire 
see: Halil İnalcık, “Capital Formation in the Ottoman Empire”, The Journal of Economic History, v. 
29, no: 1 (March 1969), 97-140, 102-103.  
79 Finlay, “Fabius Maximus…”, 993.  
80 Finlay, “Al Servizio…”, 79.    
81 Papo, Papo, 27 
82 Known as Gedik Ahmed Pasha. He was an Albanian renegade, appointed as the Grand Vizier by 
Mehmed II, the Conqueror. One of the most important achievements of Gedik Ahmed Pasha was the 
conquest of the fortress of Otranto, in southeastern Italy, in 1480. However, because of the death of 
Sultan Mehmed, he had to retreat from the city and supported Bayezid II in the succession struggle 
against his brother Cem. Although he played important roles in the succession of Bayezid, he could 
not be rescued from the suspicions of being supporter of Cem and he was choked to death by the new 
Sultan in 1482. Andrea Gritti, in his relazione read in the Senate in the year of 1503, describes Gedik 
Ahmed Pasha as an excellent officer, able to realize every duty and states that he was killed because of 
the jealousy of Sultan Bayezid for his being supported by the Janissaries. See:, “Relazione di Andrea 
Gritti” in Albèri, s. 3, v. 3, (Florence: Società Editrice Fiorentina, 1885), 1-43.  
83 “Andrea Gritti riuscì a fare una brillante carriera sul Bosforo anche grazie all’amicizia del gran visir 
Ahmed pascià, che gli aveva procurato importanti agevolazioni fiscali e lo aveva introdotto alle corte 
del sultano Bâyezîd II.”: Papo, Papo, pp. 26-27.  
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Venice and when his espionage activities became apparent, he was imprisoned by the 
Ottomans. 84  However, through his friendship with the Ottoman viziers and his 
positive impression over the Sultan, he was rescued from death and could return to 
his homeland in 1502.85  
On the way to Istanbul, he had been too young to take onto the political stage 
of Venice, but in 1502, when he returned to his homeland, he suddenly appeared in 
the play in which he would later act the principal part until his death. After having 
some titles in the government86, in 1503, almost one year after his return, with the 
conclusion of the war between the Republic and the Ottoman Empire, he was 
appointed as, oratore straordinario87, extraordinary ambassador to Istanbul in order 
make peace negotiations. He was cut out for this important job as he was famous 
among the Ottoman bureaucrats, and had good diplomatic skills.  Thanks to his 
maneuvers, he could secure some privileges on behalf of Venice, besides the articles 
of the peace. For example, the length of stay of the Venetian baili was increased 
from one to three years and the obligation of harac tax, poll-tax collected from non-
Muslim population, staying in the Ottoman Empire, was annulated for the Venetian 
merchants staying three years in the Empire.88 He returned to Venice in the same 
year and presented his relazione in the Senate on December 2, 1503.89 Later, he was 
sent to Pope Julius II as ambassador; and in 1505 he was nominated as the Capo del 
                                                 
84 Preto, p. 248. This might be perceived as the first important duty realized on behalf of the Republic, 
because Capellari in Campidoglio gives this date before his name. See: Capellari, f. 188v. 
85 Here it is important to note that in the Ottoman Empire, in the times of war, the foreigners possible 
to engage with the espionage activities were imprisoned, however, they were not generally executed 
unless they did not have harmful effects to the State. Andrea Gritti should also be imprisoned by the 
security reasons. Therefore, the rescue of Andrea Gritti from death thanks to his close relations with 
the Ottoman viziers may be an exaggerated account of the foreign eyewitnesses of the time.  
86 For detailed information about the first duties of Andrea Gritti see: Papo, Papo, 27.  
87  Oratore straordinario was the extraordinary ambassador sent to discuss a peace treaty, or to 
congratulate the accession of a new government, in the Ottoman context, the new Sultan, and with the 
conclusion of his mission he returned back to Venice. After his return, the oratore straordinario, 
should also present his relazione to the Senate like the bailo. Roberto Baschini, Gli Ambasciatori 
Veneziani da Solimano il Magnifico, (Venice: Edizioni del Leone, 1998), 9.  
88 Şakiroğlu, 428.  
89 See: Albèri, s. 3 v. 3, 1-43.  
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Consiglio dei Dieci, Head of the Council of Ten and Podestà di Padova, Governor of 
Padua. However, his sphere of responsibility was enlarged especially during the 
Italian Wars, starting to threaten the Republic. With the creation of the League of 
Cambrai, constituted between the Habsburg Empire, France, the Kingdom of 
Aragon, the Papacy, the Duchy of Savoy and Hungary against Venice in 1508, he 
was nominated as Provveditore Generale, the supreme governor with the 
responsibility of the inspection of the fortifications all along the line of frontier 
between Venice and the Habsburg Empire.90  
The creation of the League of Cambrai, and the following Battle of Agnadello 
in 1509, by which the Republic of Venice lost its possessions of terraferma, even 
Padua, started to threaten the shores of the Venetian lagoon. Concerning the lost 
territories of the Republic, the famous Italian humanist political philosopher Niccolò 
Machiavelli points out that in Agnadello, “in only one day, Venetians lost what they 
had conquered in eight hundred years with many efforts.”91 In this dramatic situation, 
as a Provveditor Generale, Andrea Gritti was engaged with recovering the lost 
territory. On July 17, 1509, Padua was recovered and Gritti worked out for the 
defense of the city.92 His success brought him the title of Procuratore di San Marco, 
the second most important duty in the bureaucracy of the Republic responsible for 
the administration of the St. Mark Basilica. As the commander of the armies, he 
marched towards Brescia but he was imprisoned by the French army there in 1512 
and was taken to Lyon. However, by his efforts for peace, he could return to Venice 
in the following year. In 1514, he nominated as the Capitano del mare, Head of 
                                                 
90 Papo, Papo, 27.  
91 “[…] in un sol giorno, i Veneziani persero quello che in ottocento anni, e con tanta fatica, avevano 
conquistato.” Niccolò Machiavelli, Il Principe, (Milan: Pillole Bur, 2006), 135.  
92 For the defense of the city, Gritti used the condottieri, mercenary soldiers and destructed all the 
churches and houses near to the city walls in order which might aid the besiegers. See: Finlay, “Fabius 
Maximus…”,   998.   
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Navy, being the most important military title at that time. 93  In 1517, with the 
collaboration of the French army, he recaptured Brescia and Verona; the recovery of 
the terraferma, gave him a good reputation as the “saver and restaurateur of the 
country”.94 This good reputation offered Andrea Gritti the cap of doge in 1523 with 
the death of Antonio Grimani. He wore the cap until his death in 1538; he concluded 
the play, in which he entered as bit player, in the leading role, he shaped the Venetian 
politics and diplomacy as well as the cultural structure of the Republic.  
The Italian Wars and especially the penetration of the enemy into the 
Venetian traditional territories of terraferma, shaped the perception of the domestic 
and international politics of Andrea Gritti. Even before elected as doge, as a 
Provveditore Generale and Capo del Mare, Andrea Gritti realized the importance of 
the defense of the existent possessions rather than offensive wars. Moreover, 
although the Venetian army was the most powerful army of the Italian peninsula at 
that time95, it clearly appeared that Venice became vulnerable in front of the allied 
powers. In this aspect, Andrea Gritti “focused above all on the need for fortifying the 
terraferma cities and for avoiding battlefield clashes”96 in order to dispose the peril 
of the occupation of the Venetian lagoon. Because of the this attitude of doge Gritti, 
Venice generally used the diplomatic maneuvers to benefit from the rivalries 
between the powers and to have strong alliances in order to stop the marching of any 
foreign power to its territories. Robert Finlay argues that by these politics Venice no 
longer played an aggressive role in the international politics and the Habsburg 
                                                 
93 Papo, Papo, 28.   
94 The various military conflicts between 1509 and 1513 and Leagues against Venice are not discussed 
here in details concerning the aim and scope of this study. However, it can be argued that in these 
struggles the main aim of the Republic was to recover its traditional territories of terraferma and to 
limit the Habsburg and French power in the Northeastern Italy. For further information about the wars, 
the strategies of Venice and the role of Andrea Gritti see: Finlay, “Fabius Maximus…”,  998-1104.   
95 Ibid., 1015.  
96 Ibid., 1004.  
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hegemony was solidified in Italy.97 In fact, concerning the sack of Rome by the 
Habsburg Emperor Charles V in 1527 and his coronation in Bologna as the Holy 
Roman Emperor in 1530 marked the increase of the Habsburg influence in Italy. 
From that time onwards, Venice was stranded between the Habsburg and the 
Ottoman Empire and lost gradually its political, diplomatic and economical 
superiority.98 
On the other hand, Venice did not only secure its territorial integrity and 
independence, but also the socio-political and cultural atmosphere of the Republic 
was reanimated by the efforts of Andrea Gritti. He promoted a “wide-ranging agenda 
of cultural and intellectual renovation designed to elevate the prestige of the 
Republic, including introducing new musical, literary, and architectural styles”99 
Andrea Gritti, himself, was also a good example of a Renaissance patrician. He was 
fluent in Latin, Greek, French, Spanish, English and Turkish languages.100 “As a part 
of his program, he patronized a number of learned patricians with whom he shared a 
                                                 
97 According to Finlay, Venice did not be in part of an alliance in order to stop the Habsburg marching, 
did not help other Italian states and did not even send auxiliary military forces. In this aspect, Finlay, 
by the light of the works of the contemporaries of Andrea Gritti, especially by using the Fabius 
Maximus analogy made by Niccolò Barbarigo describes the doge, the father of this policy, as Fabius 
Maximus in reference to Fabius Maximus who had fought against Hannibal in the Second Punic War 
in the 3rd C B.C and had focused to the defense of Rome rather than engaging into the offensive 
attacks. However, he also states that “in the 1520s, the Republic aspired to play the role of a great 
power –or at least that of an independent, balancing force between France and the Empire- but its 
refusal to commit its troops to battle significantly contributed to the rise of Habsburg hegemony in 
Italy” and this policy accelerated the decline of the Republic in terms of political influence. For 
detailed information about these argumentations see: Ibid., 988-1031.  
98 The fact that the loss of influence of Venice on the international politics, and economy is not related 
only with the defense policy and the rise Ottoman and Habsburg powers. It should be taken into 
consideration that by the end of the 13th c, Europeans, especially the Spanish got involved into the 
geographical discoveries. By the 16th c, the Spanish and Portuguese fleets reached the commercial 
network of Venice and got superior in the eastern trade. On the other hand, the Ottoman conquests in 
the Balkan Peninsula, Mediterranean islands, eastern Africa broke the unity of colonies of the 
Republic. While being in decline in terms of trade which gave the Republic the new blood in terms of 
having influence in the political and diplomatic scene, to be encountered territorially by the two great 
powers of the time, claiming the world domination, triggered the decline of the Republic. For detailed 
information about the geographical discoveries and the economic expansion of Europe see: Rice, 
Grafton, 1-69. For the impact of the oceanic trade and the Spanish-Portuguese rise in the international 
commercial network see: Lane, 274-336. For the decline of Venice see: Norwich, 449-605.   
99 Finlay, “Fabius Maximus…”, 989.  
100 Barbarigo, 87.  
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love of classical antiquity.”101 The humanist Pietro Bembo was appointed in 1530 as 
official historian. Gritti was also close to Gasparo Contarini, writer of De 
magistribus et republica Venetorum, in which the concept of the “Venetian myth”, 
accentuating the Venice as an ideal political society in comparison to the ancient 
Roman tradition.102 In the network of Gritti other humanists such as architect Jacopo 
Sansovino and artist Titian, drawing his portrait, were served.103 In addition, he was a 
fully authoritarian figure, generally presented in the political literature of the 
Renaissance period. “A dynamic, authoritarian individual, Gritti exercised the 
prestige and power of his office to the full. He refused to tolerate interference with 
his authority over the chancellery, and he ordered investigation of patricians who 
abused their office”. 104  His strong authority was not welcomed by the leading 
patricians of Venice, uneasy about the strength of the despotic power over the 
Venetian politics; they displayed their complaints and preoccupations as:  “we are 
under a republic, not under a lord”.105 In this aspect, when he died in 1538, there was 
not a great sorrow in Venice in spite of his contributions to the political and cultural 
structure of the Republic. “When he died on Christmas Eve in 1538, allegedly from 
eating too generous a helping of grilled eel and beans, celebration broke out on the 
                                                 
101 Finlay, “Fabius Maximus…”, 989. 
102 Gasparo Contarini, was the ambassador of Venice to the court of Charles V. By his work the 
concept of “myth of Venice” reached a European audience. In the work, Contarini describes his city as 
an ideal commonwealth having free from conquest, monarchical rule and arbitrary justice and argues 
that Venice was superior than ancient Rome which had been plunged into further war and civil strife 
after the defeat of Hannibal and the Carthaginians in the Second Punic War because after the defeat of 
the War of Cambrai Venice could restore its losses and devoted itself to the peace and preservation. 
See: Ibid, 989-990. For detailed information about the work of Gasparo Contarini, the other leading 
figures in the political literature and the currents of the political thought in the mentioned period also 
see: Lester J. Libby Jr., “Venetian History and Political Thought after 1509”, Studies in Renaissance, 
v. 20, 1973, 7-45.  
103 Valensi, 19.  
104 Finlay, “Fabius Maximus…”,  989.  
105 “[…] semo sotto una repubblica e non sotto un signor […]”, Sanuto v. 50, 149.  
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streets of Venice.”106 The old doge, welcomed as a big hero after the recapture of 
Padua, was sent off as a kind o loveless despot at the age of 83.  
Andrea Gritti had seven children. From his wife Benedetta, he had two 
daughters, Vienna and Benedetta, and a son, Francesco. Francesco died at an early 
age in 1506; the life stories of his daughters were mentioned neither in the 
biographies nor in the documents of the time. The sole information about Vienna and 
Benedetta is that both of them were married with the members of the patrician 
families of Venice.107  
On the other hand, Andrea Gritti had four other sons, namely Pietro, Alvise, 
Lorenzo and Giorgio, from a Greek, or a Turkish concubine with whom he had lived 
during his stay in Istanbul. 108  Luigi Bassano, a contemporary traveler, clearly 
explains that Christian merchants living in the Ottoman State did not have the right 
to have concubines, neither Turkish, nor Christian. According to Bassano, the only 
way for a Christian for taking a spouse was to get married before the kadı, Ottoman 
judge.109 At this point, it is necessary to keep in mind that the Italian, and almost all 
European, sources of the period use the word Turk to define not only for Turkish but 
also the whole Muslim identity living in the Ottoman Empire. For that reason, most 
                                                 
106 Finlay, “Fabius Maximus”, p. 1026.  
107 For detailed information about the daughters of Andrea Gritti see: Papo, Papo, 25.  
108The origin of the mother of these sons is controversial among not only the eyewitnesses of the 
period, but also the modern historians. Benedetto Ramberti, in his Libri Tre of 1539, points out that 
she of Gritti was a Turkish origin woman and this fact was generally confirmed. “[…]di una donna, 
come da molti viene affirmato, Turca,[…]”. Ramberti, 35r. Carla Coco and Lucette Valensi also 
support this idea. See: Coco, 27. On the other hand, Niccolò Barbarigo states that she was a Greek 
concubine. Barbarigo, p. 91. Robert Finlay also points out her Greek origin. Finlay, “Al Servizio…”, 
79. 
109 “[…]Ma non permettono giach’ un huomo Christiano pigli una Turcha ma s’un Christiano vorrà 
pigliare al modo, com’e il costume loro, una Christiana, gliel concedono. Il che molti Mercanti 
Christiani fanno perche non si permette tra Turchi che Cristiani tengano concubina, ne Turcha, ne 
Christiana, e per poterla tenere la fanno scriver’ al giudice per loro moglie, e pigliano, o Christiana, o 
libera, o schiava, con quella dote che si convengono tra di essi.” Bassano da Zara, 51. Moreover, here 
it is important to note that the Italian, generally European sources written by the authors from the 
Christian tradition had the intention of defining these spouses as concubines since the marriage before 
the Ottoman judges were not legal according to the Christian law. For that reason, the reasercher 
should realize that the use of the word of “concubine” reflects the perception of Italians, or Europeans; 
not the status of these women in the Ottoman Empire.  
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probably Bassano meant the Muslim women in his statement while using the word 
Turk to define them. Moreover, it is a very well known fact that at that period, 
Muslim women living in the Islamic States could not marry to non-Muslim men even 
the vice versa was possible if the woman accepted to convert. Even the non-Muslim 
men converted to Islam they were not allowed to take a Muslim spouse. Taking into 
consideration these statements, it can be argued that although her ethnic origin was 
unclear, the mother of the sons of Andrea Gritti was his spouse and she was 
definitely a non-Muslim Ottoman subject. 
As these children were known to be born outside the lines of the Catholic 
marriage; according to the Venetian law they were regarded as “illegitimate”.110 This 
means that they did not have the right of having positions in the Venetian 
bureaucracy and could not assert anything on the inheritance of their father.111  
Although their illegitimacy often crossed their paths, almost all children of Andrea 
Gritti could have important roles not only in Venice, but also in the international 
political, diplomatic and commercial arena of their time.112 Especially, one of them, 
probably the favorite of his father, became one of the most charming characters of 
both Venetian and Ottoman history of the sixteenth century, this was Alvise. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
110 The children of the patricians that were born from a lower class women; unless it was not dealt 
according to the custom and law were accepted as illegitimate. Zannini, 109.   
111 In 1484 Consiglio dei Dieci published a decree announcing that the cittadini originari of Venice 
who were illegitimate by birth in spite of their patrician origins were excluded from the bureaucratic 
carrier in the cancelleria ducale, ducal chancellery into which the non patrician citizens had the right 
to participate, as well as from the offices reserved for the patricians. Papo, Papo,  30.   
112 For brief information about the other sons of Andrea Gritti see: Ibid., 25-26. 
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3. 3 Alvise Gritti: “Bastard” in Venice, “Beyoğlu” in Istanbul  
 
Alvise Gritti was one of the four illegitimate children of Andrea Gritti. He was born 
in 1480, in Istanbul when his father Andrea worked as merchant. As it was 
mentioned above, her mother was generally thought to be a concubine, with whom 
Andrea Gritti had lived during his stay in the Ottoman capital. According to the 
Venetian tradition, the baili, diplomats or merchants going abroad were not allowed 
to be accompanied with their wives. They could only take their male children to their 
destinations in order to introduce them to diplomacy or commercial works. For that 
reason, almost all Venetians coming to Istanbul had relations with Ottoman women, 
and sometimes they could have children from them. Since the Ottoman government 
did not prohibit this practice, Andrea Gritti also used to have spouses in Istanbul.113 
In his book entitled I Dogi di Venezia, Andrea Da Mosto states that since he was “a 
grand admirer of the gentle sex and very sensual, even in his old ages he had always 
lovers” 114 . One of these women was the mother of Alvise Gritti. There is no 
satisfactory information about her; her name or her real origin was obscure in the 
biographies or the documents of the time. The only fact underlined in the documents 
is that she was one of the concubines of Andrea Gritti. The Venetian law did not 
accept the children born of these concubines, as the legitimate heirs of Venetian 
patricians as they were born outside of Catholic marriage. They did not have the right 
                                                 
113 Ferenc Szakály used the term of “concubine” in order to describe these women. However as it was 
mentioned before, the non-Muslims did not have the right of having concubines. For that reason they 
should be the legitimate spouses. In fact, Szakály also underlined this Ottoman practice:  “The Turkish 
authorities did not mind such foreigners would keep a concubine, in fact they would considerately 
make it possible for the Christians staying in the Empire, to contract a sort of temporary marriage 
before the kadı, which legitimated the status of their male without imposing too much commitment 
upon the male partners in view of the future.”, Szakály, 14.   
114  “Grande ammiratore del bel sesso e molto sensuale, anche nei tardi anni ebbe sempre delle 
amanti.”, Da Mosto, 243.  
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of participation within the Venetian bureaucracy; because they were not real 
patricians and they could not even claim any right over the titles or inherited rights 
from their family. However, Alvise Gritti grew up with his father in a real patrician 
network, like a real Venetian patrician. This shaped not only his personality and 
worldview, but also his further career.    
Alvise Gritti spent his early life in Istanbul, his birth place, with his father. 
There is no clear information about his childhood and early life; however, it can be 
argued that he returned to Venice in 1502, at the age of twenty two with the 
conclusion of the office of his father.115 Like most of the young Venetian patricians 
of that time, he studied literature at the University of Padua.116 After four years, with 
the conclusion of his education in 1506, he returned to Istanbul to dedicate himself to 
commercial activities by walking the tracks of his father. Behind this choice, not only 
his desire for commerce, but also his illegitimacy in Venice played an important role. 
Since he would not have any chance of a bureaucratic career in Venice, he wanted to 
seek his fortune in his birth place, “the melting pot of peoples of three continents 
where illegitimate birth did not throw an obstacle in the way of success and self-
assertion.”117 He controlled the family enterprise in the Ottoman capital. As it was 
stated before, his father, Andrea Gritti had a good reputation in the Ottoman capital, 
and had established an effective commercial network by establishing important 
connections with not only the foreign merchants, but also the Ottoman statesmen. 
                                                 
115  Papo, Papo, p. 29. On the other hand, Roger Bigelow Merriman, in his famous book about 
Suleyman I, points out that he returned to Venice in 1496. Roger Bigelow Merriman, Suleiman the 
Magnificent 1520-1566, (Cambridge & Massachusetts: Harvard University Pres, 1944), 101.  
116 Ramberti, p. 35r. However Gizella Nemeth Papo and Adriano Papo mention that the name of 
Alvise Gritti did not exist in the student lists that had been graduated from the university from 1501 to 
1550, edited and published by Martelozzo Forin between the years of 1960 and 1982. According to 
them, in these years, there were so many students enrolled to the university and concluded the courses, 
so there were volumes of the lists. However, due to the inconvenient conditions of preservation, the 
frequent use of illegible hand writing and short abbreviations, some names could be eluded from the 
eyes, or disappeared. See: Papo, Papo, 30-31.  
117 Szakály, 14.  
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Alvise Gritti learnt the rules of commerce by using these; he soon created his own 
network in Istanbul. He carried on the trade of almost all commercial goods, 
including grain, oil, salt, salami, saffron, silk, saltpeter, tin; most importantly, he 
prospered from the sale of precious stones and wine, especially demanded by the 
Ottoman Palace.118 
It seems that the most important turning point in the life of Alvise Gritti was 
the year of 1523, in which two elections were held in Venice and in the Ottoman 
Empire. On May 20, 1523, his father Andrea Gritti was elected as the doge of 
Venice, in spite of numerous oppositions of some prominent patricians.119 A few 
days later, the reigning Ottoman Sultan Suleyman I, the Magnificent, appointed one 
of his close servants to the Grand Vizierate by violating the rules of promotion 
within the government. This new Grand Vizier was the famous Ibrahim Pasha, who 
would be the most important figure not only in the life of Alvise Gritti, but also in 
the government of the Ottoman Empire, in the following thirteen years. As a result of 
the election of Andrea Gritti as doge, the prestige of Alvise Gritti within the Empire 
increased rapidly. He was not only a son of a wealthy merchant, or an able diplomat; 
from now on, he became also the son of the Prince of Venice, in other words Beyoğlu 
as he would be called in the Ottoman Empire. Besides his commercial and social 
network that he had established before, this situation opened him the way of having 
close relations with the Ottoman high ranking officers. Soon, he became intimate 
with the new Grand Vizier Ibrahim Pasha. Ibrahim Pasha would not only be a close 
friend to Alvise Gritti, he would also introduce him to the Ottoman politics in which 
would play important roles until his death.  
                                                 
118 Papo, Papo,  30.  
119 Capellari, f. 188v.  
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Ibrahim Pasha and the role of Alvise Gritti in the Ottoman politics will be 
discussed in the following chapter in details, but here it can be useful to give brief 
information about Ibrahim Pasha who introduced him to the political stage of the 
Ottoman Empire, in order to clarify their early relations. Ibrahim Pasha was an 
Ottoman renegade born in 1494, in the city of Parga on the cost of Epirus, captured 
by the Ottomans as it had been a Venetian dominion. He was enslaved by the 
Ottoman pirates in his early childhood and sold to a wealthy widowed women living 
in Manisa who had carefully educated him according to the Islamic tradition. Later 
he was sold to Suleyman when he had been there as a prince governor, during the 
reign of his father Selim. He was one year older than Suleyman; they spent their 
youth together and became close. After the death of his father, Suleyman succeeded 
the Ottoman throne in 1520, and appointed his closest servant to the office of head 
falconer. In a very short time period, he promoted to the posts of master of the 
household and the beylerbeyi of Rumelia, the territorial governor of Rumelia.120 He 
participated in the conquest of Belgrade in 1521 and in 1522 played an important 
role in the expedition of Rhodes. In 1523, he was appointed as Grand Vizier, and 
until his death in 1536, he secured his position of being the second man in the 
Ottoman Empire.  
The Venetian bailo Pietro Bragadin describes Ibrahim Pasha in his relazione 
in 1526 as “the heart and breath of the Sultan”121. He was a very intelligent man, 
familiar with Persian, Greek and Italian languages. He studied law and philosophy, 
knew well the Ottoman law, was curious about the conditions of the sovereigns of his 
time, read the lives of Alexander the Great and Hannibal, and the stories of the great 
                                                 
120 Hester Donaldson Jenkins, Ibrahim Pasha: Grand Vizir of Suleiman the Magnificent, (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1911), 18-20.  
121 Albèri, Serie 3, v. 3, 103. 
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wars in history.122 Bragadin also underlines that Ibrahim was much loved by the 
Ottoman Sultan; the latter could not be without him and he used to sleep in the 
Palace together with the Sultan.123  He was bound up in luxury; he wore many 
jeweled rings and dressed in a more lavish style than the Sultan did.124 He desired to 
have every fancy goods, especially the jewelry. This interest made him closer to the 
most important expert of the commerce of jewelry and precious stones in Istanbul. 
That was Alvise Gritti. 
It is not clear when Alvise Gritti and Ibrahim Pasha met and got closer; the 
documents do not reveal any relation before 1523. However, it can be thought that, 
as a Venetian merchant trading various goods in the Empire, Alvise Gritti could meet 
Ibrahim Pasha before. On the other hand, especially after the appointment of Ibrahim 
Pasha to the post of the Grand Vizierate their paths definitely crossed. Robert Finlay 
states that the Grand Vizier consumed exclusively the sweet wines and these were 
provided by Alvise Gritti.125  Moreover, Sultan Suleyman was very interested in 
jewelry than the other Ottoman Sultans. “His childhood training as a gold-smith 
contributed not only to his unprecedented patronage of local goldsmiths and jewelers 
attached to the court workshops, but also to a lively jewel trade with Venice in which 
Alvise came to play an important role.”126 For that reason, Ibrahim Pasha often 
bought expensive jewelry or high quality precious stones in order to present them to 
the Sultan, and the best address was Alvise Gritti. Ottoman documents clearly show 
that not only the Grand Vizier Ibrahim Pasha, but also other high ranking Ottoman 
state officers purchased luxurious goods, especially precious stones from Beyoğlu. A 
temessük, certificate of debt, given from the Vizier Ayas Pasha to the agent of Alvise 
                                                 
122 Ibid.  
123 Ibid.  
124 Ibid. 
125 Finlay, “Al servizio…”, p. 79.  
126 Necipoğlu,  405.  
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Gritti named Niccola, authenticates that in the year of 1532, some amounts of garnets 
costing thirty thousand Ottoman akçe, were bought from the commercial network of 
Alvise Gritti. 127  In these commercial traffics, Alvise Gritti got closer with the 
Ottoman officers, especially with the Grand Vizier Ibrahim Pasha who later 
introduced him to the Sultan as a great connoisseur of jewels.128 This was the first 
sign of his future career.  
Alvise Gritti did not only sell the commercial goods in the Ottoman lands, he 
also provided some materials for his homeland in case of necessity. One of the 
important problems of Venice was the shortage of grain, especially during the times 
of constant wars. In this aspect, the Serenissima generally preferred to turn its face to 
its best commercial partner, the Ottoman Empire. On the other hand, in the Ottoman 
Empire, the general perception of commerce was the import of the scarce materials, 
rather than the export of the surplus. The surplus, instead, should be stored for the 
states of demand. Especially, grain was discouraged to be sold because it was 
important in order not to catch out a food shortage. However, this fact could be 
moderated in practice. In case of an acute need, the Ottoman State sold grain to 
foreign states, Ottoman Empire, gave permission to carry out grain trade with foreign 
countries on condition that the needs of its own people were met. At this point, the 
intermediary actors, familiar with the conditions of the both side, became the 
catalyzing elements. During his stay in Istanbul, when grain shortage happened in 
Venice, Alvise Gritti also played an important role of intermediary between the 
dealers of grain, provided by the Ottoman state, and his homeland. Many documents 
preserved in the Archivio Stato di Venezia support this argument. By the light of the 
                                                 
127 “[…] zikr olan la’ller beg oglı âdemisi Nikola getürdigi la’llerdir[…]”, ASV, Documenti Turchi, 
Busta XII, (Busta 1, Fasc. 23, Pezzi 12). This document was published by M. Tayyib Gökbilgin, see: 
M. Tayyib Gökbilgin, “Venedik Devlet Arşivindeki Vesikalar Külliyatında Kanunî Sultan Suleyman 
Devri Belgeleri”, Belgeler, Temmuz 1964, v.1 no 2,  200-201.   
128 Necipoğlu, 405.  
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archival documents, Gizella Nemeth Papo and Adriano Papo mention that in the 
grain shortage of 1527, Alvise Gritti sent a cargo of grain to Venice by mediating 
between the dealers.129 However, the letters written by Alvise Gritti in 1526 to his 
father Andrea Gritti, occupying the seat of doge at that time, reveal that even two 
years before Alvise Gritti could realize the shipment of grain over Syria and Cyprus 
to Venice. 130  Interestingly, in the same letters, it is talked about the upcoming 
expedition to Hungary planned by the Grand Vizier Ibrahim Pasha and a sale of lead 
to the Ottoman Empire. Alvise Gritti seems again controlling this procedure. In one 
of the letters dated on January 4, 1526, Alvise Gritti announces the great preparations 
of war in the Ottoman Empire for an expedition held from sea and land.131 The grain 
trade to Venice echoed also in the later Ottoman documents; here also Alvise Gritti 
seems act as an agent between the Republic and the Ottoman Empire, and provides 
grain to Venetian merchants by using his good reputation on the eyes of the sultan.132 
Taking into consideration these data, it can be argued that the Ottoman Empire 
                                                 
129 Niccolo Barbarigo mentiones that Andrea Gritti had written to his son Alvise Gritti in Istanbul only 
two letters. One of them was sent in the times of a great hunger in Italy in order to demand grain from 
the Ottoman Empire in which he served. “Due sole lettere scrisse Andrea ad Alvise doppo che 
conguinse l’animo e l’attioni alle cose Turchi; l’una  quando l’Italia da grand fame assalita, tratto seco, 
che procurasse col Re sa condetta de formenti da queli Paesi alla nostra citta;…” Barbarigo, 93 
Gizella Nemeth Papo and Adriano Papo fortify the argument by using the documets on the demand of 
grain of Venice from the Ottoman Empire by using the reports of Consiglio dei Dieci dated on 
Settember 19, 1927. ASV, Consiglio dei Dieci, Segreti, Reg. 2, 24v-25r [25v-26r], 26r-26v [27r-27v], 
26r-27v [27r-28v], in Papo, Papo, p. 31.  However, Andrea Gritti wrote many times to Alvise. In 
Archivio di Stato, especially in the collection of Ducali ed Atti Diplomatici, the other letters, especially 
written in 1529, can be detected. Some of these letters will be used in the text in the following chapter.  
130 The letters of Alvise Gritti dated on December 4, 1525, January 4, 1526, February 4, 1526. ASV, 
Dispacci degli Ambasciatori al Senato, Costantinopoli, Filza 1-A. 
131 “Non ni achade per questa dirli altro sollum che de qui se fa preparation grandissima de harmada si 
de mar come di terra[…]” Letter of Alvise Gritti, on  January 4, 1526, Ibid.   
132 The ferman, imperial order, sent to doge Andrea Gritti from Suleyman I in 1536 documents the 
grain demand of Venice from the Ottoman Empire, before the Ottoman expedition over Iraq, known as 
Irakeyn Seferi, in 1533-1536. As ferman states, Venetian bailo and envoy came to the Ottoman Palace 
and demanded grain by explaining the food shortage in Venice. On the other hand, the doge sent 
another letter to Alvise Gritti in this subject, and the latter also transmitted this acute need to Sultan. 
For that reason, Sultan consented on sending demanded grain from his personal revenue. The firman 
mentions that the payment of the grains was not effected on time, and when it was demanded from the 
Venetian envoy, he replied as “we bought the grain from the son of doge Lovizo who dead, and the 
payment is collected only in Venice”. ASV, Documenti Turchi, Busta 3, I 37.3 XII, in Gökbilgin, 149-
150.  
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demanded lead from Venice for its future expeditions over Hungary in return for its 
trade off the grain that the Serenissima needed, and in this procedure Alvise Gritti 
played a crucial role as intermediary and financer by the help of Grand Vizier 
Ibrahim.133 
Due to this wide range commercial network, the prestige of Alvise Gritti 
within the Ottoman Empire increased. He became the most prominent merchant, and 
soon became the leader of the Venetians living in Istanbul, providing them important 
commercial privileges, and financing as banker them in case of necessity. 134 
Furthermore he could accumulate a glaring wealth, allowing him to have an effulgent 
and expensive life.  As it was mentioned above, he was educated within the lines of 
humanist education of the time. He knew both the Venetian and Ottoman tradition, 
he was so close both the Venetian and Ottoman administration. In other words, he 
constituted a good mixture of Venetian and Ottoman motives within his personality 
and life style. Francesco Della Valle, his chamberlain and biographer, who entered to 
his service in the year of 1531 and served until his death in 1534, describes Alvise 
Gritti in his narration as follows: 
[…] era d’anni cinquanta dua in circa, di person assai 
grande, bruno di faccia, con naso Aquilino, e gioudile 
nell’aspetto; dottato di buonissime littere humane greche, et 
Lattine, era prontissimo et affabile nel parlare, padrone 
assoluto della Lingua Turcha, et della Grecha, […] Il suo 
vestire era all’ usanza Turchesca di setta, e d’oro; portava in 
testa una berretta di Gibellini, et vestiva pomposamente, 
mutandosi ogni giorno di vesti. Ne usava di portar più di sei, 
ouer otto volte un vestimento, ma quelli che si spogliava si 
donava a suoi servitori. 
 
                                                 
133 Ferenc Szakály also proves this argument with the example of tin. He states that after 1523, with 
the election of his father as the doge of Venice and after having close relations with the new Ottoman 
Grand Vizier Ibrahim Pasha, Alvise Gritti became one of the most important army contractors in the 
Ottoman Empire. He underlines that between September 1524 and February 1527, not least than a 
total of seventeen tons of tin were delivered in eight lots to the gun foundry of Istanbul by a person 
whose almost undecipherable name in the related documents could be read as Gritti. See: Szakály, 15.  
134 Papo, Papo, 30.  
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[…][he] was circa at the age of fifty two, a person tall 
enough, brown faced, with an Aquiline nose, young in 
appearance; studied the finest Greek and Latin humanist 
literature, was very clever and decent in speaking, absolute 
patron of the Turkish and Greek language, […] His mode of 
dressing was in Turkish style of silk and gold brocade, wore 
on head a Gibellini headgear, and dressed in a big way, 
changed his clothes every day. [He] used to wear more than 
six or eight times one dress, but those he charged off, he gave 
them to his servants.135 
 
The accounts of Benedetto Ramberti, the author of the books Libri Tre delle 
Cose de Turchi, on Alvise Gritti have also similar characteristics with the statements 
of Francesco Della Valle: 
Veste in tutto alla Turchesca, eccetto che non porta il 
tolupane in testa, ma porta uno cappelletto di Zebellini in 
forma di piramide, come sogliono portare gli Ungari. È di 
età di cinquantaquatro in circa, ma nella faccia et nella 
disposizione del corpo dimostra à pena aggionger à 
quaranta. È grande piu che di commune grandezza et e 
bene membruto, ha gli occhi grossi neri et vivi si, che 
pareno di foco. Le ciglia che si congiungono insieme et 
longhe assai. Il naso acquilino poco, et che pare torto. La 
barba nera et il color del volto e della carne fosco. Ha la 
voce sonora, et giusta: la quale accompagnata da alcuni 
movimenti di occhi, et di mano, fa che quando ei ragiona, 
ogn’uno sta intentissimo ad ascoltarlo. Parla di tutte le 
cose sensatamente, et con somma eloquentia in Lingua 
Turca, Greca, Latina et Italiana, che tutte queste gli sono 
famigliari: ma rare volte sa trovar fine a suoi 
raggionamenti, tanto che viene accusato di troppo 
parlare.  
 
[He] totally dresses in Turkish style, except that [he] does 
not wear the turban on head, but wears a Gibellini 
headgear of a pyramid form like the Hungarians used to 
wear. He was at the age of fifty four, circa, but from the 
face and the configuration of the body; [he] looks as just 
came to forty. [He] was taller than the common people, 
robust enough, has big dark and vivid eyes like resembling 
the fire. The eyelashes overlap each other and were long 
enough. The nose was aquiline a bit, and looks hooked. 
The beard [is] dark and the color of visage and skin was 
brown. He was a loud and effective voice that was 
                                                 
135 Della Valle, 18-19. 
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accompanied by some eye and hand movements, when he 
talks, everyone was so curious to listen to him. He talks 
about every subject, reasonably, and with total eloquence 
in Turkish, Greek, Latin and Italian languages that he is 
familiar with. But rarely, he knows to find so many 
plausible explanations to his speeches that he is accused of 
having talked too much.136 
 
Alvise Gritti had a luxurious and lordly life in Istanbul; many people worked 
for his service. He   had constituted a luxurious Italian style palace enclosed by 
elegant and charming gardens near Pera, which would later be named as Beyoğlu in 
reference to Alvise Gritti. Approximately, a thousand of people ate in his palace; 
more than five hundred among these were the slaves, bought by him.137 The stables 
of the palace hosted more than a hundred of horses, a hundred and fifty camels and 
sixty mules.138 Alvise Gritti, lived like a wealthy patrician, even like a prince of that 
time, and organized his palace order according to both Venetian and Ottoman 
tradition.  
Vive con Turchi al modo turchesco, et con Christiani alla 
Christiana: ma pur la corte sua, quando specialmente sta 
in Costantinopoli, è governata all’usanza de Turchi. Ha 
gli Capigi, Checcaia, Protogero, Serraglio di putti et di 
donne con l’ordine medesimo che ha il Signore, ma in 
proportione minore.    
 
He lives with Turks in Turkish mode and with Christians 
in Christian: but for his court, especially when it was in 
Istanbul, it was held by the way of Turks. He had the 
gatekeepers, eunuchs, guards, the palace of the girls and 
women with the same order that has the Sultan, but in a 
small proportion.139 
 
The palace of Alvise Gritti was also famous for the extraordinary abundance 
of its table. For example in 1524, it was held a feast in which three hundred guests, 
                                                 
136 Ramberti, ff 36v-37r.  
137 Ramberti, f. 36v. 
138Della Valle,  19.   
139 Ramberti, f. 36v.  
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including both Christians and Turks, were all served with sliver plates. Both 
Christians and Turks attended his sumptuous feasts, such as the one in 1524 when a 
performance of the classical comedy Psyche and Cupid was followed by songs and 
dances by Perote women and Turkish entertainers. In this festival, a classical comedy 
of Psyche and Cupid, played by the actors patronized by Gritti himself and the 
dances of Perote women entertained the guests.140 Alvise Gritti generally had the 
guests in his court; besides the Italian, generally the Venetian, merchants seeking his 
protection, the diplomats of not only the Serenissima, but also the other European 
states, came to his palace and had his advises. The relazioni of the Venetian 
ambassadors and envoys prove that the Venetian diplomats were in close 
relationship with Alvise Gritti.  According to Francesco Della Valle, the Grand 
Vizier Ibrahim Pasha and even the Sultan Suleyman I often visited him in his palace 
as incognito. 141  Although this information was also proved by the Habsburg 
ambassador to Istanbul, Cornelius Schepper142, it seems an exaggerated account. On 
the other hand, even at the level of rumor, this information figures the general 
perception of Alvise Gritti in the Ottoman Empire as an important figure very close 
to the Ottoman Palace itself. 
Alvise Gritti, grown in the Renaissance atmosphere, following the trend of 
the time, patronized numerous humanist and artists in his palace, such as Francesco 
Della Valle, his chamberlain and biographer; Tranquillo de Andreis, known as 
Andronicus Tranquillus, his secretary and Agostino Museo, a Dalmatian origin 
humanist and the teacher of his son Antonio. “Pietro Arentino, a typical court poet 
                                                 
140 Carlo Zen, being in Istanbul with the duty of the vicebailo in that year reports this feast to Signoria 
on February 14 1524 in his letter. For further information about the feast and observations of Carlo 
Zen see: Sanuto, v. 36, 117-122.; Szakály, 16; Finlay, “Al Servizio…”, 80; Necipoğlu, 404.  
141 “[…] nelli spessissime volte Solimano et Abrain Bassa in habito priccato venivano diporto.” Della 
Valle, 19.  
142 The observations of the Habsburg ambassador Cornelius Shepper was discussed in the article of 
Aurei Decei. For detailed information see: Decei, 13.    
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who was never at a loss for words to praise all the eminent personalities of the age, 
also seems to have been supported financially by Gritti. This poet of honeyed words 
applauded his benefactor’s virtues in a poem of sixty-six lines, and in September 
1534 he dedicated his Psalter-translations (I sette psalmi di David) to Gritti”.143 
Moreover, Bartolo Fontio, a Franciscan friar who had been translated one of the 
work of Luther into Italian, took refuge with Gritti when he had to flee from 
Venice.144 As it was stated above, his palace was generally the stage of festivals, in 
which the ancient plays and dance shows were performed. Alvise Gritti did not 
patronize only the learning men, or artists of his time, he was directly contributed to 
the production of knowledge. By using his observations in the Ottoman Empire, he 
aimed to explain the Ottoman system to foreigners, especially to his homeland. He 
was co-author of a pamphlet on the governmental structure of the Ottoman State 
with Dragoman Yunus Bey. This short pamphlet contained detailed information 
about the Ottoman sultan and the governmental structure; in other words the 
Ottoman system which was one of the most interesting subjects for Venetians, as 
well as for the rest of Europe.145   
                                                 
143 Szakály, 17.  
144 Ibid.  
145 The pamphlet, Opera noua la quale dechiara tutto il governo del gran Turcho e tutto la Spesa che 
il gran Turcho ha sotto di lui cosi in pace come in Guerra e il numero de le Persone e nome, e 
governo de le sue Donne e Garzoni che lui tene nel Serraglio serrati e de tutta la Entrata che lui 
lanno e nomina tutti li Signori de le sue province: E il nome de tutte le sue terre chelha sotto se: e la 
ordinanza del suo Campo quando va ala guerra como va in ordinanza tutte le persone a sorte per 
sorte e come vanna e che arme portano,  was printed in the original Italian. The short work talked 
about the structure of the Ottoman Empire in the time of Suleyman I, including a variety of details on 
the statesmen, Palace, servants of the Palace, the army, incomes and expenses of the Empire. It is not 
clear when Alvise Gritti and Dragoman Yunus Bey wrote this pamphlet, however it was reprinted in 
1537 in Venice. It can be argued that this short work written by the two important figures living in the 
Empire, in other words two direct observers might be an interesting reference source for the other 
people writing on the same subject. The transliteration of the whole work was published by Albert 
Howe Lybyer. See: Albert Howe Lybyer, The Government of the Ottoman Empire in the Time of 
Suleiman the Magnificent, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1913), 262-275.  
Here it is important to note that the cose dei Turchi, the issues about the Turks, was one of the most 
important components in the early modern political literature of Europe. Especially, after the 
conquests of the Ottoman Empire in the Balkan Peninsula and the Eastern European territories, 
European States and Papacy felt the danger of to be captured by the Ottomans, or as they called by 
Turks. In this context, Europe, lacking a political unity, while searching a unity against the Turks at 
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Concerning the information given above, it can be argued that Alvise Gritti 
was one of the examples of the “versatile” personalities of the Renaissance period 
who had the chance of advance in the Ottoman Empire. He was a merchant, a 
banker, the leader the Venetian merchants living and working in the Ottoman 
Empire, an unofficial diplomat of Venice, patron of humanists. He had a luxurious 
and effulgent life, like European princes of the time. In his career, the role of his 
family was indisputably fundamental: Alvise Gritti used a good reputation and a 
wide network in Istanbul which had been created by his ancestors. However, by his 
intelligence, ambitions and merits, he could create his own network soon and broke a 
new ground that his ancestors never did the same. He could not find the chance of a 
political career in Venice because of his illegitimate birth; but in the Ottoman 
Empire, he could. After 1526, he started to appear in the political stage of the 
Ottoman Empire thanks his close relationship with Sultan Suleyman I and mostly the 
Grand Vizier Ibrahim; he served as an Ottoman officer and played decisive roles in 
the international politics of the Empire until his death in 1534. In the following 
chapter, the political career of Alvise Gritti and his role in the international politics 
of the Ottoman Empire will be discussed.   
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                          
least in military level, tried to understand the Ottoman system which was different for them in order to 
understand the success and rise of the Empire. Therefore, besides the relazioni of the Venetian baili, 
many books or pamphlets were written by Europeans, especially by merchants, travelers or diplomats 
having the chance of staying in the Empire. Due to its political, diplomatic and most importantly 
commercial relations with the Ottomans, Venice was the most important center of information about 
the Turks. The books on Turks, as well as on other subjects, were mostly produced here and spread to 
the rest of the continent; the Republic in other word was the printing office for Europe especially in 
the fifteenth and sixteenth century. For further information about Venice and its being the center of 
information see: Peter Burke, “Early Modern Venice as a Center of Information and Communication”, 
in Venice Reconsidered: The History and Civilization of an Italian City-State 1297-1797, ed. by, John 
Martin and Dennis Romano, (Baltimore & London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2000), 389-
419.  For the literature on the Ottomans see: Soykut.      
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CHAPTER IV 
 
THE ROLE OF THE BEYOĞLU WITHIN THE OTTOMAN 
POLITICS 
 
 
Alvise Gritti was one of the few foreigners having the chance of a political career 
within the Ottoman political system. In fact, the Ottoman administration mainly 
consisted of the foreign origin people. However, these people strictly trained under 
the imperial education from their childhood and they lose their own personal 
identity; in other words, they Ottomanized. The source of this system was the method 
of devşirme based on the recruitment of non-Muslim male children from their 
families in their early teens, and their training first by the Muslim Turkish families 
and then within the acemi oğlanlar ocağı, school for the rookie boys. They also 
converted to Islam, and were raised according to the Islamic principles. After the 
preliminary training, while the ordinary devşirmes were taken into the Janissary 
corps in order to be trained as the private military forces of the Ottoman Sultan 
responsible for the security of the Sultan himself, the palace and the capital city, the 
most talented ones were sent to Enderun the palace school as iç oğlanı, pages, and 
they continued their training by serving the Ottoman Sultan with different duties in 
different rooms of the palace. During their training, they were subjected to 
continuous elimination and selection and after having concluded their education, they 
were sent to the Ottoman provinces as the high ranking state officers. At this point, it 
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is also important to note that, the education given to the devşirmes, both to janissaries 
and the pages were not only technical but also ideological; they internalized the 
Ottoman state mentality and the rules in bureaucracy, learnt to not to recognize any 
authority rather than the sultan himself. They did not have family ties, the only figure 
with whom they was bound up was the sultan himself and they should implicitly 
obey his will. The Ottomans called them kuls, the slaves of the sultan.146 With the kul 
system, the Ottomans created its bureaucrats knowing well the state ideology, 
faithful to the state and sultan, and free from any other dynastic or ideological ties 
threatening their allegiance to the system. Especially with the reign of Mehmed II, 
the administration of the Ottoman Empire was totally composed of the devsirme 
origin officers; however by the seventeenth century the system faced with a gradual 
dissolution.147  
 Alvise Gritti did not have such a devşirme origin; was not trained within the 
Ottoman system and he remained Christian148 until his death. At this point it is useful 
to ask how and why such a figure entered to the political life of the Ottoman Empire 
as an important actor. As it was discussed in the second chapter in details, the 
political conjuncture of the early sixteenth century required such these extraordinary 
                                                 
146 For detailed information about the devşirme tradition, kul system and the palace education see: 
Halil İnalcık, Devlet-i ‘Aliyye: Osmanlı İmparatorluğu Üzerine Araştırmalar, v. 1, (İstanbul: İş 
Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 2009),  205-217; Lybyer, 49-55, 90-120.  About the “twin institutions”; 
devşirme and janissaries see: Speros Vryonis Jr., “Isidore Glabas and the Turkish Devshirme”, 
Speculum, v. 31, issue 3, (July 1956), 433-443. About the rooms in the palace and their functions in 
the education of pages see: Gülrû Necipoğlu, Architecture, Ceremonial and Power: The Topkapı 
Palace in the Fifteenth and Sixteenth Centuries, (Cambridge & Massachusetts & London: The MIT 
Press, 1991), 111-122.  In this subject the Italian accounts are also interesting. The relazioni of the 
Venetian baili give information about the system. At this point, it is also important to mention 
Giovanni Antonio Menavino. Menavino was a Genovese, presented to Bayezid II by a corsair and 
served the sultan as a royal page until 1514. When he returned to Italy, after having concluded his 
service Menavino wrote an interesting book about the Ottomans and the Ottoman system. In his book 
the devşirme system and the palace are described in details from the one who experienced it 
personally: Giovanni Antonio Menavino, Vita et Legge Turchesca, in Francesco Sansovino, Historia 
Universale dell’ Origine Guerre et Imperio de Turchi, (Venice, 1654), 36v-38v. 
147 İnalcık, Devlet-i ‘Aliyye…, 214-216.  
148 On the other hand, Kretscmayr argues that in order not to take opposition, Gritti showed himself as 
converted to Islam in the Ottoman Empire. Kretschmayr, 14.   
61 
 
political actors like Alvise Gritti, dealing with the complex affairs of the time, 
besides the existing bureaucrats of the contemporary states. In the Ottoman Empire 
also there was an acute need for active diplomats competent on various languages to 
act in the communication network. Besides the Ottoman bureaucrats, like Dragoman 
Yunus Bey, a non-Ottoman figure who could act as emissary and mediator on be half 
of the sultan, and inform the administration about the general situation of the 
European states and potentates would be instrumental for the Ottoman Empire 
especially in this period when Europe faced with a political chaos and the Ottoman-
Habsburg rivalry was so acute. In this respect, Alvise Gritti appeared as one of the 
best candidates to be utilized by the Ottoman administration. As it was mentioned 
before, his personal talents, family ties and the influential and complex commercial 
network that he patronized assuredly played an important role in his stand out in the 
Ottoman capital and opened him a path to meet with the Ottoman high ranking 
officers. One of them, in fact the most important name of the Ottoman bureaucracy, 
would offer him a new life: the Grand Vizier Ibrahim Pasha. Their stars would 
ascend simultaneously and like two fellow-travelers they would also come to the end 
of the way together. 
 
 
4.1. Two Good Fellow-Travelers: Ibrahim Pasha and Alvise Gritti 
 
Although it is not evident how and when Alvise Gritti entered the political stage of 
the Ottoman Empire, it can be stated that due to his close relationship with Ibrahim 
Pasha he was most probably introduced to the Ottoman politics soon after the rise of 
the Pasha to the office of Grand Vizierate in 1523. As it was indicated in the 
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preceding chapter, Alvise Gritti was first introduced to the Palace as a great 
connoisseur of jewels. Furthermore, after the appointment of the Pasha as the new 
Grand Vizier, he became an unofficial advisor to the Pasha and the Palace. This point 
supports the fact that Alvise Gritti and Ibrahim Pasha had met and become close 
friends before 1523 because the Pasha would have never chosen a person that he 
neither knew well; nor trusted for that kind of a vital task. From this perspective, it 
will be significant to clarify why Ibrahim Pasha trusted an Istanbul born Venetian 
merchant that much and introduced him to the Ottoman politics in which he de facto 
played the most important role.  
At this instant, it is essential to note that the appointment of Ibrahim Pasha to 
the office of the Grand Vizierate was unexpected since it violated the traditional 
promotion rules of the Ottoman bureaucracy. The intimate relationship between 
Suleyman I and Ibrahim Pasha since their times of youth was discussed before. 
When Suleyman I came to the throne in 1520, he appointed Ibrahim, his faithful 
servant and close friend, as Şahincibaşı, Head Falconer. In a short time, Ibrahim 
became Has Odabaşı 149 , Master of the Privy Chamber, and soon after he was 
appointed as the fourth vizier.150 In 1523, following the discharge of Piri Mehmed 
Pasha with a pension, who was famous for his successful role in the conquest of 
Belgrade in 1521 and for his opposition to the expedition against Rhodes in 1522, 
                                                 
149 To enter the Has Oda, was the most important position for a page because he met with the Ottoman 
sultan every day; he went wherever the sultan went and dealt with his personal affairs. After having 
concluded his service he could be appointed to the highest ranking offices. In order to serve in the 
Privy Chamber, the pages had to find favors in the eyes of the Sultan and their promotion was related 
to him. Colin Imber, Osmanlı İmparatorluğu 1300-1650, (İstanbul: Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 
2006), 200.  For detailed information about the responsibilities of Has Odabaşı see: İsmail Hakkı 
Uzunçarşılı, Osmanlı Devleti’nin Saray Teşkilâtı, (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1988), 340.  
150 For detailed information about the rise of Ibrahim Pasha in the Ottoman bureaucracy see: Jenkins, 
18-42. Here, it should be also mentioned that until the reign of Suleyman I, despite the lack of any 
written rule, the Sultans used to have three viziers in their Divan. However, with the reign of 
Suleyman I the numbers of the viziers increased to four. Colin Imber points out that the in order to 
appoint Barabaros Hayreddin Pasha to the membership of Divan as the title of vizier in 1540’s. Imber, 
208. It seems that the tradition was reformulated by Sulyeman I; however, it is more probable that this 
change was realized in favor to Ibrahim rather than Barbaros Hayreddin Pasha.   
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Suleyman I appointed Ibrahim as the Beylerbeyi, Governor, of Rumelia, and 
consequently Grand Vizier.151 This appointment raised the disturbance among the 
Ottoman high-ranking officials. According to the Ottoman tradition, generally the 
second vizier was accepted as the nominee for the office of Grand Vizierate152; 
however instead of Ahmed Pasha, the second vizier of Suleyman I, who was Ibrahim 
Pasha who took hold of mühr-i hümayun 153 , the imperial seal. From that time 
onwards he became the most important name in the Ottoman Empire after the sultan; 
he gained the right of supervision over all state units and a decisive role in the 
domestic and international state politics. One year later, he got married to the sister 
of the Sultan. Thus, besides their close friendship, Suleyman I and Ibrahim Pasha 
became also relatives. On the other hand, since he was promoted abruptly without 
having much experience in the state affairs; so, he needed an advisor. All other 
Ottoman officers severely reacted to his rapid promotion, and to the inconceivable 
favor of the sultan. Hence, it is presumable that, he turned his face to his close 
Venetian friend Alvise Gritti not as an advisor only for political, but also for 
economic and military affairs.  
                                                 
151  Peçevî İbrahim Efendi, Târih-i Peçevî, (Istanbul: Enderun Kitabevi, 1980), 20, 79; Feridun 
Emecen, “İbrâhim Paşa, Makbul”, DİA, 333-335, 333; Merriman,  76.  
152 İnalcık, Classical Age, 97. The violation of the promotion rules in the appointment of Ibrahim 
Pasha to the Grand Vizierate was also accentuated by the contemporary Ottoman chronicler Peçevî. 
By noting the appointment of Aysa Pasha to the Grand Vizierate after the death of Ibrahim Pasha, 
Peçevî not only mentions the tradition of the promotion to the Grand Vizierate but also criticizes the 
previous exercise between the lines: “Vezir-i â‘zam Ayâs Paşa İbrahim Paşa katlinde vezîr-i sâni 
bulunmağla ba-hasb’ü’t-tarîk vezîr-i â‘zam oldu.”, Peçevî, 20. Moreover, it should be also mentioned 
that since the reign of Suleyman I, despite the lack of any written rule, the Sultans used to have three 
viziers. However, with the reign of Suleyman I the numbers of the viziers increased to four. Colin 
Imber points out that the in order to appoint Barabaros Hayreddin Pasha to the membership of Divan 
as the title of vizier in 1540’s. Colin Imber, Osmanlı İmparatorluğu 1300-1650, (İstanbul: Bilgi 
Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2006), 208. It seems that the tradition was reformulated by Sulyeman I; 
however, it is more probable that this change was realized in favor to Ibrahim rather than Barbaros 
Hayreddin Pasha.   
153 In the Ottoman Empire, the sultan gave his imperial seal to the Grand Vizier after the latter’s 
appointment as s symbol of the right of absolute representation. The recall of the seal meant the 
dismissal of the Grand Vizier. For detailed information about the rights and duties of the Grand Vizier 
in the Ottoman Empire see: İnalcık, Classical Age, 96-97.  
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On the other hand, in relation to his purposes in international politics, 
securing the support of a Venetian was beneficial for the Grand Vizier. Ibrahim 
Pasha appeared to favor Venice and the Venetians living in the Ottoman Empire. His 
desire for luxurious goods had already opened the path of establishing good relations 
with the Venetian merchants who provided him a variety of goods from jewelry to 
wine. Moreover, the studies about the Grand Vizier clearly reveal the fact that 
Ibrahim Pasha adapted a pro-Venetian international policy during his office. This 
argument was proved also by some Venetian documents. Especially in some of the 
relazioni of the Venetian baili, Ibrahim Pasha was defined as the amico della 
Signoria, friend of the Venetian government.154 This fact was generally explained by 
the origin of Ibrahim Pasha. As it was asserted before, Ibrahim Pasha was born in the 
city of Parga, which had been an old Venetian colony before the Ottoman conquest. 
The scholars underline that his affiliation as a former Venetian subject affected the 
political vision of the Pasha, thus he followed a moderate and peaceful policy 
towards the Serenissima during his office.155 At this point, Alvise Gritti, the son of 
the Doge of Venice, was not considered only as an advisor, but also as an accredited 
mediator between the Signoria and the Pasha. 
Since his prompt promotion received severe reactions from the Ottoman 
bureaucracy, Ibrahim Pasha had to act very cautiously to secure his position by 
paying attention to his connections. As he was inexperienced in the state affairs, he 
needed an advisor and an assistant. On the other hand, having collaboration with an 
Ottoman bureaucrat who also had the chance of having a promotion within the 
                                                 
154 As an example of the usage of amico della Signoria, see: “Relazione di Pietro Bragadin, read in 
June 9, 1526”, Albèri, s.3, v.3, 103.    
155 Not only the modern scholars, but also the Venetian baili state that the favor of Ibrahim Pasha 
towards Christians was related to his origin.  In 1523, orator Pietro Zen underlines this fact as 
following: “[...] amar molto la Signoria nostra per esser nassudo soto il so’dominio.” Sanuto XXXV, 
259.  
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government would have been a threat for the Pasha. That kind of a person could 
suddenly attract the attention of the Sultan and by using the inexperience of the 
Pasha, he could undermine him. Ibrahim Pasha could not take that risk. However, 
Alvise Gritti was a Christian and was outside the Ottoman bureaucracy. He himself 
also needed the favor of the Pasha to fulfill his commercial interests that were 
substantially important for the future of his life in the Ottoman capital. Besides, his 
personal qualifications were also appropriate for that task. He was very intelligent, 
adroit, energetic and diplomatic. He was coming from a noble family, thus he knew 
well the court etiquette. Before he had never served in the state administration, but he 
was trained as a patrician; the state affairs were familiar to him. Through his father, 
he was introduced to the features of international politics and he was competent in 
numerous languages. Since he was the de facto head of the Venetian colony in 
Istanbul, he had a wide network including not only the Venetian and other 
merchants, but also the Ottomans bureaucrats and the representatives of the foreign 
states. In this context, Alvise Gritti seemed to be the best alternative to be the advisor 
even the assistant of Ibrahim Pasha and the Pasha did not hesitate to turn his face to 
his close friend for his support when he needed his cooperation.   
These arguments were also proven by some of the Venetian sources of the 
time. For example, in his Libri Tre, Benedetto Ramberti reflects the fact that Ibrahim 
Pasha preferred Alvise Gritti as his advisor, because of his inexperience in the state 
affairs. In addition, Ramberti underlines that Gritti was Christian; hence he could 
never be superior to the Grand Vizier.  
…per la poca esperientia che havea delle cose del mondo 
sostenere, se elesse il detto signore Aloygio Gritti come per 
consigliero delle sue attioni, ilquale per essere Christiano non 
gli parea compagno, ne temea che potesse farsi maggiore di se: 
et per esser nasciuto come egli era, che gli toleva ogni speranza 
di farsi in Venetia grande; molto si assicurava che gli fusse 
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fedele, aspettando ogni suo bene di li, dove era nato et 
accresciuto in qualche dignitate et non altrove. 
 
…because of the little experience of the world affairs he had, he 
elected the aforementioned Aloygio Gritti as counselor for his 
actions, who neither appeared to him as a companion since he 
was Christian, nor did he fear the fact that he would overpower 
him. Since he was born the way he was, this prevented every 
possibility for him to have a career in Venice. He really cared 
that he was loyal to him. He expected and hoped every prospect 
and office from where he was born and raised and not from 
elsewhere.156 
 
Similarly, in 1534, the Venetian secretary, Daniello de Ludovisi, in his relazione, 
reports to the Senate the reason why Ibrahim Pasha had preferred Alvise Gritti as his 
advisor as follows: 
La causa di questo favore si dice essere che Ibrahim uscito dal 
serraglio primo pascià e beilerbei di Grecia, senza esperienza e 
pratica del mondo e del governo degli stati e volendo non 
solamente servirsi de’Turchi ma levarli di mezzo, si è 
grandemente servito del detto Signor Luigi; il quale sebbene non 
aveva fatta per innanzi professione delle cose di stato, niente di 
meno aveva grandissima intelligenza delle cose, massime 
de’cristiani, ed era come è , di buon ingegno e di valore, e di 
animo molto grande ed elevato ed altissimo a maneggi grandi. 
Talmente che non vuol perder punto della grandezza ed autorità 
sua, e per natura e molto disposto a far servizio a chi lo ricerca. 
 
The reason of this favor, it is said that Ibrahim, came out of the 
palace as the prime pasha and beylerbeyi of Greece, without 
experience and practice of the world, and government of the 
states, and wanting not to be served only by Turks, but to 
eliminate them, he was mainly served by aforementioned Signor 
Luigi Gritti; although he had not have before any profession 
about the state affairs, nothing less he had grand intelligence 
about the [other] matters, in maximum those of Christians, and 
[he] was of the good ingenious, and of values, and of the very 
high dignity and [he is] advanced and highest to handle with the 
big deals. Insomuch as that [he] does not want to lose the point 
of his dignity and authority, and by his nature, [he] is ready to 
serve to anyone seeking him.157  
 
In fact, the reason why Ibrahim Pasha preferred Alvise Gritti was not only his 
inexperience in state affairs and the genuine need of the Pasha as an advisor, who 
                                                 
156 Ramberti, 35v-36r.  
157 Albèri, s.3, v.1, 30.  
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would never challenge his position, but also because Ibrahim Pasha also felt drawn to 
the Beyoğlu more than his other colleagues because they had very similar personal 
characteristics, and goals. It can be argued that, like Alvise Gritti, Ibrahim Pasha, 
himself was also a “versatile personality” of the time. Apart from his political career, 
he was also interested in arts and intellectual studies. He had a very appealing and 
luxurious life in Istanbul. One year after his appointment to the Grand Vizierate, a 
splendid palace 158  was built for him at the Atmeydanı, Hippodrome Square in 
Istanbul. His palace was not only his house, at the same time it was the meeting point 
of one of the most important intellectual networks. Ibrahim Pasha was “a generous 
patron of poetry, scholarship and the arts.”159 Most of the prominent poets of the time 
gained the opportunity of presenting their works to him, especially in the sumptuous 
festivals held in his palace, and they were generously rewarded.160 In fact, he was not 
so different from the European elites patronizing numerous humanists in the 
Renaissance era.  
He did not only patronize the artists or scholars, but was also personally 
engaged in arts and intellectual studies: he played the violin excellently, wrote 
poetry, studied law and philosophy; and eagerly followed the domestic and 
international politics of the other states of his time. On account of his competence in 
Persian, Greek and Italian languages, he could directly communicate with the 
representatives of the other states and foreigners living in the Ottoman Empire. He 
                                                 
158 Walter G. Andrews, Mehmet Kalpaklı, The Age of Beloveds: Love and the Beloved in Early Modern 
Ottoman and European Culture and Society, (Durham & London: Duke University Press, 2005), 238. 
For detailed information about the palace of Ibrahim Pasha see: Nurhan Atasoy, İbrahim Paşa Sarayı, 
(İstanbul: İ.Ü Edebiyat Fakültesi Basımevi, 1972).  
159 Ibid., 239.  Especially after his appointment to the Grand Vizierate, Ibrahim Pasha started to 
patronize numerous poets and created one of the most important networks of literature in his palace. 
For detailed information about the network of Ibrahim and the works of the poets that he patronized 
see: Esma Tezcan, Pargalı İbrahim Paşa Çevresindeki Edebi Yaşam, Bilkent University Institute of 
Economics and Social Sciences Department of Turkish Literature, June 2004. (Unpublished master 
thesis) 
160 Ibid. , 47- 48. 
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was interested in history; he read the biographies of Alexander the Great and 
Hannibal, and the stories of the heroes and great wars in history.161 These classical 
stories also influenced his political vision and future actions. Moreover, he did not 
have such a conservative tendency towards art as other statesmen had; he was 
curious about paintings and sculptures. After the victorious battle of Mohács, when 
he returned from Buda in 1526, he brought three sculptures of Apollo, Hercules and 
Diana as booty and he set them up in front of his palace.162 This was a staggering 
situation for a Muslim society. Therefore, in time, he was harshly criticized by the 
rest of the Ottoman bureaucrats and there occurred a storm of rumor about his piety 
labeled by the below couplet attributed to Figani, one of the famous poets of the 
sixteenth century, went from tongue to tongue:  
Dü İbrahim amed be deyr-i cihan;  
Yeki put-şiken şüt, yeki put-nişan. 
 
In this world two Abrahams appeared; 
One idols broke, the other idols reared.163 
 
Although this allegory, which shows clearly how Ibrahim Pasha was 
misperceived within the Ottoman social milieu, caused the murder of its poet; it gave 
an upper hand to his opponents claiming that he was not sincere in his conversion to 
Islam and preserved his Christian faith and even some polytheistic tendencies.164 As 
a proof of this argument, it was often stated that Ibrahim did not forget his origin and 
family.165 Her mother and his two brothers lived in his palace. He even provided the 
governorship of a sancak for his father. 166  The evident favor of Ibrahim Pasha 
towards Christians supported also the claims of his opponents. “The Venetians seem 
                                                 
161 Bragadin, 103. 
162 Andrews, Kalpaklı, 240. 
163 Ibid. 
164 Ibid. 
165 Jenkins, 19 
166 Ibid.  
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to have regarded Ibrahim as favorable to them and needy Christians in the empire 
turned to him for help and sometimes were freed by him from captivity and 
death.”167 In his time, Ibrahim Pasha was called as Frenk Ibrahim168 pejoratively by 
the Ottoman political elites.  
It is not possible to comment on the real faith of Ibrahim Pasha. In relation to 
his life and his political and cultural perspectives, it can be argued that he was closer 
to the western political and cultural thought than most of the other Ottoman 
bureaucrats and he made considerable efforts to incorporate some western ideals into 
the Ottoman political conjuncture. Therefore, Alvise Gritti probably became his best 
supporter. In a very short time, he introduced Gritti to the Ottoman politics. From 
that time onwards, they were not only close friends; but also two good fellow-
travelers who would run concurrently both to success and to death.    
 
 
4.2 The Introduction of Alvise Gritti to the Political Stage 
 
The introduction of Alvise Gritti to the political stage coincided with the rise of the 
political crisis in Hungary which would last for almost thirty years. In the sixteenth 
century, Hungary was cut out for a person intending to have an illustrious political 
career since it was “the most troublous; but perhaps the most promising region”169 of 
the sixteenth century. As it was mentioned before, due to its strategic importance, it 
was considered as a key point to march towards the Central Europe and a buffer zone 
for European states to stop the Ottoman expansion. But by 1527, Hungary started to 
                                                 
167 Ibid., 111.  
168 Among the Ottomans, the title of Frenk was used for Europeans. The contemporaries of Ibrahim 
Pasha were also aware of his sympathy towards Europe and European thoughts, and they severely 
criticized him.  
169 Kumrular, 41. 
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experience an internal political crisis that the other important powers of the time 
followed very carefully and interfered in according to their own interests in the 
international politics. This politically chaotic milieu made the Hungarian territories 
an open stage on which the great powers of the time settled their accounts with his 
rivals and the politically ambitious personalities got around to show their talents, 
acquire a good reputation in the current international politics and maximize their 
benefits by using this reputation as well as the opportunities created by the chaos 
itself.  Alvise Gritti became also one of those personalities, perhaps the most flaming 
and fascinating one, through the favor of his dearest friend and patron, the Grand 
Vizier Ibrahim Pasha.  
In the early-sixteenth century, Hungary became an international question. As 
it was discussed in details in the second chapter, the principle policy of the Ottoman 
Sultan, Suleyman I, in the sixteenth century was to expand its territories in Europe 
and to limit the advance of his major rival Charles V, the Habsburg Emperor, 
throughout the continent in order to prevent a possible political unification of Europe 
under the Habsburg flag. Therefore, he intended to control two important strategic 
points: Hungary and the Eastern Mediterranean. It is not surprising that in his first 
two years on the throne, Suleyman I conquered Belgrade and the island of Rhodes 
and when the French King Francis I imprisoned by Charles V and asked his help, he 
did not hesitate to reply to him by marching towards Hungary. By going an 
expedition towards the Hungarian lands, Suleyman I killed two birds with one stone: 
he both annexed the key point of the Central Europe to his domination and then by 
attacking a kingdom which had been attached itself to the Habsburg Empire through 
the dynastic marriages and contracts, he proved that the Ottoman Empire would be 
the major obstacle before the Habsburg advance. 
71 
 
On August 26, 1526, at the steps of Mohács, the Ottoman forces brought 
down all the Hungarian resistance, entered the city of Buda and murdered the 
Hungarian King Lajos II. On November 10, 1526, the Voivode of Transylvania Janos 
Szápolyai was elected as the King of Hungary by the overwhelming majority of the 
Hungarian estates, and this election was approved by the Suleyman I.170 However, 
János Szápolyai was not the only nominee for the Hungarian throne. Almost a month 
after his election, on December 17, other Hungarian princes opposing the election of 
Szápolyai, declared Ferdinand I of Habsburg, the king of Bohemia and the archduke 
of Austria, the new Hungarian king. Ferdinand claimed to be the legitimate king 
through he was married to the sister of the murdered King Lajos II. Moreover, Lajos 
II was the husband of Mary of Habsburg, the sister of Ferdinand and Charles V. 
Since Lajos II did not have a legitimate heir, Ferdinand could easily claim for the 
right of succession to the Hungarian throne.171  
In this context, after the return of the Ottoman army, Ferdinand I marched 
towards Buda with the support of the some Hungarian princes and defeated János 
Szapolyai and his supporters in Tokay on September 27, 1527. On November 3, he 
was crowned as the King of Hungary.172 Hereupon, Szápolyai and his forces were 
obliged to retreat to Transylvania. It was obvious that this disorder was going to 
disturb the Ottoman Sultan, who had conquered the city a year ago and recognized 
Szapolyai as the legitimate king. For that reason, Ferdinand I decided to send envoys 
to the Ottoman capital in order to defend his cause and demand his recognition as the 
new Hungarian king. At the same time, Szápolyai also realized the importance of 
                                                 
170 Uzunçarşılı, Osmanlı Tarihi, 127.  
171 Ibid., 327-328.  
172 At this point, it would be interesting to note that in the course of the war, most of the supporters of 
Szápolyai changed sides, and thus Ferdinand easily marched towards Buda without trying to dispose 
any resistance. Ferenc Szákaly notes that, on his coronation, Ferdinand I was surrendered practically 
by the same group that had applauded Szápolyai in his ceremony hardly a year ago. Szakály, 42.  
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gaining the support of the Ottoman Sultan in order to prevail over his rival. By the 
suggestions of his father-in-law Sigismund, the King of Poland, he sent a Polish 
nobleman named Hieronymus Laski to Istanbul to offer his friendship to the Sultan 
and request his help.173 From that time on, Suleyman I did not only act as an arbiter, 
his decisions determined the future of Hungary, as well as the future of the European 
state system. 
Hieronymus Laski came to Istanbul in December 1527, visited the viziers 
according to the ceremonial use and presented himself to Grand Vizier Ibrahim 
Pasha on December 22.174 “The Grand Vizier was astonished to hear that the King of 
Hungary, a country which they had crushed and ransacked, took the liberty to offer 
his friendship to the Magnificent Padishah without paying due homage and tribute in 
reciprocation [...]”. 175  Laski could not get satisfactory results from his first 
conversations and soon realized that he was in need of a mediator who knew the 
Ottoman bureaucracy well and who had good relations with the viziers holding the 
supremacy over the decisions of the Sultan. At that instant, he approached Alvise 
Gritti.176 Not surprisingly, this idea of mediation was given to him by Ibrahim Pasha.  
It is not clear whether Alvise Gritti got involved in the Hungarian affairs 
before, but when he entered the negotiations in 1527 he gave the impression of being 
much more prepared and informed about the political and diplomatic 
                                                 
173 Hieronymus Laski was a good candidate for this important task because he had previous diplomatic 
experience at the Porte in the service of King Sigismund of Poland, and he knew well the bureaucratic 
structure of the Empire. Merriman, p. 100.  
174  During their meetings with Hieronymus Laski, the Ottoman viziers, in their meetings with 
Hieronymus Laski, unanimously declared him that the Hungarian territories were conquered by the 
Ottoman Sultan, and as a land taken by sword, all of the whole country belonged to the Ottoman 
Empire, not to Ferdinand or Szapolyai himself with a sarcastic tone. These conversations, in fact, are 
good examples of the characteristics of the Ottoman politics and diplomacy. For detailed information 
about the conversations occurred between the viziers and the Polish diplomat see:  Hammer, pp. 104-
108.  
175 Szakály, 44.  
176 Ibid.  
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developments.177 This information is also proved by the documents conserved in 
Archivio Stato di Venezia (State Archive of Venice). In the collection of the Dispacci 
degli Ambasciatori al Senato, Filza 1-A (Dispatches of the Ambassadors to the 
Senate File 1-A) there are four letters of Alvise Gritti written in 1526. These letters 
were probably not revealed before, concerning that they were not used in the 
previous studies about Gritti. By analyzing these four letters, one can infer that 
Alvise Gritti started to appear in the politics of the Ottoman Empire in the context of 
the Hungarian affairs even before the Battle of Mohács in 1526. The four letters 
mainly enlighten the Senate of Venice, about the war preparations in the Ottoman 
Empire, in the winter of 1526. The letters also contain information about the 
transportation of grain form the Empire to Venice in exchange for lead needed for 
the campaign. In this trade, it seems that Ibrahim Pasha used the Beyoğlu as 
mediator.178 Furthermore, according to the letters the task of Gritti was not limited 
only with the commercial mediation. In the letter dated on February 4, 1526, Alvise 
Gritti mentions that he was going to participate in the Ottoman campaign against 
Hungary and asks the opinion of the Venetian Senate especially his father Andrea 
Gritti about the subject as follows:  
El mi resta dir a vostra serenittà che se mettiamo in hordine 
per andar in canpo et iudicho che per ttutto el futturo mese se 
mettaremo a chamino per andar in sochorso del re Zuane et 
io come per alttre mie ho scritto a vostra serenittà de hordine 
et comandamentto del magnifico Base seguirò el canpo […] 
magnifico Ibraim Basse non mi sia per manchar de haver 
qualche bene perché zertto vostra serenittà non lo pottria 
                                                 
177 Szakaly, 44. Ibrahim Pasha introduced Alvise Gritti to the Polish diplomat as an advisor of the 
Ottoman Empire concerning the Hungarian affairs. Moreover, he alerted the diplomat that if the 
advises and mediations of the son of doge and the Republic of Venice had not convinced the Sultan, 
the Ottoman army would have gone to the second expedition in Hungary in the year of 1527 to 
conquer the entire kingdom. The Ibrahim also noted that for a third power it was easier to defeat its 
two enemies when there occurred a power struggle between them. For detailed information see: M. 
Tayyib Gökbilgin, “Kanunî Sultan Suleyman’ın Macaristan ve Avrupa Siyaseti’nin Sebep ve Âmilleri, 
Geçirdiği Safhalar”, Kanunî Armağanı, (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 2001), 5-39, 16-17.  
178 “[…] 3 in 4 mila piombi richiestolo dal magnifico Ibraim Bassa […]”, Letter of Alvise Gritti to the 
Senate,  on  January 4, 1526, ASV, Dispacci degli Ambasciatori al Senato, Filza 1-A.  
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creder quantta sia la gracia sua verso di me suo servittor. Io 
per le prezedentti mie ho scritto a vostra serenittà quelo saria 
l’anemo mio et son ben zertto se vostra serenittà vorà metter 
del buono che pottrò haver lo inttentto mio dexidero veder la 
resposta de ditta mia per potter fermar in chosa ben stabile 
[…] 
 
It remains to me to tell your serenity that we are preparing us 
to go to the campaign and I say that altogether in the next 
month we will hit the road to go to the aid of the King Zuane 
[János Szápolyai] and I, like the other [letters] of mine, wrote 
to your serenity about the order and commandment of the 
magnificent Pasha [that I] will follow the campaign and […] 
the Magnificent Ibrahim Pasha does not make me lack of 
having some good [things] because certainly you, your 
serenity, could not think how much grace of him is towards 
me, his servant. I, through my former [letters], wrote to your 
serenity this will be my opinion and I am so serious if your 
serenity will want to put well that I will be able to achieve my 
purpose. I desire to see your response of [the thing] that I 
explained to be able to fix the thing stable enough […]179 
  
 The statements of Alvise Gritti prove that the Beyoğlu was in the known of 
the preparations of the Ottoman campaign against Hungary and announced this to 
Venice. Taking into consideration that he had been already acting as the advisor of 
Ibrahim Pasha in international politics, it can be stated that this is not a surprising 
fact. However, most importantly, Alvise Gritti with his sentences reveals that the 
Ottoman Empire had the idea of replacing the existent Hungarian King Lajos II with 
János Szapolyai even before the Battle of Mohács. As it was mentioned before 
Szapolyai at that time vas the Voivode of Transylvania who was famous for his 
oppositions to the King.180 After the murder of Lajos II he was elected as King by the 
                                                 
179 Alvise Gritti to the Senate on February 4, 1526, ASV, Dispacci degli Ambasciatori al Senato, Filza 
1-A. Here it is important to note once more that on the letters the year was mentioned as 1525. 
However, concerning the information given in the letters, it can be argued that they were dated 
according to more veneto, the Venetian calendar.  In more veneto, the new year started on March 1 for 
that reason in order to find the exact dates, it should be added one year to the years noted on the 
documents concerning the months of January and February.   
180 For the candidacy for throne and oppositions of János Szápolyai to the King Lajos II before the 
Battle of Mohács see: Coles, 81-82.  
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estates. In this respect, the information given by Alvise Gritti proves that this election 
arguably organized by the Ottoman Empire.  
Another important point revealed by the letter is that even in that year Alvise 
Gritti had the intention to have a political career in Hungary even in the mentioned 
year; perhaps this was a promise for him from the Grand Vizier who offered the 
Beyoğlu many opportunities due their affinity as Gritti underlines. In the same letter 
Alvise Gritti points out the possibility of his stay in Hungary after the war by talking 
about his son Antonio: 
Anttonio mio fiol voria perseverase ale lettere lattine perché 
se converò restar in Ongarie penso farmelo venir arentte et la 
lingua vulgar non si usa ma ttutti exerzitta la lattina però, 
principe serenissimo, vi piazerà far che el suo prezepttor 
presto non manchi ttegnirlo auli studii che questo da poi a 
chorso la ochasion del andar in Ongarie mi è inttratto in 
anemo. 
 
Antonio, my son, wants persevere in Latin language because 
if I ought to stay in Hungary I think to make him near [to me] 
and the vulgar language is not used but everyone uses Latin 
however, the most serene prince, we desire that his tutor soon 
does not miss keeping him in the studies because anyhow, the 
occasion of going to Hungary was entered my mind.181 
 
Concerning the information given above, it can be argued that Alvise Gritti 
was informed about the Hungarian campaign before; despite there is not any further 
information whether he was participated in the campaign and went to Hungary with 
the Ottoman army. The studies conducted about him show that his first appearance 
on the Ottoman political stage was one year after the Mohács. During the 
negotiations the Beyoğlu was presented to Hieronymus Laski by the Grand Vizier 
Ibrahim Pasha as the councilor of the Divan in 1527.182  Laski soon gained the 
confidence of Gritti and by offering him some concessions, like an “annual pension 
                                                 
181 Szakály, 44.  
182  Eudoxiu Hurmuzaki, Documente privitóre le istoria Románilor, v. 2/1... Academie Române, 
Bucharest, 1891, 44 cited in Szakály, 44.  
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of four thousand ducats and the income of a rich Hungarian bishopric”183 and he 
guaranteed the mediation of the Beyoğlu, between himself and the Ottoman high 
ranking officers. Therefore, Alvise Gritti became a key figure who reported the 
demands of the Hungarian king to the Ottoman court while explaining the Ottoman 
views and conditions to the envoy of Szápolyai.184 At first, the visiers did not give 
Laski a kind reception but through the diplomatic maneuvers of Gritti, everything 
took a new turn.185 
During the long lasting and complicated negotiations, Alvise Gritti played a 
crucial role. After some meetings with the viziers, as an outcome of his efforts, on 
January 27, 1528, Hieronymus Laski was presented to the Sultan and declared that he 
asked the Sultan’s recognition of his master Szápolyai as the legitimate king of 
Hungary and the Ottoman protection by expressing the loyalty and friendship of 
Szápolyai towards Suleyman I.186 On February 3, the Sultan declared that he gave the 
crown of Hungary, which he had conquered by his sword, to János Szápolyai as a 
reward for his obedience and loyalty.187 Furthermore, the Sultan announced to the 
envoy that he was going to take an expedition in a short time against Ferdinand I to 
restore the authority of Szápolyai in Buda. In return, the Hungarian king would send 
an annual tribute to the Sultan and would give his military support to the Ottoman 
army in the future wars of the Empire in Europe. In other words, Hungary became a 
vassal state of the Ottoman Empire.188 
After the conclusion of the treaty, Hieronymus Laski sent a dispatch to his 
master. While explaining the conditions of the treaty, he underlined the contributions 
                                                 
183  “[...] pensione annua di circa 4000 ducati e del reddito di un ricco vescovado Ungherese 
[...]”Finlay, “Al Servizio...”, 84.  
184 For further information about the conversations of Gritti with the Polish diplomat Laski see: 
Szakaly, 44-46.  
185 Gökbilgin, “Kanunî Sultan Suleyman’ın…”, 17.  
186 Ibid., 18, Papo, Papo, p. 73.  
187 Peçevi, 108-109.  
188 Coles, 8, Uzunçarşılı, Osmanlı Tarihi, 328-329.  
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of Alvise Gritti to the negotiations and added that “[...] his success was due to Gritti 
only, for without his assistance he would hardly have been able to achieve 
anything.” 189  Gábor Barta, who has focused on the mission of Alvise Gritti in 
Hungary in his studies, points out that Laski exaggerated the situation. According to 
Barta, the efforts of Gritti can not be disregarded undoubtedly can not be. In fact, 
without the intervention of Gritti the treaty could have had harder terms for 
Hungary.190 However, as it was previously documented, the main concern of the 
Empire was to support Janos Szapolyai, even before the Battle of Mohács. Moreover, 
Suleyman I did not prefer the consolidation of Habsburg hegemony in such a 
strategic point that could threaten his expansion policies in future as well as his 
possessions in the Balkan Peninsula; a vassal Hungary which was going to be an 
Ottoman satellite and to act as a buffer zone was more beneficial for the Sultan.  
This, in fact, is a good example to understand the Ottoman policy of 
conquest. In his widely known article entitled “Ottoman Methods of Conquest”, Halil 
İnalcık points out that the Ottoman Empire followed a “gradual method of conquest” 
particularly in the Balkan Peninsula and Eastern Europe since the foundation of the 
state. According to this method, there were two phases that were put systematically 
in practice. Firstly, the Ottoman sultans established a kind of political protection over 
the neighbor states and secondly, they took them under the direct control of the state 
by eliminating local dynasties and administrations. The political protection of the 
Ottoman Empire over the states was, in reality, the implementation of the vassalage 
system which was based on reciprocal duties. The vassal states had to recognize the 
Ottoman authority, pay yearly tributes and provide military support to the Sultan 
whenever it was required. In return, the Ottoman State guaranteed the territorial 
                                                 
189 Szakály, 46.  
190 Barta, 252-253. 
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integrity of the vassal states and his protection over the lands against internal and 
external threats. These vassal states were utilized as buffer zones between the 
Ottoman main lands and the Dâr’ü-l Harb, and as a stepping stone for further 
expeditions of the State. Therefore, the State, without spending extra expenses, 
created political entities subject to itself, obtained tributes and secured an auxiliary 
military force to his army. Moreover, in the course of time, it eliminated the local 
elites and governments, and implemented its own administrative system when it 
became necessary.191  
At this point, it should be signified that the role of Alvise Gritti was 
undeniably important in terms of achieving the agreement between Suleyman I and 
János Szapolyai.  However, even if the arbitration of Gritti was not provided, the 
Ottoman Sultan would probably have chosen to compose a vassal state on Hungarian 
lands. The aim of Suleyman I was to march towards the Central Europe. Moreover, 
as a sultan claiming to create a universal empire, Suleyman I aimed to support the 
weak and small independent political entities in Europe in order to limit the 
expansion of the hegemony of Charles V, the Habsburg emperor having also shared 
the same desire with him. Charles V had already suppressed his major rival Francis I, 
the king of France in 1525. In 1527, the armies of Charles V sacked Rome, and 
seized the Duchy of Milan. In that way the Habsburg hegemony was de facto 
consolidated in Italy.192 Within this context, the establishment of the authority of his 
brother, Ferdinand in Hungary would give an upper hand to Charles V and change 
the balance of power in Europe to the disadvantage of the Ottoman Empire. 
Concerning these, it is clear that Suleyman I would support the weak Szapolyai, 
                                                 
191 Halil İnalcık, “Ottoman Methods of Conquest”, Studia Islamica, 2 (1954), 103-129.  
192 Salvatorelli, 381-384, Finlay, “Fabius Maximus…”, 991-992.  
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instead of taking side with Ferdinand I of Habsburg. In any case, the mediation of 
Alvise Gritti hastened the process; but did not change the consequence. 
This mediation was not only beneficial to János Szápolyai, but also to Alvise 
Gritti. As a consequence the Beyoğlu obtained a brilliant commencement in his 
political career in the Ottoman Empire. After coming to terms with the Ottoman 
Sultan, Szápolyai nominated Alvise Gritti as orator et rerum negotiorum procurator, 
orator charged to represent the interests of Szápolyai before the Divan.193 His task 
was to move between the Ottoman government and Szápolyai. In a short time, Alvise 
Gritti started to convey information about the developments in the Empire, including 
the possible expeditions and the conditions of the army. He had already acted as an 
advisor to the Grand Vizier and the Ottoman court; after 1528 he became the 
representative of Szápolyai. His illegitimate birth had prevented his entrance to the 
political life of Venice, but at that instant, he could find the opportunity of having a 
respectable political career at his birth place. Alvise Gritti would use this occasion in 
an ideal way and ascend the career stairs rapidly and eagerly, but mostly without 
control.  
On the other hand, Venice was worried about the ventures of Alvise Gritti. 
The consolidation of the Habsburg dominance in Italy, and the seizure of the Duchy 
of Milan by Charles V indicated the approaching danger of Venice’s occupation by 
the Habsburgs. Charles V had been urging his brother Ferdinand to attack the 
Republic since 1526.194 In this context, while the Serenissima supported secretly 
every political act against the Habsburg advance; it tried to avoid the provocative 
acts and alliances at the same time in order to prevent a possible Habsburg-Venetian 
war that could result in the loss of the terraferma, even of the lagoon. Although 
                                                 
193 Finlay, “Al Servizio...”, p. 84; Szakaly, p. 47; Papo, Papo, p. 73.  
194 Finlay, “Fabius Maximus…”, 1022-1023. 
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Venice had supported, and in a sense encouraged, the Battle of Mohács in 1526, the 
acts of the son of the Doge became more and more a matter of concern. In the eyes of 
the Habsburg Empire, János Szapolyai was perceived as a puppet king of the 
Ottoman State, in other words the greatest enemy of Christianity that coveted the 
hereditary Habsburg lands. In addition, Alvise Gritti was serving for the Empire 
which was his protector state. Since he was the son of Andrea Gritti, the acting Doge 
of Venice, his acts could constitute an effective pretext for the Habsburg Emperor 
who had been willing for the invasion of Venice. For that reason, while appraising 
the success of his son, Doge Andrea Gritti warned Alvise Gritti about signing the 
correspondences that he sent to János Szapolyai as “the most faithful servant of your 
Excellency” instead of using his full name195 in order not to provoke the house of 
Habsburg against Venice.    
On the other hand, besides its preoccupations about a Habsburg attack on its 
territories, Venice still had doubts about a possible Ottoman invasion of Italy. Since 
the times of Mehmed II, Italy had experienced the danger of being invaded by the 
Turks and the fear of a potential Turkish attack on the Peninsula was one of the 
important concerns of the Italian politics even in the sixteenth century.196 Despite 
                                                 
195 “Et se tu hai ad far intender alcuna cosa al Serenissimo Vayvoda over a’soi agenti fallo cumessi, ma 
convenendo pur scriver fa ne la sottoscriptione ‘el fidelissimo servitor de vostra Maestà, senza 
mettervi altramente il nome tuo.”, “Andrea Gritti to Alvise Gritti on March 18, 1528”, ASV, Consiglio 
dei Dieci, Parti Secrete, Reg. 2, ff. 52v-53r 
196 A possible Turkish attack on Italy, or in general on Europe, was one of the most important concerns 
of the European politics from the late fourteenth to the late seventeenth century.  As it was mentione 
before, after the conquest of Istanbul in 1453 and the Ottoman attacks on Venetian Friuli and Otranto, 
in Europe, Italy was considered as the new objective of the Ottomans. This was also supported with 
the ideological motives. The city of Istanbul had been the “New Rome” for the Eastern Romans. Turks 
had conquered the “New Rome” and from then on they were going to attack Rome and destroy totally 
the Christian faith. This idea secured its place in the political agenda of Europe until the defeat of the 
Ottoman armies in Vienna in 1683 by the allied European forces.  Here it is important to note that, this 
fear was also used by several forces as a pretext according to legitimize their acts. To organize a 
crusade against the Turks became a political propaganda of the kings in their elections especially in 
their rivalries for the crown of the Holy Roman Empire as one can see in the example of the rivalry 
between Charles V and Francis I. Moreover, the Papacy also used this fear in order to conciliate the 
quarrels between the European potentates and most importantly to unite the fragmented political 
entities of Europe unless for a common threat. In this aspect, Turkish fear was used as an important 
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they were good commercial partners; Venice also had this fear, and it did not really 
trust the friendship of the Ottoman Sultan. Even after the Battle of Mohács, the 
Venetian envoy Marco Minio, who was sent to congratulate the victory of the Sultan, 
warned the Serenissima with the following words: 
[...] il Signor voleva far tre imprese l’una di Rodi, l’altra di 
Ungheria, le quali ha fatte, la terza manca a far, la qual non 
può esser altro che Italia. 
[...] the Signor wanted to make three conquests, one of 
Rhodes, the other of Hungary, which he realized, the third to 
be missing, which can not be other than Italy.197  
 
In this chaotic situation, Andrea Gritti was on the knife edge and as a Doge, his main 
task was to secure the territorial integrity of Venice. Hence he did not prefer that his 
son took active parts in the political conflicts between these two main powers of the 
time and incriminate the Republic.  
 In 1528, the main objective of the Ottoman expedition was revealed: 
Suleyman I would meet Janos Szapolyai in Buda, strengthen his authority in 
Hungary and by gaining his forces, he would march towards Austria to meet 
Ferdinand. On April 8, the orator and vice bailo Pietro Zen reported to the 
Serenissima that he had a confidential conversation with Ibrahim Pasha on February 
12 and from him he learnt that the preparations for an expedition against Ferdinand 
had just started.198  However, Doge Gritti could not take a deep breath because 
                                                                                                                                          
instrument in the times of Reformation to unite Catholics and Protestants to fight against a common 
enemy.  For detailed information about the subject see: Soykut, 18-111, Özlem Kumrular, Avrupa’da 
Türk Düşmanlığının Kökeni, Türk Korkusu, (İstanbul: Doğan Kitap, 2008), 121-134.  
197 Albèri, s.3, v. 3, p. 116.  
198 Letter of Pietro Zen to Consiglio dei Dieci, April 8, 1528, ASV, Capi del Consiglio dei Dieci 
Lettere Ambasciatori-Costantinopoli (1504-1550), Busta 1, f. 72r. On the other hand, the news about 
the Ottoman expedition was wispered to the Habsburg Emperor as well. Özlem Kumrular states that 
after having been informed about the Ottoman plans, Habsburg Emperor Charles V sent Juan de Balbi 
to the Shah of Iran  as envoy with a letter in which he addressed to Shah as “our dearest brother and 
friend”, in order to gain his support and make an alliance with him against the Ottomans. In reference 
to this letter dated on February 15, 1529, Kumrular argues that the Habsburg Emperor was informed 
about a possible Ottoman attack over Habsburg dominations even in the winter of 1529.  See: 
Kumrular, p. 45. Although, Kumrular points out that this letter was written to the Iranian Shah, Shah 
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concurrently, other news about his son were sent to the Ducal Palace: It was 
announced that Alvise Gritti was going to participate personally into the Ottoman 
campaign as the master of headquarters and if it was required, he was going to act as 
the head of some contingents.199 This was too much for the Doge; he immediately 
sent a letter to his son in November 1528, in which he asked Alvise to return to 
Venice by providing him the annual revenue of a thousand ducats.200 Alvise did not 
listen to his father: he would neither return to Venice, nor give up intervening in the 
Ottoman and Hungarian politics. From that time onwards, he did not remain only as 
a tool utilized by the both sides, he was also going to take important roles as a real 
actor in this play in which the principal roles was changing in the twinkling of an 
eye. 
 On May 10, 1529, the forces of Suleyman I departed from Istanbul. In the 
expedition, Alvise Gritti was charged as the army contractor. “The Sultan had thirty 
thousand golds and just as many piasters paid to him in advance to procure 
foodstuff.” 201 In this important task, Gritti was also supported by his patron János 
Szapolyai. On August 8, Szapolyai ordered his subjects to provide the Ottoman army 
the necessary food substances via Alvise Gritti.202 Ten days later, Szápolyai met with 
Suleyman I on the Mohács steps, which had a symbolic meaning for both of them.203 
The Hungarian King again pledged his alliance to the Ottoman Sultan and they 
marched towards Buda castle. The castle was being defended by a minor Hungarian 
                                                                                                                                          
Ismail, concerning the date of the letter, the addressee should be Shah Tahmasp, being in throne since 
1524.   
199 Finlay, “Al Servizio...”, p. 85.  
200 In his letter, Andrea Gritti states that the Venetian Republic was surrounded with the enemies full 
of detestation, and the acts of Alvise Gritti could damage the prestige of the Republic as well as 
himself. Gritti concludes the letter by underlining that he wants to see his son once again when he is 
alive. See: Letter of Andrea Gritti to Alvise Gritti, November 24, 1528, ASV, Consiglio dei Dieci, 
Parti Secrete, Reg. 2, ff. 84r-v. For detailed information about the letter and the approach of Andrea 
Gritti to the acts of his son Alvise see: Finlay, “Al Servizio...”, pp. 84-85.  
201 Szakály, p. 50.  
202 Ibid.  
203 Ibid. 
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and German force which could not resist the Ottoman bombardment and they 
surrendered within five days and Szapolyai was enthroned by Suleyman I as the King 
of Hungary.204 A few days later, Suleyman I marched towards Vienna with the 
support of the forces of Szapolyai.  
In the meantime, there was a political wilderness in Europe. In 1526, against 
the emperor, the League of Cognac was created between France, the Papacy, Venice, 
Milan and Florence. However, this alliance could not become successful. In a short 
time, Charles V seized Milan and the imperial troops sacked Rome in 1527.  Two 
years later, the forces of Francis I were decisively defeated at Genoa and the French 
King was forced to sign the Treaty of Cambrai on August 5, 1529 which obliged him 
to abandon his claims in Italy on behalf of the Habsburg Emperor Charles V. 
Therefore, Charles V did not only defeat his main rival in the struggle of the crown 
of the Holy Roman Empire; but also gained predominance in European politics. On 
the other hand, due to the advance of Charles V, Venice was stranded: the dominance 
of Charles V in Italy exposed Venice to the danger of losing its independence.205 
From then on, the only savior of the Republic would be the supremacy of the 
Ottoman Empire against Charles V.  
According to Heinrich Kretschmayr, after the Treaty of Cambrai, Venice 
provoked the Ottoman Sultan to attack Vienna and used the son of the Doge as an 
                                                 
204 The Ottoman chronicler Peçevî gives interesting accounts about the coronation of Szapolyai by the 
Ottoman Sultan. Peçevî points out that Szapolyai sent by his envoys the crown being the symbol of 
the Hungarian Kingdom since the times of Alexander the Great, in other words since three thousand 
years,to the Ottoman Sultan Suleyman I because the Hugarian King was killed on the battlefield of 
Mohács by the Sultan. Peçevî notes that the crown was taken from the envoys, registered to the 
imperial treasury and given to Szapolyai back through the son of the Doge Alvise Gritti. Peçevî, 138-
139.  The style of  Peçevî in the explanation of the events clearly shows the Ottoman perception. 
Ottoman Sultan considered that after the Battle of Mohács, Hungary became one of his dominions and 
by his will he appointed Szapolyai as the King. The presentation of the crown to the Sultan and its 
registration into the accounts of the imperial treasury were also significant examples of the Ottoman 
diplomacy and the general attitude towards the vassal states.  
205 In the correspondences of Andrea Gritti sent to his son Alvise, the preoccupations of the Republic 
can clearly be observed: “ 
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agent to convince the Grand Vizier Ibrahim Pasha and Sultan Suleyman I.206 This 
argument was also proved by the correspondences circuited between the Doge 
Andrea Gritti and his son Alvise. In most of the correspondences of 1529, conserved 
within Archivio Stato di Venezia under the collection of Ducali ed Atti Diplomatici, 
Busta 22, (Ducal and Diplomatic Affairs, Folder 22), Andrea Gritti enlighten his son 
about the general political situation of Europe and the oncoming Habsburg threat; 
and he required Alvise to communicate these immediately to the Grand Vizier.  
Moreover, in case of an attack to the Habsburg dominions, Venice promised to help 
the Ottoman Sultan by his naval forces and ports. As it was also mentioned in the 
letters, the main concern of the Republic was to secure the peace with the Ottoman 
Sultan; the Republic was well aware that, at that time the sole power able to stop the 
Habsburg Emperor was the Ottoman Sultan and the future of the independence of the 
Republic depended on the Ottoman success over Habsburgs. It is not clear whether 
Alvise Gritti played an important role in the formulation of the idea of an expedition 
to Vienna against the Habsburg forces; however, by communicating the situation of 
Venice and the Republic’s demands for help, it is possible that he precipitated the 
decision making process in the Ottoman Palace.   
Nevertheless, the Ottoman army could not become successful in Vienna; the 
city was besieged for 23 days from September 23 to October 15 and despite the 
Ottoman Sultan had demanded the surrender of the city, the forces of Ferdinand I 
resisted.207 The Turkish attack revived the religious agitation and the concept of 
“unity against the Turks” changed the perception of war in Europe. In fact, the 
reason of the war was demonstrated by the Ottomans as to restore the authority of 
Janos Szápolyai, unfairly undercut by Ferdinand I of Habsburg and to limit the 
                                                 
206 Kretschmayr, 17.  
207 For detailed information about the Siege of Vienna and the reasons of the failure see: Peçevî, 135-
151, Uzunçarşılı, Osmanlı Tarihi, 329-330, Merriman, 104-108.  
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expansion of Habsburg Empire which must be appreciated by the other European 
states that were worried about their independences. However, especially by the 
efforts of the Papacy, the European public opinion was persuaded that this war was 
waged against the Christendom and should be stopped. That propaganda was so 
effective that even Martin Luther changed his mind about the war against the Turks 
and invited the German nobility to participate in the resistance against them.208 
Moreover, besides this strong resistance, the compelling climatic conditions 
disintegrated the Ottoman army. The war season had already passed and neither 
animals nor soldiers could manage the cold weather. Therefore, Suleyman I was 
forced to abandon the siege and he withdrew his forces towards Buda on October 15, 
1529. 
 After having saluted once more János Szapolyai in Buda as the King of 
Hungary, Suleyman I decided to leave a representative there both to assist the King 
and to control the situation on behalf of the Ottoman Empire and then to return to 
Istanbul with his forces. “The man who chose Suleyman, certainly in agreement with 
Ibrahim, as a real manager of Turkish control in Hungary, was Alvise Gritti, now 
mature, daring and diplomatically and politically powerful.”209 Alvise Gritti stayed in 
Buda there with a janissary garrison and he was also rewarded by the Sultan with two 
thousand golds for his services during the siege. 210  In fact, Gritti was the best 
alternative for the Ottoman Sultan for the task of representation because he had been 
                                                 
208 Luther, in his first orations, proposed that to wage war against Turks meant to oppose the Divine 
will because the Turks were sent by God in order to punish the Christians for the sins that they had 
committed in time. However, when the Turkish threat approached to the center of Austria, he changed 
his mind and invited the German nobility to fight against the Turks in order to secure the future of 
Christianity. For detailed information about the change of the ideas of Luther and their impacts on the 
political agenda of the time see: Soykut, pp. 63-34.  
209 “L’uomo che Solimano scelse, certamente di concerto con Ibrahim, come vero gerente del controllo 
turco in Ungheria, fu Alvise Gritti, ormai maturo, spregiudicato e potente diplomatico e politico.” 
Coco, p. 385. Uzunçarşılı also points out that the Ottoman Sultan charged Gritti being the advisor of 
the Grand Vizier in order to control the situation of the Hungarian King Szápolyai in Hungary. 
Uuznçarşılı, Osmanlı Tarihi, 331.   
210 Szakály, p. 52. 
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involved with the issues about Hungary since its initiation; he knew well the 
Ottoman point of view and was largely instrumental in the mediation between the 
King and the Sultan. Besides these, he had already been appointed as the 
Consiliarius Regius, Royal Concillor, Summus Thesaurarius, High Treasurer and 
Bishop of Eger by Szápolyai during the Siege of Vienna.211 These titles also overtly 
indicated Gritti’s influence on the Hungarian politics and how he was favored by the 
King Szápolyai. Szápolyai had been chosen him instead of numerous Hungarian 
noblemen. In that choice, the personal skills of Gritti and his large network definitely 
played an important role. On the other hand, it can be argued that one of the main 
concerns of Szapolyai was to guarantee the support of the Ottoman Sultan by 
cooperating with someone accredited by the Sultan himself. 
 Not only the Hungarian King and the Ottoman Sultan, but also the Venetian 
Doge and the Republic of Venice were content with this new situation. As it was 
indicated before, Venice had been extremely concerned about the acts of Alvise 
Gritti at first. However, the Siege of Vienna changed the circumstances. Despite the 
fact that the Ottoman expedition was not totally successful, it stopped the Habsburg 
threat for a while and directed the imperial public opinion and the European as well, 
to war against Turk again from the invasion of Venice. Moreover, having an 
effective agent both in the Ottoman Empire and Hungary was beneficial for the 
Serenissima. Alvise Gritti could also guard the Venetian interests and direct the 
Ottoman and Hungarian politics on be half of the Republic. Alvise was 
simultaneously in the service of the Sultan and the Hungarian King for that time but 
he was also a Venetian by birth and initially had to secure the interests of the 
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Republic. On November 2, 1529, while consecrating the success of his son, Andrea 
Gritti underlined that fact:  
[…] Praterea vi dicemo cum Senatu esse stato di molta 
satisfatione della Signoria nostra haver inteso l’elettione 
vostra, i Episcopo d’Agria e Thesorier generale del prefato 
serenissimo Re d’hungaria, si per la buona existimatione di 
voi, et amor che vi porta la Signoria nostra, si et perché 
mediante, l’auttorità, che havete col prefato serenissimo Re 
siamo certi, che non mancarete di continuar et accumular li 
buoni officii da voi fatti in ogni tempo per il stato nostro, il 
quale se vi dimonstrara et memore, et grato dell’oparationi 
vostre.   
 
[…] Moreover, we say, with the Senate, that to hear your 
election as the Bishop of Eger and the General Treasurer of 
the aforementioned most serene King of Hungary was a great 
satisfaction for our Signory; concerning the good reputation 
of you the affection that our Signory have for you, and 
because through authority that you have with the 
aforementioned most serene King, we are certain that you will 
not fail in continuing and accumulating the good offices that 
have always been done for our State, which will demonstrate 
you the awareness and gratitude for your operations.212 
 
In fact, the direct involvement of Alvise Gritti in the Hungarian state affairs 
was more beneficial for the King Szápolyai than for Gritti himself. Firstly, Alvise 
Gritti distanced himself from the nobility which was formed by factious and 
traditional Hungarian princes and tried to limit their influence over politics in order 
to consolidate the authority of Szápolyai and to realize his own projects. 213 
Moreover, his appointment as the High Treasurer could revive the Hungarian 
economy, which was on the verge of bankruptcy. Gritti was a genuinely competent 
economist and with the precautionary measures that he took, he became successful in 
rebalancing the Hungarian finance.214 He supported the merchants of all nationalities 
                                                 
212 Andrea Gritti to Alvise Gritti, November 2, 1529, ASV, Miscellanea Ducali ed Atti Diplomatici, 
Butsa 22.  
213 Coco, pp. 387-388. 
214 The task of treasurer was not so much popular among the Hungarian aristocracy because in the 
complex fiscal organization of Hungarian State it was very problematic to collect revenues. On the 
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and exercised supervisory control on the Northern Hungarian cities abounding in 
mine. In particular, he took the deposits of the salt and precious metals in 
Transylvania under his control.215 
However, Gritti did not spend much time in Hungary. After having a short 
stay of almost six months, János Szápolyai asked him to return back to Istanbul. 
Most probably, the King thought that Gritti would be more useful in Istanbul than in 
Hungary concerning his success in mediation between the King and the Porte. On the 
other hand, for Gritti, to return back to the Ottoman capital was more beneficial. “He, 
whose power depended on the highly complex and unstable power relations at the 
Porte, could not afford to be left out –for a long time- of the ongoing intrigues which 
were bearing on his own position as well.”216 Hence, he carried out the order of the 
kind without demur and after having appointed Tamás Nadasdy 217  as his 
representative to manage the revenues of the Bishopric of Eger and the salt deposits 
of Mármaros in Transylvania, took the road of Istanbul in January 1530. When he 
arrived at Istanbul, he became aware of the preparations of a new war against the 
Habsburg; but what he was not aware of was that he would play an important role to 
define the ideological motives behind that war and, most importantly that war would 
determine the fate of the Beyoğlu himself. 
                                                                                                                                          
other hand, if the treasurer carried off the task he could also make large amounts of money by using 
the privileges and exemptions that he held. Szakaly, p. 53.  
215 While Gritti tried to control the rich deposits of mine in Transylvania, King Szápolyai also helped 
him by arresting two important names of the region, Pál Artándy and Baláz Artándy for their misuses 
in the region. These two names had farmed out the salt monopoly in the Mármaros area since 1523; 
and they could be an obstacle before the aims of Gritti. For that reason, despite there is no information 
whether he asked their arrestment, it is probable that Gritti affected the decision of Szápolyai. For 
detailed information about this issue see: Szakály, p.54; Barta, p. 254.  
216 Szakály, p. 54.  
217 In the Siege of Vienna, Tamás Nadasdy was the commander of the forces defending the Buda castle 
on behalf of the Austrian archduke Ferdinand. When Ottoman troops broke the resistance he took 
refuge to Gritti in order to save his life. As Gábor Barta mentions he was a good organizer and 
administrator and he soon captured the attention of Gritti with his talents. For that reason Gritti saw no 
harm in his appointment as his representative. However Támas Nadasdy was going to be one of the 
major opponents of Gritti in a short time. For detailed information about Nadasdy and his relations 
with Alvise Gritti see: Barta, 254-255, 277-278; Szakály, 83-86.  
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4.3 Alvise Gritti at the Center of the Power Struggle: Enigmatic and Complex 
Relations 
  
Although the Siege of Vienna in 1529 was not successful, it can be considered as an 
important turning point for both Ottoman and European politics. The Ottoman forces 
could not capture the city; however they could frighten Europe and albeit for a while 
could reduce the Habsburg pressure over the European states. Moreover this 
Habsburg-Ottoman war, in nature, became a supremacy struggle between Muslim 
and Christian worlds especially by the help of the imperial propaganda. The future 
existence of the independent sovereigns of Europe was related to the Ottoman 
success against the Emperor but at this instant, they could not directly support the 
Ottoman side in order not to be the supporters of the infidel aiming to destroy the 
Christian faith. In this context, the excommunication of Janos Szápolyai in December 
1529 proved that the preoccupations of the sovereigns were not meaningless.  
With the effects of the Siege of Vienna, the balance of power in the European 
politics was also changed. After the sack of Rome by the imperial armies in 1527 and 
the French defeat at Genoa on August 1529, Francis I was forced to abandon his 
claims on Italy and his dreams to be the Holy Roman Emperor by the Treaty of 
Cambrai. 218  Although France had to obey Charles V, it secretly supported the 
Ottoman expedition of Vienna and German Protestants against the Habsburg 
authority. Similarly, Venice was cornered by the Habsburgs; Charles V who had just 
defeated Francis I and strengthen his forces in Italy now started to threaten the 
Republic. Moreover, the commercial partnership and political passes of Venice with 
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the Ottoman Empire was widely known in Europe; and the Venetians were blamed to 
call the infidel into the heart of Europe for its own interests. Although Venice did not 
directly support the Siege of Vienna, its contributions in the organization of war were 
evident. As it was discussed before, the success of the Ottoman Empire against the 
Habsburg Emperor was the sole solution for the Republic. However, the failure of 
the Siege forced to Venice also to came to an agreement with the Habsburg Empire 
and finally on December 22, 1529 the Republic entered the alliance of Cambrai.219 
After paralyzing all his rivals, on February 25, 1530, Charles V had been crowned as 
the Holy Roman Emperor by the Pope Clement VII in Bologna. From then on, the 
European States have no chance other than the Ottoman Sultan.  
On the other, on the Ottoman front the main concern was to blanket the 
failure of the Siege of Vienna by accentuating the glaring power of the Empire and 
the grandeur of the Sultan in order not to loose prestige in the political arena. For that 
reason, the Siege was reflected to the other states as a successful. The Ottoman 
Sultan, just after his withdrawal from Vienna and even before returning to Istanbul, 
sent a fethname220, announcement of conquest, to Andrea Gritti, the Doge of Venice. 
In this fethname dated to November 13, 1529, the Sultan, after emphasizing the 
richness of the lands that he conquered and his own grandeur the Sultan, explained 
the Doge that he gifted the whole Hungary which he had taken by his sword to King 
Szapolyai. He also noted that he went to Vienna to settle the accounts with Ferdinand 
claiming to be the king of the country belonging to the Sultan himself. The Sultan 
added that he did not find Ferdinand in Vienna and after hearing that he had been 
escaped from the city; he decided to end the campaign.  Suleyman I enjoyed letting 
                                                 
219 Ibid.  
220 Fethname was the general name of the letters sent to the other potentates when a new conquest 
realized. In these letters the expeditions and the conquests were described in details by underlining the 
power and the grandeur of the Ottoman sultan and the army. For details see: Uzunçarşılı, Saray 
Teşkilâtı, 288-289.  
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Andrea Gritti, the Doge of Venice, know his great success. Despite the letter was 
addressed to the Doge, the real aim of the Sultan was to announce the success of the 
Siege to the European States. In this aspect, Venice, acting like a press office e and 
leading the news transportation throughout Europe at that time, was used as a 
publicity board.221 
The circumcision feast of the four sons of Suleyman I, was another tool of the 
Sultan to blanket the failure and to display the power and grandeur of the Sultan to 
the other states. The feast started on June 1530 and lasted three weeks. “For the 
common people all sorts of amusements were provided; the soldiers, the dignitaries 
of law and theology, and the officials all their part in the ceremonies and the 
distribution of gifts.” 222  Together with the oriental princes and the European 
representatives, the Doge of Venice was also invited to this festival by a special 
envoy. Andrea Gritti did not participate in the festival; however, he sent two 
extraordinary envoys to congratulate the Sultan and offered him luxurious 
presents.223 Needless to mention, Alvise Gritti was also present in the ceremonies. 
The magnificent shows and the luxury of the feast demonstrating the power and 
wealth of the Sultan were also reflected to the European audience from the eyes of 
the Venetian delegation224: Suleyman I achieved his purpose. 
While the public opinion was detained by these diplomatic maneuvers of 
Suleyman I, the policy of the Ottoman Empire was specified: Ferdinand I would be 
forced to abandon his claims over Hungary and to recognize the Ottoman supremacy 
                                                 
221 This original copy of this fethname was written in Greek language and it was published by Joseph 
Müller. Joseph Müller, Ein Grieehisches Schreiben des Sultan Suleiman an Andreas Gritti über die 
Belagerung Wiens im Jahre 1529, (Vienna, 1860).  
222 Merriman, pp.108-109.  
223 The Venetian envoys presented the Sultan various luxurious presents such as the cloths of gold and 
silk for a value of seven thousand ducats. Maria Pia Pedani, In Nome del Grand Signore, (Venice: 
Deputazione Editrice, 1994), pp. 142-143.    
224 Apart from the bailo Francesco Bernardo, Andrea Gritti sent two orators for the feast, Pietro Zen 
and Tommaso Mocenigo. These diplomats discussed the general atmosphere of the feast in details, in 
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and a new expedition would be organized against the Habsburg Emperor Charles V. 
It is evident that the Grand Vizier played the most important role in this decision.225 
The new round of war between Charles V and Suleyman I would be a struggle for 
the “World Empire” and Hungary was going to be used once again as a pretext.  
 One of the key figures of the project was Alvise Gritti. Most probably by the 
persistent suggestions of the Grand Vizier Ibrahim Pasha, on October 11, 1530, 
Suleyman appointed Alvise Gritti as Orator Turci, Ottoman emissary, commissioned 
to organize the necessary food supplies for the planned campaign and to persuade 
Ferdinand I to abandon his claims over Hungary by explaining him the plans of the 
Ottoman attack.226 This was a great shock for Venice. As it was mentioned above the 
Republic was forced to sign the Treaty of Cambrai and at that time it was at peace 
with the Habsburg Emperor. However the son of the Doge was acting as an Ottoman 
agent and taking important roles in the preparations of the Ottoman wars against the 
Habsburg Emperor. The acts of Gritti could harm the Republic. However Gritti was 
serving in the Ottoman politics and his first duty was to fulfill the tasks given to him 
by the Grand Vizier and the Ottoman Sultan. For that reason he did not hesitate to 
reply to the Venetian orator Tommaso Mocenigo who alerted Gritti about the 
possible reaction of Charles V to his actions as follows: 
“Come? Vui sè fiol del Serenissimo e andè? Che dirà 
l’imperator?” Lui li rispose: “Son servitor del Signor 
Turco.”  
 
“What? You are the son of the Most Serene [Doge] and you 
go? What will the emperor say?” He [Gritti] replies to him: “I 
am the servant of the Turkish Signor.”227 
 
                                                 
225 Ibrahim Pasha followed an anti-Habsburg policy during his office and played an important role in 
the specification of the Otoman policy towards Hungary and Central Europe. Gökbilgin, “Kanunî 
Sultan Suleyman’ın…”, 8. 
226 Kretschmayr, 24; Barta, p. 256.  
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Following this response and indifference of Gritti to the worries of Venice, the 
Republic of Venice had forced to require its representative in Spain to announce the 
Emperor that despite he was the son of the Doge, Andrea Gritti did not have any 
relation with Alvise Gritti whose authority and cognitions were depended only to the 
Hungarian King Szapolyai.228 
 Although Gritti was charged to organize the necessary food supplies for the 
Ottoman campaign and to persuade the representatives of Ferdinand to abandon his 
claims on Hungary by the Ottoman Sultan, in his address to the Hungarian magnates 
after his appointment as orator turci, he mentioned that he was going to ascertain the 
actual situation of Hungary and to find out who were obedient to Szápolyai, the 
vassal of the Sultan, and who were not. Gritti also warned the Hungarian people that 
everyone should recognize the authority of the King, and obey to him because in the 
following summer the Ottoman Sultan intended to go a second expedition over 
Hungary and to punish severely those were disobedient to the Hungarian King.229 
Therefore the resistance of the Hungarian princes to the authority of Szapolyai was 
intended to be broken by intimidating them with the Ottoman menace and Ferdinand 
was going to loose his support in Hungary and be forced to agree with the Ottoman 
Empire. Ferenc Szakály argues that by authorizing Gritti to interfere with the inner 
conflicts of the Hungarian Kingdom, the Ottoman Sultan tried to strengthen the 
internal position of his vassal through the mediation of the Beyoğlu.230 In other words 
Gritti was used as a tool to suppress the Hungarian opposition to the Ottoman policy 
of intervention by Suleyman I.  
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 To fulfill the first step of his task, in the fall of 1530, Gritti took the road of 
Poznán where the peace negotiations between Ferdinand and Szapolyai were going 
to be held. However, before having reached the city, he faced with a surprise: the 
forces of Ferdinand I under the command of General Wilhelm Roggendorf attack the 
territories which belonged to Szapolyai.231 Gritti immediately changed the road and 
came to Buda. On October 31, 1530, Buda was besieged by the forces of 
Roggendorf. Szapolyai, Gritti and Hieronymus Laski got caught in the Castle. 
Beyoğlu was obliged to head the forces Szapolyai which were composed of Ottoman, 
Hungarian and Serbian soldiers. He personally commanded the soldiers and 
encouraged them by giving them extra money. 232  The efforts of Gritti and the 
responses of the forces of Kasım Pasha and Mehmed Bey, the sancakbeyi, governor, 
of Semendria, and the two hundred cavalries of Tamás Nádasdy turned out 
satisfactory; the siege failed after fifty days and Ruggendorf was forced to withdraw 
his forces after fifty days.233  
 Thus, the Beyoğlu proved that he was not only a great merchant and an adroit 
diplomat; but also a brave solider and commander, never escaping from the war 
when needed. Soon after the siege, Szápolyai summoned a Diet in Buda. In the Diet, 
important economic measures were taken at the instance of Gritti: the exportation of 
the great castles was prohibited234 and the current money was fixed. From then on, 
besides the gold coinage of Ferdinand and the current money of Szápolyai; the 
currency of Gritti, with his coat-of-arms, was going to be in circulation. Moreover, as 
a reward for his services, he was appointed as the Comes of Mármaros235  and 
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governor of Hungary on December 26, 1530. He could also resign the revenues of 
Eger Bishopric to his son Antonio.236    
 The appointment of Gritti as the Governor of Hungary aroused a great 
indignation among the Hungarian magnates. In order to minimize the oppositions, 
Szápolyai had already selected the members of the Diet among the participants of the 
defense of Buda; the Hungarian magnates had not entirely been represented.237 
However, the members also rejected the proposal; right after long negotiations and 
the promise that the sole task of Gritti was going to strengthen the position of the 
Hungarian King Szápolyai and to serve for the preservation of the freedom of the 
country, the members reluctantly voted for the appointment.238 The main argument of 
the opposition was that according to the Hungarian state tradition, the sole occasion 
for the appointment of a governor besides the king was that if the king was in 
childhood and not able to govern the Kingdom by himself. At this point, according to 
them, there was no need for a governor in Hungary.239 The opponents also worried 
that Gritti was going to be the third king besides the existent two. He was ambitious 
and at that instant he stand on the center of a wide network; by the help of foreign 
powers he could easily overthrow the Hungarian King and wear the crown himself.  
 However the Hungarian King did not have any other solution, in order not to 
use the support of Gritti, he should abandon some of his claims on be half of the 
Venetian. On the other hand, Gábor Barta argues that János Szápolyai was not forced 
to appoint Gritti besides himself; he really desired this because the economic and 
political situation in Hungary became worse than the previous years. The conflicts 
with Ferdinand could not be solved. The Hungarian King realized that the Ottoman 
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Empire preferred a political chaos in Hungary rather than the peace in order to 
control the entire region and to use it as a buffer zone against Habsburgs. In this 
aspect, Szápolyai perceived Gritti as an instrument; besides himself Gritti would also 
be a responsible from the turmoil in Hungary.240 
 Shortly after his appointment he subscribed a declaration to Charles V and 
Sigismund I, two important European princes interested in the Hungarian affairs, in 
which he pointed out that if Ferdinand was not to abandon his claims over Hungary, 
the Sultan would march towards Europe.241 In fact, this was the realization of the 
task given to him by the Sultan. However, there was a very interesting note in this 
declaration: while alerting the Emperor and the King of Poland Gritti mentioned that 
in spite of his services to the Ottoman Sultan, he did not converted to Islam and 
remained Christian and as a good Christian he was worried about the future of 
Christendom. 242  Although the Habsburgs were not persuaded, and the troops of 
Ferdinand were not withdrawn from the territories given to Szápolyai, on January 21, 
1531, a new meeting of negotiation was held at Visegrád and an armistrice of three 
months was accepted by the two sides. “It was on this occasion that the country’s 
division into two was first commonly accepted.”243 
 Alvise Gritti came to Istanbul in March 1531 as the Governor of Hungary and 
suddenly found himself at the center of the problems concerning the Central-
European relations. At the same time Hieroymus Laski was also in the Ottoman 
capital. Due to the efforts of Gritti and Laski the armistice agreement was extended 
from three months to one year and signed by the representatives of two sides. After 
this, the Habsburgs understood that in spite of all disadvantages, Gritti was an 
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instrumental figure in the Ottoman Empire. “From his warnings they could hear the 
Sultan’s voice, and they came to understand that the way to changing the Sultan’s 
standpoint was through him.”244  
 However Gritti started to turn gradually into an enigmatic and adventurous 
individual in the eyes of both European powers directly interfered with the affairs of 
Hungary and the Ottoman Empire.  Firstly, Venice was concerned about the acts of 
its son. Alvise acts as an emissary of the Sultan, but he at the same time tries to 
control the administration in Hungary that Ferdinand I of Habsburg claimed the right 
of succession. This could provoke the Habsburg Emperor since he was the son of 
doge. Moreover, now Gritti tried to include his two brothers, Lorenzo and Giorgio 
into the European diplomacy. Two of them performed the task of representation of 
Gritti in the European states by communicating the correspondences reciprocally and 
follow the situation in Istanbul and Venice. The majority of the Senate argued that 
the activities of Gritti was going to harm the Republic, even endangered its freedom 
b provoking the emperor in terms of attacking the Republic, his eternal desire, by 
using the activities of the son of doge as a good pretext. For the Senate perhaps it 
would be better if he had not to be born at all.245 
 The fears of the Hungarian magnates were justified: in a short time Gritti 
started to force the limits. First he tried to participate into the German Imperial Diet 
in order to enter personal contact with the Hapsburgs then in the following year he 
interfered in the struggle between Poland and Moldavia, he intended to mediate a 
peace treaty between the Polish King and the Moldavian Voivode Petru Rareş on 
commission by the Sultan.246 The pretext had been already created: since Rareş had 
attacked the Polish territories and he had been in war with the Poland King since 
                                                 
244 Szakály, 62, Barta, 279-280.  
245 Szakály, 61.  
246 Ibid., 62-63.  
98 
 
1530. This was a good opportunity for Gritti; mediation was his area of 
specialization. On the other, the Hungarian and Polish magnates were worried about 
the attempts of the Beyoğlu. They thought that the hidden purpose might be to 
overthrow the Voivode and replace his place by himself or one of his proponents; his 
son Antonio, his dearest friend Laski or another one. The Hungarian King Szápolyai 
was also insecure about the situation. The supremacy of Gritti over Moldavia could 
shake his authority in Hungary; Szápolyai could not take such a risk. Therefore, he 
revealed immediately the plans of Gritti and the rumors about him to Petru Rareş: the 
Beyoğlu made himself another enemy.247   
 Because of the revelations of his secret plans by Szápolyai, Gritti postponed 
the time of his return to Hungary until 1532 when the German Expedition, known as 
Alaman Seferi in the Ottoman historiography started. Actually, the main purpose of 
the Ottoman Sultan was to meet with the Habsburg Emperor Charles V and his 
brother Archduke Ferdinand I in Vienna. The campaign was not only a military 
operation: the raison d’être of the campaign was the struggle for the supremacy in 
the world politics and the title of the “world emperor” rather than an attack to annex 
more territories. As it was mentioned before, Suleyman I considered himself as the 
sole person having the right to claim the title of emperor. This was, in fact, the 
reflection of the Ottoman perception of sovereignty, existed since the reign of 
Mehmed II. Mehmed II, known as the Conqueror, had conquered Istanbul, the capital 
city of the Eastern Roman Empire, and defined himself as Kayser-i Rum, the Caesar 
of Rome. With the conquest of Istanbul, the capital city of the Eastern Roman 
Empire, Mehmed II sat on the throne of Caesars and incorporated the Roman 
inheritance into the Ottoman State. The successors of Mehmed II did not use the 
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same title for themselves; on the other hand they still continued to consider 
themselves universal emperors like Caesar. Moreover, with the participation of the 
Holy Lands and the north-African territories during the reign of Selim I, besides the 
Roman identity, the State assumed the tradition of the Islamic caliphate and the 
Ottoman sultans considered themselves as the protectors of the entire Muslim 
world.248 In this respect, Suleyman I who sat on the throne of a “world empire” 
ruling the territories dispersed on three continents did not endure any other candidate 
claiming to be the universal emperor. Besides the territorial expansion of Charles V 
clashing the expansion policy of the State, the ideological claims of Charles V was 
also a threatening factor for Suleyman I. Thus, the Ottoman Sultan decided to face 
with his rival again in his dominions.  
 The task of Alvise Gritti in the German Expedition was to supply the 
Ottoman army as he did in 1529. The Sultan was going to stop in Hungary and then 
together with the forces of the Hungarian King, he would march towards Vienna. For 
that reason, in the spring of 1532, Gritti hit the road of Hungary with five hundred 
horsemen and two hundred infantry. However, before his departure he undersigned 
another big deal: he played an important role in the formation of ideological 
background of the expedition by contributing to the creation of symbolic objects for 
the Sultan. In the same year, before the expedition, the Grand Vizier Ibrahim Pasha 
presented Suleyman I with a crown like golden helmet.249 “Besides a plumed aigrette 
with a crescent shaped mount, the golden helmet had four crowns with enormous 
twelve-carat pearls, a head band with pointed diamonds, and a neck guard with 
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of the regalia and symbolisms of the representation of power see: Necipoğlu, 401-407.  
100 
 
straps.”250 The helmet was produced by a consortium of Venetian goldsmiths and 
merchants patronized by Alvise Gritti. However, the interesting side of this 
enterprise is that the golden helmet bore a striking resemblance to a papal tiara.251 
Besides this helmet, many other regalia such as scepters, ceremonial canopies, horse 
furnishings and a throne were presented to the Sultan by the Grand Vizier to be 
displayed in the German Expedition. In his prominent article about this regalia and 
its role in the representation of power in the context of Ottoman-Habsburg rivalry, 
Gülrû Necipoğlu argues that the creation of the objects in the mentioned period was 
not accidental: it was a very clever and carefully figured plan in order to show the 
magnificence of the Sultan, to the world, especially to the Habsburg Emperor 
Charles V and the Pope Clement VII by using their own tools of the representation of 
power in a struggle for the universal sovereignty especially after two years from the 
coronation of the Habsburg Emperor as the Holy Roman Emperor in Bologna.252 
Through the splendid regalia the Sultan would show on the battlefield that he was the 
sole emperor monopolizing the political and spiritual authority in his own 
personality. Necipoğlu also points out that in order to create such a clever and 
effective response it was essential to know well the meaning of these symbols in the 
European political culture because these were not the Ottoman means of 
sovereignty.253 At that point Alvise Gritti played the principle role. He did not only 
patronize the goldsmiths and merchants of the regalia, but most importantly he 
created the background of the idea with the Grand Vizier Ibrahim Pasha.254  
 In the summer of 1532, when he was in Buda, Alvise Gritti engaged another 
venture: He organized an attack against Clissa “to recapture this Dalmatian castle, 
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held at the time by Habsburgs, which had been donated to him by King János.”255 
Clissa was a very strategic point because it lies less than a hundred and fifty miles 
from the Italian port Ancona on the coast of the Adriatic Sea, and at that instant the 
Beyoğlu intended to possess the city on his own account. This attempt created a great 
crisis: it irritated Charles V and Ferdinand I as well as Suleyman I. Venice scared 
again about the consequences of the attack, the Serenissima had just made peace with 
the Emperor and because of the uncontrolled actions of the son of the Doge, it could 
be sentences as the scapegoat and face with another Habsburg threat on his 
territories.  The attack of Clissa could not be successful, after a few days, the forces 
of Gritti were withdrawn from the city.  
 The German Expedition of the Ottoman Sultan started in August. Instead of 
stopping in Buda, the Ottoman forces marched towards the north-western zones of 
Austria.  The Castle of Güns, the key for Vienna was captured in three weeks and 
Suleyman I called his rival Charles V to the battlefield.256 At that time, Charles V 
was in the city of Lintz and he declared that he would resist with his all forces in case 
of an Ottoman attack to Vienna. At the same time under the command of Alvise 
Gritti and János Szápolyai, the Hungarian forces besieged the Castle of Esztergom by 
the order of the Sultan. The main logic behind this was dividing the Hapsburg forces 
in order to gather Vienna.257 At the end of October, despite the Ottoman forces were 
able to capture several towns and castles in Austria, Suleyman I decided to withdraw 
the army because the Ottoman war season passed again and the Sultan realized that 
the Ottoman army would resist the heavy artillery of Charles V if he besieged 
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Vienna.258 After having heard the news, Gritti also gave up the siege of Esztergom in 
a hurry and returned to Buda in December 1532.259  
 The Ottoman Sultan could not be successful on the Austrian territories once 
again; Suleyman I from then on a war against Habsburg in Austria would not bring 
him a decisive result. Moreover, the Sultan had neglected the eastern frontiers for a 
long time and the new Safevid Shah Tahmasp started to threaten the eastern 
territories. On the eve of a new Persian expedition, the Sultan intended to close the 
Western front by solving the “Hungarian Question”   On the other hand, in the 
German territories the Habsburg brothers Ferdinand and Charles V started to struggle 
with the Protestant rebellions. Therefore, they could not take the risk of a possible 
war with the Ottoman Sultan within this chaos. Ferdinand I send his envoys to 
Istanbul. The Hapsburg envoy Hieronymus Zara could convince the Grand Vizier 
and they agreed upon conditions of the peace in principle. According to the treaty, 
Ferdinand was going to secure his possessions in Hungary but would not interfere 
with the territories of Szápolyai; the frontier between their possessions would be 
drawn by the Ottoman will and Ferdinand would send an annual tribute of thirty 
thousand golds to Suleyman I. Therefore, the division of Hungary into two spheres of 
influence was accepted by the Habsburgs, and Ferdinand I became a vassal of the 
Ottoman Sultan. 260 
 As an experienced negotiator, Alvise Gritti did not loose the chance of 
participation in the negotiations between the delegation of Ferdinand and Ibrahim 
Pasha. In April 1533, Gritti arrived in Istanbul, in a short period he controlled the 
negotiations ad declared to the Habsburg delegation that the Sultan did not have any 
intention to dethrone János Szápolyai and to pass part of Hungary to Ferdinand 
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without the knowledge of the Hungarian King. Therefore, he belied the promises of 
the Grand Vizier given without the consent of himself and of the knowledge of the 
Sultan as well. In the following weeks, Ibrahim Pasha declared that the Beyoğlu, as 
the most competent figure in the Hungarian affairs would lead the negotiations in 
accordance with his orders.261 In the sessions the first act of Gritti was to protest the 
rumors that he was intending to seize the Hungarian throne by underlining the fact 
that if he had wanted such a thing, the Sultan would have appointed him as the 
Beylerbeyi but as a good Christian he abandoned his political ambitions only to 
secure the kingdom from a total Turkish invasion. Gritti very cleverly gave two 
messages; first he accentuated his power in the Porte but then he alerted the 
delegated that in case of the continuation of the chaos in Hungary, Suleyman I would 
take the kingdom under the direct control of state Hungary would become another 
Beylerbeylik of the Ottoman Empire.262 
 In the long lasting negotiations, Gritti became more enigmatic and double 
faced: with the diplomatic puns he bedevil the Habsburg and Hungarian delegates, 
gave them the promises which he did not have the authorization to realize. After 
having realized that Szápolyai was not going to possess the entire Hungarian 
territories, - he was also fully aware of the hostility of the Hungarian princes against 
him- he changed his side and in June 1533 he proposed the Habsburg delegates an 
inconceivable plan: the Habsburg forces in alliance with France and Venice would 
attack the Ottoman Empire. Gritti underlined the fact that the land army departed for 
Persia and the navy under the command of Barbaros Hayreddin Pasha was in Africa; 
thus the Empire could not resist the attack.263  While proposing a crusade against the 
Ottoman Empire, Gritti tried to convince the Habsburg envoy Cornelius Schepper by 
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a prophetic portent: he that in the sky of Istanbul, there had been seen two warriors 
speaking Latin and Turkish and the Latin one had shouted that the fortune that had 
been on the side of the Turks would soon move towards Christians.264 It is not 
evident whether Gritti really desired a crusade against the Ottoman Empire; however 
it can be argued that the Beyoğlu realized that he was loosing his power and 
influence both in Hungary265 and the Ottoman Empire and in order to secure his 
position he tried to be take support from the Habsburg side. On the other hand, he did 
not acquire a good reputation among the Habsburgs; his plan did not find acceptance 
and the rumors about his evil policies and two faced actions were verified once more.  
 The story of the sky warriors was not the only prophecy spreading in the 
Ottoman Empire. In the summer of 1533, the prophecies about the imminent 
destruction of the Ottoman Empire by the Christian power were spread from mouth 
to mouth and Alvise Gritti was at the center of one of these prophecies. The 
Habsburg envoy Shepper explain the current thought in the Ottoman Empire, which 
he heard from one of the agents of Gritti, as following: 
[…] how the empire of the Turks will be destroyed by a 
bastard, who will be the son of some prince, of tall stature and 
swarthy in complexion, a bastard who will have great 
authority with the Turks, and who will have them execute 
some exploit by means of which they will be destroyed. They 
are persuaded, without doubt, that is the Beyoglu that is 
Alvise Gritti, who is the son of the doge, swarthy in 
complexion, and such great prestige and authority with the 
Turks that he seems to dominate them.266  
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 In fact, Alvise Gritti had been already become a detested figure in the 
Ottoman political milieu. Especially with the commencement of the Persian 
Expedition and the departure of Ibrahim Pasha from Istanbul for the campaign in the 
fall of 1533 gave the opponents of Gritti an upper hand. Dragoman Yunus Bey had 
already turned back to him. Barbaros Hayreddin Pasha, wanting an active Ottoman 
struggle with the Habsburg forces in the Mediterranean rather than the diplomatic 
negotiations to solve the long lasting problem, worried that Suleyman I was being 
poisoned by Ibrahim Pasha and Alvise Gritti according to their selfish and evil 
desires and ambitions. Most importantly, he had lost the confidence of Suleyman I 
during the negotiations with the Habsburg envoys. In May 1534 it was understood 
that Gritti had conducted secret negotiations with Charles V without the consent of 
Suleyman I and Ibrahim Pasha by presenting him as the mediator for a peace treaty 
between Charles V and Suleyman I. This fact was revealed by Cornelius Schepper, 
the Habsburg envoy to Istanbul. The sultan replied the envoy with anger: “I have 
never charged him with any task in this matter. He was only charged with the 
Hungarian affairs, and that is all.”267 
 For that reason, in the absence of his fellow passenger Ibrahim Pasha, Gritti 
was deprived from the support in the Ottoman Empire and even his life was in 
danger. On the other hand, he was also near the brink of bankruptcy: He was not able 
to collect back the credits that he had provided the King János Szapolyai and other 
Hungarian princes. Moreover, one his greatest enemies, the chief of treasury, 
Defterdar Mahmud Çelebi demanded him to pay his revenues in coin rather than in 
kind such as jewels, silk or spices due to the state’s need of cash for the Persian 
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campaign. Gritti was forced to sell his golden and silver plates in order to pay his 
debt. 268 Moreover, he blocked Gritti to collect the annual tribute of Wallachia.269 
After having nominated to mark out the frontiers of Hungary and to reconcile 
Ferdinand and Szápolyai on be half of the Ottoman Sultan, he himself was also 
aware that this task could be the last office that he acquired from the Ottoman Sultan. 
On July 18, 1534, soon after the departure of Suleyman I to Persia, he hit the road of 
Buda: this would be his last curtain.  
 Alvise Gritti went through Transylvania on his way to Buda in order to settle 
a political dispute between the potentates. However, this chaos turned to him.270 The 
Transylvanian princes marched towards Gritti with their entire forces. Gritti and his 
companions which were composed of two thousand Janissaries took refuge the 
fortress of Medgyes. The fortress was besieged by forty thousand Hungarians. 
Neither Ferdinand, nor Szápolyai replies the shouts of Gritti for help. Moreover, the 
Ottoman forces situating in Hungary rejected to act without having an imperial order 
from the Sultan. After a siege of two months, Gritti fell into hands of his enemies. 
“He was beheaded, his heart was ripped out, his hands, fingers and feet were cut of 
and dispatched as souvenirs around Hungary.”271  
 The death of Gritti did not cause a great anger in the Ottoman Empire. 
Following the tragedy János Szápolyai was questioned by the Ottoman Sultan and 
Suleyman I demanded indemnity because of the negligence of the Hungarian King. 
Moreover, in September 1535, he sent Yunus Bey to investigate the death of Gritti. 
János Szápolyai was generally accused from the case. However, within a short 
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period, the tragedy of Gritti was forgotten. The meaning of accusing the Hungarian 
King would be coming into Suleyman I did not sacrifice his vassal for Alvise Gritti. 
Because of his uncontrolled activities he had already lost the confidence of the 
Ottoman Sultan, and most probably if he had reached Istanbul, his end would not 
have been different. After few than two years, the Ottoman Palace witnessed another 
murder: After having an ordinary diner with the Sultan Suleyman I, the Grand Vizier 
Ibrahim Pasha was stabbed and strangled on March 15, 1536. The legitimating of the 
murder was the claims of the Pasha to be the uncontrolled power; even a new Sultan 
replacing Suleyman I. Alvise Gritti and Ibrahim Pasha, two fellow-travelers, who 
had started to gain power simultaneously before a decade, also came to the end the 
way together: They were died in a similar way and a new era started in the Ottoman 
Empire. 
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CHAPTER V 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
All the world is a stage,  
And all the men and women merely Players. 
They haue their Exits and their Entrances;  
And one man in his time playes many parts...272 
 
 
 
Alvise Gritti is as one of the few Christians having a political career in the Ottoman 
Empire and he played a variety of roles in the European politics of the Empire from 
1526 to 1534. It would be inaccurate to argue that Alvise Gritti was the unique 
foreigner participated into the Ottoman political life; from his foundation, the 
Ottoman State benefited from the foreigners and placed them into the political life of 
the state in case of an acute need. These people generally served the state as 
dragomans or consultants. However, what makes Alvise Gritti as an important and 
interesting figure worth to analyze carefully is that although he was not trained in the 
devşirme system and secured his Christian identity and family connections, he 
reached such a high position within the Ottoman politics by acting a role of 
mediation between the Ottoman Empire and the European states.  
 Alvise Gritti appeared in the political stage of the Ottoman Empire in a period 
in which the Habsburg-Ottoman rivalry for the universal supremacy reached its peak. 
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As it was mentioned in details in the pervious chapters, although this rivalry seemed 
to be a power conflict of two greatest powers of the period, it was a political turmoil 
in which the other European States got involved. In fact these complicated 
circumstances of the period prepared the emergence and rise of Alvise Gritti. The 
Ottoman State needed an effective instrument that it would use in its international 
affairs as a consultant, a mediator, an agent and even a victim and it used this in the 
personality of Alvise Gritti. Alvise Gritti was also used by the other political agents 
of the time. Venice used his son as a good source of information and mediator 
between itself and the Ottoman administration. János Szápolyai utilized the Venetian 
as a mediator between himself and the Porte, a threatening factor in order to 
consolidate his authority in Hungary and a good economist to rebuild the royal 
finance. The Austrian archduke perceived Gritti as a good agent in the Ottoman 
Empire. Therefore while he was the “bastard son” of Doge and an ordinary wealthy 
merchant, Gritti became an international figure even an authority, with the name of 
Beyoğlu.    
 Apart from the political circumstances of his time, the personal talents of 
Alvise Gritti and the political and commercial networks that he controlled in Istanbul 
facilitated the rise of Alvise Gritti within the political milieu of the Ottoman Empire 
as well as in the international politics of the first half of the sixteenth century. Gritti 
was a well educated and adroit person and he was the son of the Doge of Venice 
which was one of the most important political actors of the period. These helped him 
in terms of having a good reputation. The role of Ibrahim Pasha, who answered the 
door of the Ottoman palace and political life to Gritti, could not be denied assuredly. 
After being the advisor of the Grand Vizier concerning relations with the European 
states, the star of Alvise Gritti ascended with a rattling rate and he became a key 
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figure in the Ottoman as well as the European politics of the period. He also gained 
the opportunity to lead a political career in Hungary and in short time of five years he 
undersigned several things to change the history of Hungary. 
 At this point, it can be argued that Alvise Gritti was one of the good examples 
of the “versatile personalities” of his time. As it was discussed thoroughly in the third 
chapter, according to the definition of Jacob Burckhardt, one of the most prominent 
historians of the Renaissance period in Europe, these people were the stereotypes of 
Renaissance who had different occupations besides their main professions. For 
example, the statesmen were generally the patrons of arts and humanists, the 
merchants and diplomats having the classical education of philosophy and literature 
and use these in the affairs of the daily life and contributed the outbreak and spread 
of the information. These “versatile” people were also universal in a sense; they 
could live anywhere that they could satisfy their desires. Most of the time, this 
versatility was fed by the desire of fame; thus the people usually engaged in complex 
and adventurous affairs that they did never realize their consequences before, and 
their acts brought about their deaths: The system in which they acted devoured them.  
In this context, the family structure and education based on the current Renaissance 
thought figured the personality of Alvise Gritti and besides his merchant identity, he 
developed a passion for fame and authority and different occupations to acquire them 
in respect of the tradition of his time. As it was mentioned before he undersigned a 
pamphlet about the Ottoman Empire, organized many festivals in which the classical 
plays were stages, patronized numerous artists and intellectuals. Moreover, used the 
politics and even wanted to be a part of it in order to realize his own desires.  
 Here it should be noted that this “versatility” was also seen in the 
personalities of the Renaissance princes and statesmen. These political figures 
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usually had different occupations besides the politics, for instance they were good 
poets or musicians, always patronized numerous artists and intellectuals, and used 
everyway to have success and fame as suggested the famous political philosopher 
Machiavelli. In this context, the political figures usually appeared as despots to 
consolidate their authorities in their dominions by suppressing the opposition centers 
in bureaucracy, the local authorities and the unrest in provinces. Moreover, they 
engaged in complex international politics in order to maintain the “balance”, even to 
manipulate it for their own benefits. The implementation of the state politics over the 
subjects and the maneuvers in the international politics based on the secret alliances 
and two faced diplomacy, proved the validity of this fact in European states system 
and the Ottoman Empire. The personalities of Sultan Suleyman I and Ibrahim Pasha 
also fit the definition of the “versatile personalities”. Although it is not accurate to 
define Suleyman I as a “Renaissance Prince” since he always secured his claim to be 
an Islamic Sultan, these two Ottoman figures also exemplified the general perception 
of the period. Especially Ibrahim Pasha, with his all acts and initiatives and the tools 
that he used to legitimate them, reflected well the zeitgeist. This similarity in their 
personalities caused the Grand Vizier, Sultan and Gritti to become closer to each 
other. Ibrahim Pasha was promoted unorthodoxly to the highest office of the 
Ottoman Porte and Alvise Gritti unorthodoxly intervened in the Ottoman politics as 
advisor due to his affinity to the Grand Vizier. These three “fellow travelers” did not 
only form the Ottoman politics, but also modified the European states system for 
almost a ten years period.  
 In this context, despite his invaluable consciousness of the political system of 
his time, the main failure of Alvise Gritti was that he did not realize to limit himself 
and when to stop. By analyzing his activities it can be argued that he had not thought 
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of establishing an authority neither in Ottoman State nor in Hungary. Alvise Gritti 
was really a clever person able to analyze the general political structure; he was well 
aware that the Ottoman Empire was not going to place him on the Hungarian throne; 
this would be rejected also by the rest of the political authorities having several 
claims on Hungary and the “Hungarian Question”. His main purpose was to become 
famous and strong and use this power in developing his trade network. Even in his 
final departure to Hungary, he was followed by many merchants. He would establish 
a route of commerce between Venice, Buda and Istanbul; therefore he could control 
the entire European trade. In order to achieve this purpose, he realized that he should 
also have a political authority and tried to acquire this via the mediation between the 
states. He realized too late that he was being used and since his activities which he 
had followed until that time faced strong reactions, he had to conduct enigmatic 
actions. He tried to maintain chaos by following hypocritical policy. He tried to 
become closer with each country in the middle of power struggle and tried to impose 
a belief that this chaos could only be solved by him, but he failed. He played a 
variety of roles on the stage of world, as Shakespeare another “Renaissance man” 
referred in one of his plays; but the curtain was closed for him in 1534. From then 
on, the decors, costumes, leading actors would change as well as the text and 
director…  
 In 1534 when Alvise Gritti was murdered by the Hungarian princes, almost 
no body sorrowed in real sense. János Szapolyai and Ferdinand I disposed the third 
candidate for the Hungarian throne for which they were both competing with each 
other. The Hungarian magnates opposing to the domination of any foreign power in 
Hungary that could threaten their own authorities get rid of the “serpent” aiming to 
commercialize the Hungarian territories to the Ottoman Sultan and Austrian 
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Archduke in order to maximize his benefits and to replace himself on the Hungarian 
throne by eliminating all local powers. The Republic of Venice took a deep breath 
because it would not be suspected anymore by the Habsburg Emperor and the 
Ottoman Sultan because of the uncontrolled acts of the son of the Doge The Ottoman 
statesmen applauded his murder because his life came to a bitter end before he 
destroyed the Ottoman State. The Ottoman Sultan Suleyman I, was himself also 
content from the situation. Gritti had abused the cognitions provided to him by the 
will of the Sultan himself; he had already started to serve his own personal interests 
rather than the Ottoman State and he became a threat before the implementation of 
the Ottoman plans in Hungary. In other words, he had been used as a tool for the 
great plans of the political powers of his time and when he was not instrumental to 
realize these plans anymore, he was abandoned by each of them. The same 
circumstance caused the death of his fellow-traveler Ibrahim Pasha. He was killed by 
the order of his old and close friend and patron Suleyman I because of his so-called 
assertion to have an authority beyond the Sultan whose signals were seen during the 
Persian Expedition. In short the desire of fame and authority caused the end of these 
two fellow-travelers: the system devoured its own children.  
The archival materials, several documents and biographies in addition to the 
secondary material on Alvise Gritti help researchers and readers to understand the 
general portrait of Alvise Gritti and from the perspective the Ottoman-European 
relations in sixteenth century. However there are still there are unanswered questions 
about the life of Alvise Gritti, his political activities and the general political 
atmosphere of the period. The personal relation between Ottoman Sultan Suleyman I 
and Alvise Gritti is still an important area of research. Western sources claim that the 
Sultan often visited him in his palace to consult the state affairs and participated in 
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the festivals organized by Gritti. Despite it seems exaggerated and has not supported 
by the Ottoman sources, concerning the roles of Alvise Gritti that he undertook by 
the will and favor of the Sultan, this argument is worth to be analyzed. Moreover, the 
Venetian representatives perceived Alvise Gritti as the second most important person 
in the Ottoman bureaucracy after the Grand Vizier Ibrahim Pasha but it is not clear 
either that Alvise Gritti had a part of the formulation of the Ottoman politics.  
Another area open to further research is whether Alvise Gritti took any part on 
domestic and foreign relations of the Ottoman State apart from the “Hungarian 
Question”. Last but not least the details about his death are not totally revealed. It is 
still obscure whether Suleyman I or the other Ottoman statesmen had a role in his 
death.    
 In conclusion, the further research based on the new documents and 
interpretations which will be conducted on Alvise Gritti, his life and activities will 
have invaluable contribution to the interpretation the Gritti phenomenon and the 
relations between the European states and the Ottoman Empire more accurately. At 
this point it is considered that the comprehensive research conducted in the Ottoman 
archives, which have a secondary place in most of the present works will reveal new 
information about the subject which will provide a strong basis to have a most 
comprehensive analysis.   
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